THE ANNIVERSARY OF PLASSEY.
TO-MORROW is the anniversary of the battle of Plessey, the battle which secured their Empire in India to the British people. The best-known story of the battle is that in Macaulay's famous essay ; but much to be preferred to Macaulay's account, vigorous and picturesque as it is, is the description of the engagement on which he chiefly relied.—that to be found in Orme's " History of the Mili- tary Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan." There Orme, iu his majestic, unaffected style, one of the noblest vehicles for historical description in English literature, gives in considerable detail the history of the campaign, and the events which led up to and concluded it. As a rule, a hundred and fifty years after their publication nooks, like men, find their own level. Both the men and the books secure the position in the world's estimate which they deserve. There are, however, certain exceptions, and Orme is one of them. His Indian history is one of the really great books in our literature, and yet it has never received the recognition it deserves. Orme was a surgeon in the service of the East India Company, and was cognisant of the events which he describes at first, not at second, band. It is not unfair to compare him to Thucydides, either in regard to his presentation of facts or Lie grasp of style. The pages in which Orme describes the tragedy of the Black Hole are, we venture to assert, unsur- passed and unsurpassable in historical literature.
The best anniversary memorial that we can offer our readers of the battle of Plessey is to quote the salient passages from Orme. We must pass over his . description of the Council of War which Clive summoned, not on the night before Plessey, but on the night before he marched to the field of Plessey. We may quote, however, the characteristic sentences in which Orme generalises on Councils of War :—
, "It is very rare that a council of war decides for battle ; for as the commander never consults his officers in this authintic form, but when great difficulties are to be surmounted, the general communication increases the sense of risque and danger which every one brings with him to the consultation. Thirteen officers were against, and only seven voted for immediate action. The sanction of this council in no wise alleviated the anxieties of Clive ; for, as soon as it broke up, he 'retired alone into the adjoining grove, where he remained near an hour in deep medita- tion, which convinced him of the absurdity of stopping where he was ; and acting, now entirely from himself, he gave orders, on his return to his quarters, that the army should cross the river the next morning."
The pages which succeed this admirable disquisition describe the march of the troops to Plessey, and certain communi- cations with Meer jeffier, the general of Surajah Dowlah, who, it may be remembered, had promised to go over to Clive with his cavalry. Orme next takes us to the army of the Nabob, which Clive found posted about a mile away from his own position at Plessey. He describes the moral condition of the Oriental despot's camp in a passage worthy of Tacitus "The despondency of the Nabob increased as the hour of danger approached. Sitting in his tent in the evening of his arrival at the oamp, it chanced that his attendants quitted him one after another in order to say their usual prayers at sunset, until they left him quite alone; when a common fellow, either through ignorance, or with an intention to steal, entered the tent unperceived, until he was discovered by the Nabob ; who starting from the gloomy reflections in which he was absorbed, hastily recalled his attendants with this emphatic exclamation : 'Sure they see me dead!"' How striking is the way in which Orme conveys to ns the manner in which the tyrant is always haunted by the fear of desertion in an hour of peril.
