It is with this problem of an immense gap in
the ellective defences of the free world that the discussions now taking place about American military aid to Pakistan are concerned, In order to stop the gap properly, political and military strength must be created in two areas—the Middle East, and South Asia. Despite the best efforts of the West, the attitude of Egypt) general Arab hostility to Israel, the weakness and internal difficulties of Persia, and Afghanistan's exposed 1,250-mile frontier with the Soviet Union have so far made any Middle Eastern grouping unattainable. In South Asia the problem( of Burma is in many respects separate; while India, fo4 profound reasons which call for sympathetic understanding and respect, has been the main obstacle to political consolida4._ tion and increased defensive strength. Hence the immediate practical question is whether in South Asia some means car( be found for strengthening Pakistan, and whether in the Middle • East Turkey's dangerous physical isolation can be ended and some defensive barrier placed along the Soviet route to the oil which is vital to the defence of the West.
As a sympathetic -and first-hand recent account shows (Ian Stephens, Horned Moon: Chatto and Windus, 21s.) Pakistan enjoys a human strength flowing from the vitalit and resourcefulness of its people, and a spiritual, streng drawn from an Islamic ideal whose attractive power, though unfamiliar and in many respects alien to the modern West, must not be underestimated. But the country's total strength is less than its size and population at first glance suggest Physical division is a main source of weakness. Pakistan'5 area is more than four times that of Great Britain, while irl Asia only China, India, and Japan have more than its kventy4 five million people. But East Pakistan, with one-seventh of the area and more than half of the population, is separated from West Pakistan by a thousand miles of India; while in West Pakistan the densely peopled Punjab is screened in the west and north-west only by the thinly settled areas of Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province.
Pakistan has no heavy industry, and little engineering. Economically, it is an agricultural country, with rice and wheat as the main food-crops, and jute and cotton as the main export crops, which provide the mainstay of its foreign trade but are also subject to the wide price fluctuations of primary commodities. Pakistan's political assets include remarkable success in bringing the tribes of the North-West Frontier area into peaceful participation in the country's life; its political problems include a, shortage—which valiant efforts are being made to overcome—of the trained administrative, technical, and professional class required to help development into 4 modern state. No information is available about the size of the Pakistani armed forces; her peoples include some of the finest fighting stocks in the world; but their technical training requires outside assistance, while only from abroad can she draw heavy weapons and most kinds of ammunition.
Published information about American ideas of aid to Pakistan is scanty. For two years American wheat has saved the country from the widespread distress (if not worse) threatened by two successive droughts. Militarily, what is contemplated appears to be enough merely to enable Pakistan to re-establish two divisions disbanded more than a year ago because of financial stringency. In money, a sum of the order of 15 to 20 million 'dollars (say, £51 to £7 millions) may be involved. 'The larger of these figures would be less than ten per cent. of the total Pakistan defence budget of some £75 million. Linked with the idea of military aid to Pakistan (according to Washington reports) is a projected defensive alliance between Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan which, if achieved and effective,'would buttress Turkey's south-eastern flank and interpose a barrier to Soviet advance toward the oil-fields. Power, and will not enter into a military alliance with the West against the Communist bloc. Nevertheless, what is contem- plated has aroused intense anxiety in India, and is spreading a deep bitterness against America in many Indian circles.
One underlying Indian apprehension—that a strengthened Pakistan might seek to resolve the Kashmir dispute by force— may be dismissed at once as unfounded. India spends twice as much on her armed forces as Pakistan, and they are therefore presumably at least twice as strong, and at least twice as well armed. India has steel and engineering industries, and took over the British-established ordnance factories in the sub- continent—all of which Pakistan , lacks.' Even were no conditions attached to aid by Washington (as there are sure to be), Pakistan's strategic position in relation to India is ,too weak for a military struggle to end otherwise than in disaster.
Indian fears as voiced by Mr. Nehru appear to have three Main roots—that a strengthened Pakistan would disturb the balance of power in South Asia; that American' military aid would somehow—as it were by invisible strings—bring back Colonialism. or the risk of future colonialism; and that it would not only draw the cold ward—and any future hot war—to India's borders, but would also generally imperil what Mr. Nehru terms a " non-war area " in Asia.
No one who -recalls the long, passionate, sacrifice-filled struggle which preceded India's attainment of independence, or who considers what Mr. Dulles described last June as Mr. Nehru's " calm demeanour and lofty idealism " will dismiss these apprehensions lightly. To each of them, however, there is an answer. It is true that to strengthen the Pakistani armed forces would change the local balance of power—unless, indeed, India accepted similar aid (which would be gladly given); but the change would be favourable to India's own security, for at the gate which invaders and conquerors have repeatedly forced down the centuries it would station guards who could repel them—or at worst delay them until reinforcements arrived. How clearly Moscow and Peking see this, and how little they like it, appears from the strident objections both have already voiced.. As regards a supposed risk of renewed colonialism accom- panying military aid, to any one who (like the present writer) Knows the contemporary American scene from extensive recent travel and first-hand observation, such an idea is sheerly laughable. The last thing Americans want is colonies or colonialism; their whole history, tradition, and ethos are rePugnant to both. Indeed, folk-memories of their country's difficulties and mood in its early years of independence give Many Americans great understanding of India's present attitude, ,,and "flatly, phet heytfiorre tconcepto na ntdh to any from owf hAichi ai t cpnr ifingsd. safety through membership in a " non-war area " is invalid. Not only does it run counter to all experience—and in this connection lessons as recent as Denmark, Norway, Holland, and Belgium in 1940 speak with no uncertain voice; it also disregards the fact that for Communists the road to world domination runs avowedly through Calcutta as well as through Peking.
, The realities of the contemporary world are harsh but Iexorable. The nature and scale of modern military force make „both the South Asian and the European arcs of the free world's frontier with Communism indefensible, without American -Military aid and support. 'The political menace of Communism !i? free societies can be countered only by unity and strength. facts are recognised in the new political and military strategy which the Eisenhower Administration is shaping. Too Much should not be expected of a proposal deliberately modest in character. Nevertheless, American military aid to Pakistan, Particularlf associaed with a tripartite defensive alliance Ivhose othey ir members tae Turkey and Iraq, should strengthen Pakistan, the Islamic countries, the Commonwealth, and the free India can best safeguard her independence and fulfil Cr. true destiny by firmly taking the lead in the same direction. mindful that it was no militarist who said, " When a strong an armed keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace."
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