SPECTATOR'S LIBRARY.
HISTORY,
The History of British India. From 1805 to 1835. By Horace Heyman Wilson. F.B.S., dce. dee. Vol. III Madden.
Thaw's,
The Italians at Horne. By Fanny Lewald, Author of "Dlogsne," " Clementine and Jenny," dm. Translated from the German by the Countess D'Avigdor. In two volumes Newby. Ficrios,
Vanity Fair ; a Novel without a Hero. By William Makepesee Thaekeray. With
Illustrations on Steel and Wood, by the Author Bradbury and Event.
PROFESSOR WILSON'S HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA.
Tam third volume of Professor Wilson completes his task, and the His- tory of British India ; which may now be read in his pages and those of Mill from the "earliest period" to the last renewal of the Charter. In a literary point of view, the last volume does not differ from its prede- cessors. It is a solid, painstaking, well-digested, well-arranged narrative of facts, intermingled with appropriate reflections in proper places, sensibly just in the main, though with a loaning to the regular and official side. On the other hand, there is the old want of historical ap- prqciation of events, and of variety in the narrative. One fact seems as good as another in the eyes of Professor Wilson; and if the larger occur- rences occupy a larger space, it is because there is more of them—a longer story to tell—not because there is more in the larger event. Hence, the narrative, though clear, is unexciting, rather level than equable, and more entitled to praise as a work of industry than a work of art.
The time occupied by the volume is the decade from 1823 to 1833; embracing the governments of Lord Amherst, Lord William Bentinck, and the negotiations and debates on the renewal of the Charter, together with its final settlement. The principal military affairs are the Burmese war and the capture of Bhurtpore : the civil matters chiefly relate to the restoration of the dilapidated finances, the abolition of the practice of Sat-, tee, the systematic pursuit and punishment of the Thugs, and the renewal of the Charter aforesaid. There are also a crowd of minor events,—two or three murders of British authorities by Native grandees, and their punishment ; the war between Russia and Persia; the commencement of steam-navigation to India; the contest of the Bombay Bench with the civil power, in which the lawyers were worsted; and a variety of squab- bles and arrangements with the lesser Native powers, as well as settle- ments, or at least alterations in subordinate matters, in the management of our own territory.
Such things, however necessary to be known to the student of Anglo- Indian history, are not very large or attractive in themselves, and may perhaps contribute to give that level character to the volume we have already spoken of: but probably there is a cause still deeper, and seated in the nature of things. The fact is, we have now got to an age of moderate men as well as moderate measures. As long as the world is quiet and moderate too, they rub on well enough. I bit of retrench- ment here, a positive curtailment there, a commission to inquire into this, another to investigate that, a philanthropic determination to put down a cruel practice which has been considered years enough to ripen the question if not to decompose it, with a variety of peddling improve- ments that sometimes succeed and sometimes fail in the working, look respectable and businesslike, and may even serve for a panegyric. But when events go cross, mankind get restless, or roguery is rampant, your mediocre men with their multitude of counsellors are not exactly the men for the occasion. It is usually said that the Burmese war could not have been avoided : and that is clear enough, if the assertion be limited to the authorities who then held sway and the maxims on which they acted. But, even allowing for the arrogance and mistaken self-sufficiency of the Burmese, it is by no means certain that the war might not have been postponed for a long period. Had peace been the cue of Warren Hastings, we suspect that he would have taken some sufficient means to define the boundaries, and then have compelled our own subjects and allies to observe the border regulations. Had Clive been at the bead of affairs, it is probable he would have dealt such a vigorous blow at the Burmese army of observation, invasion or whatever else it be called, for the very first offence, that we should have heard no more of it for a long time to come. It is certain that had Clive, Hastings, or Wellesley, deter- mined on the war, neither of them would have commenced the campaign in the sickly season, (when the troops could not move for illness and the rains,) upon a scheme of river operations which there was not depth of water enough to carry out, and for which, had the idea been practicable, proper means were not provided. Had they planned a second operation by an army acting through Arakan, so as to reach the river Irawadi be- tween Rangoon and the capital, and then either to collperate with the force at Rangoon or use it as a base, they would not have proceeded without some certain knowledge of a practicable pans through the moun- tains dividing Arakan from the Irawadi, or employed a general so obsti- nate as to refuse to reconnoitre the roads officially pointed out to him and the Government by 4n officer on the spot ; thus defeating the object of the expedition and losing his own life as well as the lives of many of his soldiers by the sickness of the country. "The final subjugation of Arakan accomplished one object of the equipment of General Morrison's force, and rescued a valuable territory from Burma op- pression. The next principal object, cooperation with the force of General Camp- bell on the line of the Irawadi, was frustrated in the first instance by an imper- fect knowledge of the country, and finally defeated by the insalubrity of the cli- mate. The Burma in retreating from Arakan had separated into small parties, whose track could not be pursued through the intricate jungle and labyrinth of water-courses by which the land between Arakan and the mountains was over- spread. That passes through the mountains existed was self-evident; but of their number, their direction, and their practicability, the accounts were vague and on- precise; and little reliance was placed even upon such as were entitled to some credit. Thus the Aeng pass, which eventually. proved to be practicable for cattle and artillery, was wholly disregarded; while with singular infelicity, the only ef- fort that was made followed a direction beset with almost insurmountable dsff*- collies. • • "It is mentioned by Captain Pemberton, that, an accurate account of the pass was furnished to Government by Mr. Robertson, the Political Agent at Chitta- gmg, in July 1824, and that the same officer also mentioned its existence to Gene ral Morrison. No attempt-was made to ascertain the real nature of this line of communication; and it was not until the end of the war that its practicability was experimentally proved, by the march of a detachment with elephants across it, from Sembegwen on the Irawadi, to Aeng in Arakan, in eleven days."
