THE YANQUIS ARE COMING

Christopher Hitchens assesses

the chances of America invading Nicaragua

Managua/Washington DC 'OF THE people who were cheering you today,' I inquired of a Sandinista friend on May Day this year, 'how many do you think would applaud as you were led to the scaffold?' He did not seem to take the question amiss, and after pondering for a moment replied, rather impressively I thought, that he doubted it could be more than 25 per cent.

The Sandinistas' attitude to violence is not as promiscuous as their enemies make out. The decision to resume armed struggle against the Somoza dynasty was not taken lightly, and involved a protracted debate. In matters like accepting arms from the Soviet Union, or giving them to the Sal- vadorean rebels, great circumspection is displayed. But behind every argument, whether it is tactical or strategic, lies one bedrock conviction. Sooner or later, it will come to a war with the United States. The Sandinista anthem contains the lines, 'We fight against the Yanquis, The enemies of humanity', and for the veterans of the movement this is a war that has been going for more than half a century. The murder of Sandino was the worst defeat, the overthrow of Somoza the greatest victory. But the real showdown is yet to come.

Certain decisions have been taken in

advance. It has been resolved not to abandon Managua and make for the hills, but to turn the capital into 'a tomb of imperialism', to emerge from the ruins and to begin guerrilla warfare. The nine-man directorate has taken a collective vow not to surrender, but to force an invader to kill them. In the words of Sandino's famous telegram to Captain G. D. Hatfield of the United States Marine Corps in July 1927, `No me rendire y aqui los espero. In other words, come and get me.

It is beginning to look as if, in the shape of the Reagan administration, the Sandi- nistas have found somebody to take them up on it. Just as Congress was deciding to oppose aid to the Contras., administration spokesmen began to discuss military in- tervention in a much more specific and detailed way than heretofore. Partly, this was a gambit, as if to say to Congress that a vote against the Contras was a vote for the only other alternative. But partly it was a revelation of official thinking. As the White House put it in a letter sent to two congressional committees, 'direct applica- tion of US military force' has been ruled out 'for now', but this course 'must realisti- cally be recognised as an eventual option, given our stakes in the region, if other policy alternatives fail.'

The weathervane in these matters is usually the portly figure of George P. Shultz, Secretary of State. In the debased argot of the White House press corps, he counts as 'a moderate' because of his discretion about ideological questions, his distrust of military solutions and his long and skilful 'turf war' against the feline influence of Ms Jeane Kirkpatrick. Speak- ing to the American Bar Association on 23 May, Shultz told his hearers that the fainthearts in Congress 'are hastening the day when the threat will grow, and we will be faced with an agonising choice about the use of American combat troops'. In this, Shultz was supported by Fred Ikle, one of the principal intellectual hardliners at the Pentagon, who ridiculed the current 'policy of pinpricks' and asked: 'What are you going to do two or three years from now, when Nicaragua is fully armed? Are you going to provoke another Cuban missile crisis?'

These arguments succeeded in their im- mediate purpose, which was to make Con- gress vote for aid to the Contras as a more 'moderate' alternative to invasion. But why should the salami-slicer stop here? The aim of the Contras is to remove the government of Nicaragua. If they find that they cannot do this by guerrilla means, then does the Shultz/Ikle logic not still hold? As Senator Mark Hatfield, a Repub- lican from Oregon, said in the Senate on 6 June: When we create the image of a threat to America by this little Central American republic today, we are also creating a respon- sibility that will ultimately be ours to destroy it. And if the forces that are operating there today cannot demonstrate capability to des- troy it then we have no other option but to introduce our own forces to "destroy this great threat to the American republic".

If you will the end, you will the means. And one can count off the options quite easily. The Sandinistas will not dissolve their regime to oblige Mr Reagan. The economic sanctions, which affect mainly the middle and trading classes, will not cripple them. The Contras have consider- able nuisance value, but it is almost im- possible to imagine them fighting their way down to Managua and rallying support as they come. Like the animals on the famous farm, the Nicaraguans are united on at least one point. They don't want Jones back.