Orme goes on to describe the grove of Plessey, and certain marked characteristics of the place which was to be the battlefield. After this follows the main description of the opening of the battle, which we cannot do better than quote verbatim, asking our readers at the same time to turn to their Macaulay and to observe how the great essayist used the material pieced at his service by the earlier historian. Admirers as we are of Macaulay's style and genius, it is •im- possible to admit that he improved on his model. Note the picturesqueness, and also energy, of Orme's simple yet vivid phrase, "and behind each cannon walked an elephant":— "At day-break, the enemy's army issuing from many different openings of the camp, began to advance towards the grove ; 50,000 foot, 18,000 horse, and 50 pieces of cannon. The greatest part of the footwere armed with matchlocks, the rest with various arms, pikes, swords, arrows, rockets. The cavalry, both men and horses, drawn from the northern regions, were much stouter than any which serve in the armies of Coromandel. The cannon were mostly of the largest calibres, 24 and 82. pounders ; and these were mounted on the middle of a large stage, raised six feet from the ground, carrying besides the cannon, all the ammunition belonging to it, and the gunners themselves who managed the cannon, on the stage itself. These machines were drawn by 90 or 50 yoke of white oxen, of the largest size, bred in the country of Purace ; and behind each cannon walked an elephant, trained to assist at difficult tugs, by shoving with his forehead against the hinder part of the carriage. The infantry and cavalry marched in many separate and compact bodies. Forty vagabond Frenchmen, under the command of one Sinfray, appeared at the larger tank, that nearest the grove, with four pieces of light cannon. Two larger pieces advanced, and halted on a line with this tank, close to the bank of the river. Behind these posts 5,000 horse and 7,000 foot took their station under the command of Meer Murdeen, and the son of Moonlol. The rest of the army in large columns of horse and foot extended in a curve from the left of the hillock near their camp, to the ground about 800 yards east of the southern angle of 'the grove of Plessey; and in this part were the troops of Meer Jaffier, Boydoolub and Lattee. In all the openings between the columns were interspersed the artillery, two, three and four pieces together. Colonel Clive, viewing the enemy's array from the top of the hunting-house, was surprised at their numbers, as well as the splendor and confidence of their array ; but judging that if his own troops remained in the grove, the enemy would impute the caution to fear, and grow bolder, he drew them up in a line with the hunting-house, and facing to the nearest tank. They were 900 Europeans, of whom 100 were artillery-men, and 50 were sailors; 100 Topasses, and 2,100 Sepoys; the artillery were eight field- pieces, all six-pounders, and two howitzers ; the Topasses were blended in the battalion with the Europeans, the sailors assisted the artillery-men. The battalion with three field-pieces on the right, ancIthe same number on their left were In the centre; on the right and left of which extended the Sepoye in two equal divisions. The other two field-pieces and the howitzers were advanced 200yards in front of the left division of Sepoys, and posted behind two brick-kilns. This line' extended 600 yards beyond the right of the grove; but the distance of the enemy in, this quarter, prevented any danger of their falling upon the flank before whatsoever troops were ordered could fall back, and range along the east side of the grove. The first shot was fired by the enemy, at eight o'clock, from the tank; it killed one and wounded another of the grenadier company, which was posted on the right of the battalion. This, as a signal, was followed by the continual fire of the rest of the Nabob's artillery on the plain. But most of their shot flew too high. The two advanced field-pieces answered the fire from the tank, and those with the battalion acted against the different divisions of heavy artillery on the plain ; but firing out of the reach of point-blank shot, hit none of the enemy's guns; nevertheless, every shot took place, either in one or other of the bodies of infantry or cavalry. But ten for one killed, was no advantage in such a disparity of numbers, and in half an hour the English lost 10 Europeans and 20 Sepoys ; on which Colonel Clive ordered the whole army to retire into the grove. The enemy, elated by this retreat, advanced their heavy artillery nearer, and fired with greater vivacity than before ; but their shot only struck the trees; for the troops were ordered to sit down, whilst the field-pieceselone answered the enemy's cannon from behind the bank. Explosions of powder were frequently observed amongst their artillery. At eleven o'clock Colonel Clive consulted his officers at the drum head ; and it was resolved to maintain the cannonade during the day, but at midnight to attack the Nabob's camp. About noon a very heavy shower covered the plain, and very soon damaged the enemy's powder so much, that their fire slackened centime- ally ; but the English ammunition served on. The Nabob had remained in hie tent out of the reach of danger, continually flattered by his attendants and officers, of whom one half were traitors, with assurances of victory; but about noon he was informed that Meer Murdeen, the best and most faithful of his generals, was mortally wounded by a cannon-ball. The misfortune disturbed him to excess ; he immediately sent for Meer Jaffier; and as soon as he entered thetent, flung his turband on the ground, saying ‘Jaffier, that turband you must defend.' ' The other bowed, and with his bands on his breast, promised his utmost services ; and returning to his troops and associates immediately dispatched a letter to Colonel Clive, informing him of what had passed. and advising him either to push forward in the instant, or at all events, to attack the Nabob's camp at three the next morning; but the messenger was afraid to proceed whilst the firing continued. In the meantime, the terrors of the Nabob increased continually ; Roydoolub taking advantage of them, counselled him to return to his capital; his advice prevailed and the Nabob ordered the army to retreat into the entrench- ments."
