FRANCE AND BRITAIN
WE can have no doubt that the welcome which the Government and people of France have given to the King and Queen on their state visit to Paris was as sincere and heart-felt as it was outwardly magnificent. The postponement of the event due to the Queen's personal bereavement, disappointing as it was, was un- derstood by the French people, and has not prevented them from doing full justice to an occasion which is recognised by both nations as historic. Once only in her long reign did Queen Victoria (in 1855) pay a cere- monial visit to the French capital. Edward VII, well known in Paris as Prince of Wales, once only went as King, at the critical moment when the statesmen of both countries were turning their minds to that general settle- ment which led to the Entente Cordiale. The next royal visit, that of King George and Queen Mary, in 1914, assumes for the reader of history a special significance, since it was so soon to be followed by alliance in war.
None of those earlier ceremonial visits, significant as they were, had the symbolic importance which attaches to the events of this week. It has only been in the last few years that it has been realised that France and Britain are bound together by ties quite unlike those which unite any two other countries in Europe. Throughout English history Englishmen have been better acquainted with France than with any other foreign country, but have been more often at war with her. Most of our wars during the Middle Ages were fought on. French soil. The jealousy between the Kings of England and the Kings of France was traditional. Later, and especially in the eighteenth century, the antagonism was not be- tween kings, but between Governments and trading interests, and in the Napoleonic wars the hostile feeling became national. After 1815 there were no more wars between the two countries, but throughout the inter- national ups and downs of the nineteenth century there was nothing to indicate a unique relationship which would bring the two countries together. Though English culture—literary, artistic, social—owes more to the culture of France than to that of any other modern nation, this has been offset by differences of temperament which are not altogether superficial, and will always have to be reckoned with.
The Entente Cordiale and the Great War went far to establish the feeling of common interest. But that was all. Strategically the two countries had become necessary to each other, but for many years after the War they failed to see eye to eye in the interpretation of the Peace Treaties. The French people could never forget their devastated areas, and popular opinion demanded from successive French Governments that the utmost should be exacted from Germany both in respect of war indemnities and continued disarmament. This country, anxious for the recovery of Germany as a necessary element in the recovery of Europe, viewed with misgiving the French policy of keeping Germany down with the support of powerfully armed allies. It would be idle to overlook these past differences of opinion, and errors, so understandable, which have proved disastrous. With time a broader outlook was to come—the outlook of Locarno—but too late. New symptoms of unrest were already apparent. The war spirit, checked in its outward form by the Armistice and the Peace Treaties, had been driven underground ; fermenting, spreading, feeding upon itself, it was to take new forms all the more dangerous because associated with ideas and fundamental conceptions of human society. Nationalism was still a predominant element in these ideas, but it was identified with a conception of the unified, overriding power of the State which challenged the rights of the individual and crushed freedom of speech and thought.
This new undeclared war of ideas which is now rending Europe has shown Britain and France unmis- takably how they stand to eacil other. The old necessities of expediency still stand, as before. Locarno, denounced by Germany, still exists for the security of France and Britain against unprovoked aggression. With Germany growing in strength and now the dominant military Power in central Europe, with Italy possessed by Imperialistic ambitions under a forceful dictator, with Spain threatening to offer another frontier to be defended, France for self-defensive reasons alone would be bound to seek the goodwill of Great Britain.
But it is not this consideration alone, or mainly, which now draws Britain and France together. For all their temperamental differences they have in common a fundamental individualism which has led them to base their political systems upon the freedom of the individual—or what is called democracy. The demo- cracy may be very imperfect in both cases, but it is deep-rooted. In spite of conditions which make for instability in French Governments, and in spite of deep cleavages of opinion between Right and Left, there is little doubt that the essential France is liberal in spirit in the fullest possible sense of the term—in the sense that in cherishing the freedom of the individual she is on the side of those things that make freedom worth while, and would keep what civilisation has bequeathed to us and guard it against the inroads of barbarism. There were certain things which civilisation has been taking for granted. It has presupposed the right of free thought and free worship and free speech within certain limits, and the right of citizens to a fair and open trial ; it has assumed that war is among the greatest of evils, and should be prevented by mutual under- takings. In this broad view of civilisation France remains wholeheartedly on the same side as Great Britain and the United States. We know where she stands, and she knows where we stand. If there were the same understanding between all the countries of Europe the race for armaments would cease forthwith, and the fear of war would no longer be a nightmare in the world.
The closeness of the understanding between Great Britain and France is a formidable and a reassuring factor in the European situation. But it is not, of course, enough. Pressed beyond a certain point and too exclu- sively it might even become a danger as tending to draw other States, together in counter-alliances. It is rightly a matter of policy in this country not to allow questions of internal government to affect our efforts to be on the best possible terms with Germany, Italy, or, for that matter, Russia. Peace and improved trading relations are and should be prime objectives in our policy so far as they are compatible with justice and the defence of our own vital interests. Subject to these conditions—but only subject to them—it is of supreme importance that this country and France together should come to terms with the dictator countries so that the present strain may be relieved and the war talk brought to an end. To this end we must keep step with France and France with us, strong where essentials have to be defended, but anxious to open up avenues of appease- ment, and pave the way, either through the League of Nations or in some other way, for a stable system of European security.
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