TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE NEEDS OF THE NAVY.
THOUGH we deem an efficient Army a national necessity, 1 and have given, and shall give, our strongest support to Mr. Brodrick's scheme because we believe it makes for efficiency, we have never doubted for a moment that the supreme force, defensive and offensive, of the nation must always be the Fleet. It is no flourish of rhetoric to say with the Naval Discipline Act that "under God" it is on the Fleet that the safety and welfare of these realms chiefly depend. Without the Fleet we and our commerce, and our lives and homes, and, even our Army, are but tinkling brass and sounding cymbals. Not only does the Fleet keep out invaders, and bind the Empire together, but it alone enables us to make our policy effective throughout the world. As Bacon said, sea-power is an "abridgment of Empire,"—that is, the essence of Empire. Therefore, to keep the Fleet powerful and effective must be the first duty of every Englishman, Scotchman, and Irishman,— the one thing he dare not neglect. It may be, and is, folly to neglect the Army. To neglect the Fleet is utter ruin. But though we feel this in a way which cannot be over- stated, we must protest against a mistaken and unintelli- gent movement which has been gathering strength in the last few weeks,—amovement directed against Mr. Brodrick's scheme of Army reform in the supposed interests of the Navy. Mr. Winston Churchill has, we regret to see, made himself the leader of this movement, and has allowed him- self to use language which, whether intended or not, will be sure to be taken to mean that support of Mr. Brodrick-'s scheme of Army reform involves the neglect of the Navy. If this were really so, and if the new Army scheme necessi- tated the starving of the Navy, there would be no stronger opponent of Army reform than the Spectator. But it is not so. We support Mr. Brodrick's scheme because it is a. scheme which is not inconsistent with making the Navy the first charge on the purse, the brain, and the heart of the nation. We fully admit that no nation can have a supremely strong Army and a supremely strong Navy, that there is not money enough for both supremacies, that the nation must make its choice between the two, and that it must choose the supreme Navy. It is because Mr. Brodrick's scheme allows us to make the right choice, while at the same time giving us an efficient Army, that we believe in it. If Mr. Brodrick had proposed to add immensely to our standing Army, if he had asked for a vast increase of men with the colours, and if he had tried to imitate Continental models and to make the Army the prime care of the nation, we should not merely not have supported him, but should have done our best to defeat his scheme. But he has done none of these things. He may have used an unguarded word or two in debate such as Mr. Winston Churchill fastens upon in his article in Tuesday's Daily Mail, but judged by facts and deeds his scheme is a good scheme, and first of all because it is entirely compatible with naval supremacy. Practically Mr. Brodrick makes no increase in our home standing Army, for his new garrison regiments cannot be regarded as that. The only substantial increase he makes is in the non-standing part of the Army. His additions are to the Yeomanry and the Militia, and that is an addition which even Mr. Winston Churchill does not object to. . In reality, Mr. Brodrick's scheme, beyond this increase in the numbers and efficiency of the Yeomanry, Militia, and Volunteers, is merely a scheme for the better and more efficient organisation of the existing standing Army. No doubt Mr. Brodrick has in the course of his scheme of organisation and decentralisation divided the national forces into army corps, but we refuse to condemn his scheme, or to regard it as likely to ruin the Navy, because he has chosen this name, or rather retained this name, for the great localised commands which he is going to inaugurate. Yet such is the terrible power and fascination of a word that a very able writer in Wednesday's Daily Mail, while dealing with the neglect of the Mediterranean Fleet—in an article which deserves most serious consideration—actually ends with the exclamation, "Let the army corps wait." To regard the army corps proposal in this way shows a want of all sense of proportion. That our standing Army is too large and ought to be reduced is a perfectly arguable point, but the existence of army corps does not imperil the Navy any more than the existence of battalions or companies or corporals' guards.
But though we protest against the notion that the reform of the Army must mean the neglect of the Navy, we welcome all sound and serious criticism in regard to the state of the Navy. We by no means feel sure that the condition of the Navy is as good as it should be.
But if it is not, and if things in the Navy are in anything like the condition which they were in the Army at the beginning of the war, then there is need for instant action.