We cannot, unfortunately, find space to quote Orme's account of the retreat, or the advance of the English troops, or of the way in which Meer Taffier's cavalry, when they finally came over, were at first mistaken for the enemy. The final passage, however, must be given verbatim :— " Thus the whole of the English army entered the camp at five o'clock, without other obstacle than what they met from tents, artillery, baggage, and stores, dispersed around them, and abandoned by an army which out-numbered them ten to one, and were flying before them on all sides in the utmost con- fusion. The cause of this sudden panic was the flight of the Nabob, who hearing that Meer Jaffier remained inactive on the plain, and that the English were advancing to storm his camp, mounted a camel, and fled at the utmost pace of the animal, accompanied by about 2,000 horsemen. The victory was decided, and was confirmed by the arrival of the messenger with the letter sent by Meer Jaffier at noon ; soon after came another, whom Colonel Clive immediately returned with a note, requesting Meer Jaffier to meet him the next morning at Daudpore."
The account of the meeting between Clive and Meer Jaffier next day at Dandpore is as follows ,—
" On entering the English camp, he alighted from his elephant, and the guard drew out, and rested their arms, to- receive him with the usual honours. Not knowing the meaning of this com- pliment, he started back, as if he thought it a preparation to his destruction ; but Colonel Clive advancing hastily, embraced and saluted him Nabob of Henget, Behar and Criss, which removed his fears. They conferred about an hour, he making some apologies, and the Colonel no reproaches ; but advised him to proceed immediately to the city, and not to suffer Surajah newish to escape nor his treasures to be plundered."
Those who have followed our quotations from Orme will do well to turn to the original and read the account of how the Nabob, Surajah Dowlah, fled from his capital in a boat and how Meer Tallier occupied his palace. We must find space for the conference between Meer Jaffier, Clive, and the other persons concerned in the Treaty made before the war as to the disposition of Surajah Dowlah's wealth and territory. It is here that we get the account of Clive's disillusionment of the double traitor and blackmailer °midland The conference being ended, Clive and Scrafton went towards Ornichund, who was waiting in full assurance of hearing the glad tidings of his good fortune; when Clive said: ' It is now time to undeceive Omichund;' on which Scrafton said to him in the Indostan language: Omichund, the red paper is a trick; you are to have nothing.' These words overpowered him like a blast of sulphur; he sank back fainting, and would have fallen to the ground, had not one of his attendants caught him in his arms ; they carried him to his palankin, in which they conveyed him to his house, where ho remained many hours in stupid melancholy, and began to show some symptoms of insanity. Some days after, he visited Colonel Clive, who advised him to make a pilgrimage to some pagoda; which he accordingly did soon after, to a famous one near Maulda; he went, and returned insane, his mind every day more and more approaching to idiotism; and, contrary to the usual manners of old age in Indostan, still more to the former excellence of his understanding, he delighted in being continually dressed in the richest garments, and orna- mented with the moat costly jewels. In this state of im- becility, he died about a year and a half after the shock of his disappointment. Grounded on his importance, by knowing the secret, he held out the terror of betraying it, to secure his own advantages. Whether he would have be- trayed it, if refused, is uncertain ; for part of his fortune was in the power of the English, and he had the utmost vengeance of Jaffier and his confederates to fear. However, the experiment was not to be tried. But, on the other band, as his tales and artifices prevented Surajah Dowlah from believing the repre- sentations of his most trusty servants, who early suspected, and at length were convinced that the English were confederated with Jaffier, the 2,000,000 of rupees he expected should have been paid to him, and he left to enjoy them in oblivion and contempt."
With this verdict on the Omichnnd incident we must conclude
our excerpts from Orme. Those readers who are willing and able to take our advice to turn to Ot me's own pages— not, we regret to say, too easy a task, as Orme has never been reprinted, and must he read in the fine original quarto— should not fail to note the account of Surajah Dowlah's ond. It is like a page from Suetonins.
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