What, then? I can only pass on what George Shultz told Zbigniew Brzezinski at a luncheon where he fondly imagined that he was off the record. The 'plan', in its present form, is this. Nicaragua will be blockaded on both its Atlantic and Pacific coasts. A very large contingent will drop onto Managua from the air, comprising as many disaffected Nicaraguans as possible but consising in the main of American special forces. The aim will be to capture as many of the Sandinista leadership as is feasible, to 'neutralise' the remainder and to hope that many average Managuans will greet the new arrivals with relief. Congress would almost certainly stipulate, as it did with Lebanon, that American troops could stay no more than 90 days under the War Powers Act. So, within 90 days, the United States would have had to emplace a pro- visional government, and turn the job of 'mopping up' over to its Nicaraguan substi- tutes. The Cubans and Russians, it is assumed, would gnash their teeth and no more. The last assumption is probably correct. But quite a number of other risks would attend the operation, even if it were a success. American relations with the rest of the hemisphere, including countries like Brazil and Mexico, would take perhaps a generation to repair. The United States' position at the United Nations, which has been gaining in strength over the last few years, would be eroded overnight. The corollary of that would be a vast, free propaganda holiday for the Soviet Union all around the globe, and the end of her isolation over Afghanistan. In addition, the joint chiefs of staff are said to be unkeen, the Congress is frankly nervous, and public opinion by all measurements is opposed.

The chin-pullers and pipe-suckers are, in their large majority, convinced that wiser counsels will prevail. Who am I to doubt the wisdom of the CP and PS faction? It is certainly hard to imagine the United States doing anything so rash or potentially dis- astrous. But, as the second term inches along, it is equally hard to imagine the Reaganites doing the only other thing, which is admitting defeat. Time and again, they have announced that there will not be another Cuba in the hemisphere, or, as they keep putting it, 'not on our watch'. And, as Mr Ikle said recently of the Sandinistas, 'They are hellbent on pursuing their policy. The idea that you can strike a deal with them seems unrealistic.'

The worst nightmare of the Republicans is not foreign but domestic. Suppose that the Democrats come up with a candidate in 1988 who will do to them what Kennedy did in 1960 and attack them from the right? Kennedy denounced Eisenhower's laxity in allowing a 'missile gap' to develop, and I can just imagine Mario Cuomo saying solemnly that the White House has been all talk and no action in Central America. The only insurance against this dread outcome would be for the White House to do now what Kennedy did at the Bay of Pigs only this time, no more Mr Nice Guy.

The preparations for an invasion of Nicaragua are all in place. General Paul F.

Gorman of southern command has at his disposal a brand-new network of airstrips in Honduras and Costa Rica, a fleet of landing craft, a large force of specially trained troops and a tremendous advan- tage in supply lines, rear bases and en- gineers. By last February at the latest, the

entire equipe was ready and had rehearsed air and amphibious landings at least once.

What is that sound from south of the border? It is the sound of unblooded young officers singing 'Why are we waiting?'

Public and political opinion could prob- ably be made to go along if the casualties were light and the pretext was good enough. The best way to get popular support for a war, history shows, is to start one. Here, I offer the comments of 'a

senior Costa Rican official', reported last week in the New York Times. He said that,

'in the event of an invasion, his govern- ment would probably issue a statement blaming the Sandinistas for provoking it.' As in the case of Grenada, anything that smacks of an invitation to invade would do much to allay public disquiet. Everybody feels more comfortable with an invitation. And to defend plucky little Costa Rica. . . .

Public opinion, anyway, may not be as soggy and wimpish as the CP and PS faction fondly supposes. The movie of the moment, eclipsing all rivals at the box office, is Rambo, in which Sylvester Stal- lone, not content to wipe out the shame of Vietnam, wipes out a good proportion of its population as well. Audiences erupt when John Rambo, being briefed for his death-affirming mission, breaks in to say, 'Sir — do we get to win this time?' I attended in the company of my friend Mr Minh, proprietor of Washington's finest Vietnamese restaurant and a man who left Hanoi in 1954. Mr Minh is not a commun- ist. He watched the film raptly and said he was half-amused, half-appalled and very worried about Nicaragua.

The ancient Greeks had a saying to the effect that the sword attracts the hand. American soldiers prefer to say that if it can be done, it will be done. I wouldn't be so alarmist as to predict an invasion of Nicaragua. But I would say that all things press towards the event.