• • • •
"We met," says Captain Trent, "but little arduous difficulty, yet performed a march of one hundred and twenty-four miles, which had been supposed im- practicable, in eleven davit; and clearly pointed out, that, had this road been ex- amined, it would have been found that there was nothing to have prevented a por- tion of General Morrison'e army from wintering in Ave, instead of perishing in the marshes of Arakan."
It may be alleged that Lord Amherst and his Government acted upon erroneous information. This, however, is not the fact as regards the Arakan campaign—they would not notice the information which was correct. But, had the excuse been as true regarding the Arakan plan as it was respecting the Irawadi, it would merely prove our ease. It is only mediocre men who select agents likely to mislead them, or who, in important matters, act upon their misleading tales.
Although this volume, like the doings it chronicles, is not of a very large or interesting character' it contains a full account of the period which it treats of, and a good deal of various information on incidental matters, which is curious in itself. One of these points connected with the opium traffic is a singular example of the permeating and defying power of free trade.
The anticipated consequences of the augmented export of Malwa opium attracted the attention of the Government as soon as it became an article substantive value; and measures for guarding against them were very early con- templated. To prohibit the growth of the poppy in states which were internally independent, was very properly held to be a stretch of power which was un- warranted by subsisting relations; and it was resolved therefore to enter the market as a purchaser, and buy up so large a portion of the supply as should leave little or none for the indirect export. This plan, as might have been easily foreseen, tended only to keep up the prices; on the one hand encouraging the extension of the cultivation, and on the other absorbing the profits of the ship- ment and resale. A change of agency, and its transfer from Bombay to Bengal, were next tried; but without material benefit. It was therefore determined to endeavour to enlist the native princes in the service of prohibition, and induce them to place restrictions on the culture of the poppy, and prevent its transit through their territories, by undertaking to pay them an annual fixed sum as an equivalent for any diminution of revenue which they might sustain in the assess- ment of the lands, and the loss of duties upon the passage of the drug. Partly tempted by the prospect of present personal advantage, and partly overborne by the commanding influence of the British Government, most of the princes of Malwa and Rajpntana acceded to this arrangement, and concluded formal treaties, by which, in consideration of certain stipulated annual payments, and after pro- vision made for internal supply, they conceded to the British agent the un- natural privilege of paralyzing national industry and extinguishing native enterprise; injuries almost capable of counterbalancing all the benefits conferred upon Central India by the extermination of the predatory system. The 'lila- evens results were very soon sensibly felt both by princes and people, par- ticularly in those states in which the cultivation of the poppy was extensive, aa in Kota, where it bad usurped the place of the crops of grain which the im- munity of the country from the general devastation that surrounded' it had, through the wisdom of its ruler, Zalim Sing, particularly favoured. A temporary agreement was nevertheless effected with the Raj Rana, of the same tenour as that with the other chiefs; but the compact excited general dissatisfaction among the people, and upon its expiring it was not renewed. It was agreed instead, that the British Government should purchase the larger. portion of the opium grown in Kota, giving to the Raj Rana a bonus on the price, on condition of his pre- venting the sale of any further quantity for the purpose of export. This plan proved equally distasteful to the merchants and vexatious to the growers; and was attended, it was asserted, with so much injury to the revenue, that it could not be insisted on with any regard to the fair claims of the state. Although the like feelings of discontent had not been openly avowed in other quarters' yet they had been similarly excited, and had led to evasion and resistance. The forcible seizure and confiscation of the opium in transit by the subordinate officers of the British Agency, was a manifest violation of the independence which had been acknowledged by treaty, and which, although sanctioned by special agreements, could not fail to be a fruitful source of contention and annoyance: nor was the interference in all cases tamely submitted to: armed men were hired to escort the opium on its way through the territories where it was treated as contraband; and the attempts of the chiefs themselves to be faithful to their engagements and prevent its passage were encountered with a resolute defiance which led to serious affrays and loss of life. Nor could the system be effectual. As long as Jaypur and Jodhpur were open to the passage of the drug, it was of little avail to shut up the avenues through those territories the princes of which were parties to the prohibition. Even in regard to them, however, it was impossible to seal hermetically every channel by which the trade could find an issue; and, in spite of all precautions' the traffic went on increasing with the augmented stringency of the checks devised for its limitation. This failure, and the obvious objections to the whole scheme, had for some time past disposed the Bengal Government to relin- ritih its prosecution; and during the administration of Mr. Bayley, inquiries were instituted with a view to its abandonment. Lord W. Bentinck took the same view of the arrangement as his predecessor; and it was resolved to desist from all inter- ference with the growth and transit of opium in the territories of the native chiefs, and to consider the treaties by which they were bound to prevent the trade as null and void, under the clause authorizing the British Government to continue the restriction only while it should look upon it as essential to its interests. In place of the prohibitory engagements, it was at first attempted to revert to the original plan of purchasing the produce; but, as this was not found to answer, recourse was had to a system of licensing the direct conveyance of opium from the country where it was grown to Bombay, for sale or export on private account, charging for the licence such a sum as should be equivalent to the cost and risk of conveyance by the circuitous route to Daman, and the duties there levied. This plan was at- tended with more than the anticipated success, and secured to Government a con- siderable annual revenue from the opium commerce of Central India, without doing wrung to the interests of princes or people."
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