THE THOUSAND- YEAR REICH
John Laughland on the common themes of Nazi and modern German aspirations for Europe
Paris MR Hans Dietrich Genscher is an honour- able man. The German foreign minister's indefatigable niceness to everyone goes under the name of 'Europe': 'The Ger- mans have never been as European as they are today,' he says. The soubriquet `Europe' is intended to indicate a new German co-operativeness, a rejection of the disastrous 'special path' she used to pursue.
Unfortunately, in speaking the language of Europe, Mr Genscher is not, as he likes to think, distancing himself from Ger- many's violent past. In particular, the Nazis were cynical enough to deck their aggression in European colours, as a perus- al of wartime German newspapers quickly reveals. Headlines like 'In the Name of Europe', The Struggle for a United Europe' and even 'Europe's Lebensraum' were common. The alliance with Italy and the countries of the East enabled the Nazis to think of themselves as pan-Europeans, organising 'European youth conferences' and the like.
Just propaganda, of course: yet the debate about the 'new European order' which was to follow the German victory was sophisticated enough to be taken seriously. In 1942, for instance, the Berlin Union of Businessmen and Industrialists organised a colloquium entitled 'The Euro- pean Economic Community' and the inau- gural lecture was delivered by the Reichs- minister for Economics, Walther Funk. Stressing the need to control inflation and outlining plans for a social market eco- nomy (`the peoples of Europe will rightly demand a sense of social responsibility from their leaders'), Funk emphasised the role economic union would play in consoli- dating political union in Europe: 'A stron- ger sense of economic solidarity must be fostered among the peoples of Europe by means of co-operation in all areas of economic policy.' The Reichsminister for Agriculture, Walter Darre, agreed, arguing that a strong economic union at the centre of Europe would act as a stabilising centre of gravity, enabling 'other countries to gather round it of their own accord in a balanced economic relationship.' The importance of economic union as a means of accelerating political union had been recognised since the 19th century, especially by the economist Friedrich List. According to him, economic power could be used to undermine the political inde- pendence of other countries. Prussia had been able to unify Germany in her own image first by using her pre-eminent eco- nomic position to dictate the terms of the Zollverein (Customs Union), and then by grouping the North German Federation around her (in a kind of two-speed Ger- many), safe in the knowledge that the initially reluctant Southern States would tag along in the end if she took the initiative.
The Nazis wanted to organise the new European economy along German lines, basing it around the pre-eminent position of the Reichsmark, with the financial capital of Europe in Berlin. This, they felt, would overcome the '19th-century policy of the balance of power' which the Great Powers outside central Europe (Britain, France, Russia, Turkey) had practised to Europe's and Germany's detriment. This was exacerbated by the very 'system of nation states' itself, and Goebbels be- moaned the rivalry between the nations of Europe which had prevented it from uni- fying in the past, attacking Churchill for being un-European and insular. Often the Nazis stressed that Germany's fate was inseparable from that of Europe. 'Ger- many has always been the homeland of Europe. We cannot turn our backs on Europe. Germany, the heart of Europe, must be concerned for the whole of Europe, if it wishes to live. We want at all costs to make the principle of common sacrifice for the common good the corner- stone of the new European constitution.'
This recalls the propaganda of first world war Germany, too. The wartime Chancel- lor, Bethmann-Hollweg, also demanded an end to the balance of power, and the label he gave to his disastrous bid for power was `Mitteleuropa'. A confederation of states based on an alliance with Austria (and possibly also France) was proposed as the way to strengthen Central Europe and ensure peace.
It is enough to make us raise our eyebrows, then, when Chancellor Kohl talks of 'the definitive rejection of the 19th-century order in Europe . . . the struggle to achieve a balance of power has been superseded'. Furthermore, he and Genscher have fallen into the old trap of straightforwardly identifying Germany's fate with that of Europe, such as when he resurrected an old motif from the 1840s, the flowing of the Rhine, to describe the inevitability of German and European unification. Elsewhere, they have been described as 'two sides of the same coin'. This is a long-term trend: German policy- makers long referred to the need to 'over- come the division of Europe', rather than the need to rid the East of communism, and this gives the impression that the Americans are as much a part of the problem as the Russians. Genscher repe- atedly stresses Germany's position 'in the heart of Europe', saying 'Germany's des- tiny is embedded in Europe. Not only our history but also our geographical position gives us a special responsibility for the future of Europe'. Indeed. Germany's central position gives her a central role, even a 'mission': 'We Germans can be the architects of a united and indivisible Europe.'
It has never been difficult for the Ger- mans to identify with Europe. With her religious and political fragmentation and her unclear frontiers, Germany resembles Europe. It is a mistake to think of the Germans as inveterate nationalists; they have seldom had much affection for the nation-state. A provincial country with no real capital city, the Germans often feel more cosmopolitan or universalist than nationalist. Thomas Mann remarked on the Germans' boundlessness, their Wan- derlust. The most potent political models in Germany, whether the barbarity of racial- ism, the romantic attachment to the ram- shackle pan-European Holy Roman Empire, or the good Europeanism of our own day, have been international. One often hears Germans saying, 'I am not German, I am really a citizen of the world.'
Thomas Mann identified another Ger- man fault: their unpolitical nature. Imbued with Idealist philosophy, which was born out of a rejection of British empiricism, they have a tendency to believe that reality can be determined by the perceiver. When Genscher addresses the problem of Ger- many's pre-eminent economic power, he writes, `I think our neighbours ought to overcome the tendency to think in terms of nation-states' as if the problem will go away if we cease to think of Germany as a country. Elsewhere, he writes, 'our ac- tions, and above all our thinking are of special importance for the fate of the whole continent' as if any action is good so long as it is motivated by a good will, a very mistaken doctrine in international rela- tions.
It is impossible to say whether there is a secret agenda behind the plans for Econo- mic and Monetary Union, but it is strange that the Bundestag has determined that the `independent' European Central Bank should be in Frankfurt. Whenever Mr Genscher speaks in France, he emphasises that in the united Europe, the Franco- German axis (the 'partnership of destiny') will take the lead, although this idea is understandably played down in Britain. Plans for a two-speed EMU and a Europe of 'concentric circles' based around an inner core are the common currency of thinking in Bonn, and if this is the out- come, it might look very much like the realisation of Germany's long-standing aim to escape from the perceived vulnerability of her position in the middle of Europe by gathering around her a clutch of alliances. As Bismarck said, `I have always found the word 'Europe' on the lips of those who wanted something from other Powers which they dared not demand in their own name.'
The point is not that this is necessarily more evil than bids for power by other countries. Britain, after all, used to know a thing or two about hegemony. The ques- tion is, can it work? 'Europe' can be the watchword of dictatorships and democra- cies alike, it is a dubious candidate as a political principle. What is needed are arrangements which will enable the inevit- able disunity and disagreement between states to be resolved: in short, a policy of balance. Mr Genscher's `European con- sciousness' will not make these problems go away. for they are of a more stubborn nature. As Clemenceau said of the Ger- mans after the Treaty of Versailles, 'You know, there are still twenty million too many.'
John Laughland is a Lecturer in Politics at the Sorbonne.
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