We dare not neglect the Navy. If things are wrong in the Army, it is a source of national hemiliation and disgrace, but not of actual ruin. If the Navy is neglected, then the whole Empire must founder as surely as must one of our great battleships if she were to be obscured in a fog of smoke made by the black powder of her own guns,— pounded to death by enemies armed with smokeless powder whom she cannot see, but to whom she in her canopy of smoke is a safe and easy target. Our metaphor may be clumsy, but we have chosen it deliberately because of an allegation made by the writer in Wednesday's Daily Mail to whose article, headed "Unready," we have just alluded. The writer, who, as we have said, is clearly a man of knowledge and ability, and. who writes from the Mediterranean Fleet and date's his communica- tion June 10th, 1901, states in so many words that in many of the ships in the Mediterranean Fleet such "prime necessities" as "telescopic sights, smokeless powder, breech-loading field-guns, and wireless telegraphy" do not exist. Now if this element as regards the smoke- less powder is true, as we deeply regret to say we believe it is, our ships must be at a disadvantage in action of which it is almost impossible to speak with calmness. A ship using black powder fighting a ship or ships using smokeless powder in their big guns—all our possible enemies in the Mediterranean use smokeless powder—could hardly escape destruction Again and. again during the last four years it has been proved that those who use black powder against smokeless powder have no chance. For example, the American field artillery at Santiago had only black powder, and in consequence it practically could not be used in action. It is not a question of one sort of powder being a little better than the other,—of lyddite against mainite. The user of smokeless powder in any action starts with ninety points in a hundred to the good. A month or so ago we should have said that it •was absolutely impossible that any ships in the Mediterranean Fleet should be without smokeless powder, but when we remember that the country at the most critical period of the war was left with only some three thousand rounds of rifle ammunition, it is impossible to comfort oneself with any such optimistic considerations. We are bound, after the disclosures about the War Office, to assume that the thing may be true, and that the Admiralty may have neglected to supply this prime necessity. Remember that this is not, in reality, a question of money, and that the Treasury cannot be made the scape- goat. The Treasury is made responsible for much, but it is absolutely inconceivable that the Treasury would really refuse money for providing the Fleet with smoke- less powder, or for supplying the ships with breech. loading field-guns in place of the "antiquated toys "- to use Mr. Winston Churchill's phrase—which, according to the writer in the Daily Mail, are now to be found in the Fleet. We may almost say, indeed, that there is public proof that the Treasury has not been asked and has refused, for we are certain that men like Lord Selbome and Mr. Arnold-Forster would have resigned rather than accept such refusal. That they have not resigned is a clear indication that these needs, assuming they exist, are not left unsupplied because of want of money. It is far more likely that the wants complained of come from want of organisation.- As the writer in the Daily Mail very truly _says, "We have got the material, but it is not organised.? This want of proper organisation is, we believe, the danger of the naval, as it was of the military, situation.
We do not suppose that the Admiralty as a whole is as badly disorganised as was the War Office, or that it would show the same Chinese attitude in case of war, but we fear that there are signs that our naval organisation is not as good as it should be and might be. We should like to feel sure, for example, that the problems of sea-strategy, as affected by modern conditions, have been faced and thought out as they require to be. We are inclined to think that the sailors and the civilians both are a little too much inclined to pay respect to .what we will call for want of a better word the scenic side of sea-power. We have tried to have proofs of our sea-power in every ocean and off every coast. These outward and visible signs of the universality of our Empire are no doubt very attractive, but do we remember sufficiently that sea-power is really one and indivisible, that if and, when you have won the command of the sea, or asserted it conclusively against your rivals, you have won it altogether ? For example, if we are strong enough to destroy French naval power in the Mediterranean and the Channel, we have won sea-power as against them in every sea. The battle must be decided at home, because that is where the chief French naval power is to be found. It would not matter, pending the decision, that France was stronger in ships than we were in the China seas, off Madagascar, or in the West Indies. All local fragments of sea-power fall to the victor in the main battle. This means, then, that we must keep our main strength where our possible enemies keep theirs. The Mediterraneanper se is not of paramount moment to us, but if the French keep their main force there we must do the same, for when war comes we must win at sea. Ships or squadrons or fleets that will probably be able to hold their own are not good enough for us. Unless they can give the knock-out blow they are of no account. It would be better for us strategically to have no ships in the Mediterranean than not enough to win with absolutely. In the same way, if the potential challengers of our sea-power concentrate their forces in the Mediterranean, our ships, though in the Mediterranean, may really be giving us the command of the sea in the South Pacific or the Indian Ocean. The primary object of a Fleet is not to prevent invasion, but to give us the command of the sea. No doubt the first and greatest benefit secured by the command of the sea is im- munity from invasion, but the Fleet's primary duty is to secure the command of the sea. Of course we want to use our ships also for police purposes, to produce a certain political effect by their visibility, and to keep a physical watch over our commerce, but it must never be forgotten that their prime duty is to guard and keep the command of the sea by defeating the Fleets of all those who may seek to deprive us of it. We should like to feel sure that our naval strategy in peace is based not upon a mere lip service to this obvious doctrine, but on a stern application of the principle, be the apparent results never so strange. It might be that the result of the application of that principle would be to turn the Channel Squadron into a Straits Squadron, and to keep it in all times of anxiety as a sentinel at the gate of the Mediterranean ready ta reinforce either the Mediterranean Fleet, or a Coast Defence Fleet, as need might arise.
These, however, are details in regard to which we have no desire to dogmatise. We merely desire to insist upon the need for the most careful study of the strategic situation. Have we got clear ideas as to our naval strategy in case of wax, and if not, why not? It cannot be said that we cannot make our plans till the enemy have made theirs, for it is essential that we should strike the first blow and lead the war. He who waits to be struck in a naval war and stands on the defensive is half ruined before the first shot is fired. Of course everything has been properly worked out, says the reader. We trust so ; and two years ago we would have sworn that it must be so. But in face of all that has happened, dare we say so now ?
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