THE DREAMS OF MR. MOREL.
[To THE EDITOR OP THE "SPECTATOR."' SIR,—If it were merely a matter of a difference of opinion between the Spectator and myself I would not trouble you with a comment upon your review of " Morocco in Diplomacy." The great majority of your readers would doubtless accept your view; I should probably go on dreaming and we should all live happy ever afterwards. But do you really think that my criticism of the "acceptance of national liabilities towards Foreign Powers by secret commit- ments withheld from the British nation" is met by your retort : " There has never been any secrecy as to the object of our ententes with France and Russia " P The passage quoted applies not to the ententes—i.e., to the public arrangements which collectively go by that name. It applies to the secret arrangements negotiated in 1904 with regard to Morocco, the nature of which the British people were only informed of in November 1911, after their publica- tion in Parisian newspapers. Do you consider it right that the British people should have to consult the columns or foreign newspapers in order to be informed of the national liabilities undertalcen by their own Foreign Office P The secret Franco-Spanish Convention of October 1904, submitted to and approved by Lord Lansdowne, and its complement, the secret Articles of the Anglo-French Declaration of the precedent April, committed—or were so interpreted by the Foreign Office—this country to approval and support of a Franco- Spanish partition of Morocco—now accomplished, but only after• immense risks run by us. The public in both countries which supported the Anglo-French public declaration had no knowledge of them. There was a public entente on the Morocco question approved by both peoples. Behind it were secret liabilities approved by neither. To suggest that these secret arrangements made for peace is to fly in the face of the most patent evidence to the contrary. They made for war. Why?
For the simple reason that they sought to ostracize from any voice in the settlement of the Morocco problem a Power which possessed unquestioned rights in Morocco : by virtue of material interests which had been steadily growing since the 'seventies ; by virtue of a treaty with Morocco and repre- sentation at the Sultan's Court, by virtue of participation in the first international conference held in regard to Morocco; by virtue of her numerous consular agencies, post-offices, and various enterprises established in Morocco. Germany tried to break through that secret ring fence in 1905, and she so far succeeded that a second international conference was held proclaiming the independence and integrity of Morocco. On the strength of that a diplomacy making for peace and on good terms with France would have used all its influence to prevent the Act of Algeciras being treated as waste paper without a preliminary owderstanding with Germany. It would have put a price upon its support of France acquiring what the Act of Algeciras did not give her, viz., protectorate powers over Morocco, and that price would have been a Franco-German understanding. That was what a diplomacy working for peace had the power to do. That is what the diplomacy I criticise not only did not do, but went to the extremist lengths in backing the elements in France which, despite repeated resolutions voted by the French Chamber, had got the upper hand and were determined to march to a precipitate absorption of Morocco over Germany's toes.
One would really think from reading your review that I was a sort of amiable maniac weaving webs of my own imagina- tion, instead of a humble recorder of unpopular but incon- testable facts which are not disposed of by generalities. The vicious character of these secret arrangements of 1904— vicious in the sense that they made international discord inevitable—is fully recognized by French statesmen who have the honesty and the courage to face facts. As M. Ribot said in the Senate last December : "In 1904 a treaty was signed—a secret treaty—whose clauses we have only recently learned. . . . It was a treaty of partition, and has created differences which are not yet all cleared away." Baron d'Estournelles de Constant was even more frank on the same occasion :-
" Why [he said] was the French Parliament told only half the truth when it was asked to pass its opinion upon an arrangement with England P . . . It is this double game towards Parliament and towards the world which becomes morally an abuse of truet."
After referring to the Anglo-French public declaration he went on to say :— " But the public was ignorant that at the same time, by other treaties and by contradictory clauses hidden from it, the partition of Morocco between France and Spain was prepared—of that Morocco of which we guaranteed the integrity. There existed two irreconcilable French policies in Morocco—that of public arrangements, that is to say, a policy of integrity which was not the true one, and that of secret arrangements postulating a pro- tectorate and a partition of Morocco."
My plea is that a dishonest policy does not pay and that the secret policy of 1904 was a dishonest policy. What bas the
British national interest gained from it P You would be hard put to say. The Foreign Office exists, like every other Department of the State, to serve the national interest. It is not a sacrosanct institution outside all national control—at least that robe is not one which can be tolerated very much longer with safety. No one supposes that diplomatic negotiations can be carried out in the market square, and no one has ever put forward so ridiculous a contention. But that
is not the point. It is merely caricaturing my book to say that my idea is that " Germany can do no wrong and that the policy of every Power must be judged to the extent to which it recognizes this cardinal truth." My object was much less ambitious. It was to show that the avalanche of criticism directed against Germany on one particular issue, which more than any other particular issue has embittered Anglo-German relations, was based upon inaccurate and incomplete data, and hence was unjust and foolish. That contention, backed by documentary evidence, has not been met.
As to your last question, I should reply to it with a negative. But I do not admit the assumption which underlies it. It would be just as inconvenient to us, perhaps more so in the long run, if France and Russia crushed Germany.—I am, Sir, [Mr. Morel thinks himself a better and more competent judge of the value of his book than we are. Conceivably he is right ; but if his view is insisted on, and we are not to be allowed to express our honest opinion on a political work unless it is also the view held by the author, criticism becomes a farce. The suggestion that France and Russia want to crush Germany is preposterous rubbish. What they want is
to be let alone—i.e., to maintain the status quo. No doubt
that may be disagreeable to Germany, and may even from her point of view be regarded. as inconsistent with her right to a
place in the sun; but to pretend that there is a con- spiracy to crush or even to "hem in" should have been impossible to any observer of the facts.—ED. Spectator.]
Previous page
