T URKEY AND THE LYNCH COMPANY. • S INCE the fall
of Hilmi Pasha, the Turkish Grand Vizier, we have heard little of the proposed amalgamation of the. Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company (generally known as the Lynch Company) with the Ottoman Hamidieh Company. We imagine that the negotiations have fallen through for the present, and we cannot say whether they will be resumed. Although the navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates seems at first sight to concern Great Britain only in a remote political degree, the suggested fusion of the British and Turkish companies is, as it happens, one of those commercial negotiations which may introduce a good deal of friction into the relations of two countries. We do not know how far the British Foreign Office has supported the Lynch Company in its efforts to bring about the amalgamation, but we assume that the proposals could not have been carried as far as they were if the Company had not had the co-operation of the Foreign Office to a certain extent. In Turkey it has not often been possible, as it is in other countries, for private persons to extend their industrial enterprises without the intervention of the British Embassy in the process of sanctioning and confirming concessions. Whether or not the Foreign Office has done more than discharge these ordinary functions of helping British subjects trading abroad to embrace perfectly legitMiate opportunities, the fact remains that several Turkish politicians maintain that Great Britain is inclined to use the Lynch Company in order to play a political part and acquire a firmer influence over the districts which the Company serves. We need hardly say that we do not believe for a moment that Sir Edward Grey has lent or would lend himself to any such manoeuvre ; but it should always be the aim of the Foreign Office not only to refrain from mixing itself up unneces- sarily with private commercial enterprises, but studiously to prevent so far as it possibly can the existence of any rumour or suspicion that private British companies can be employed for such political purposes. We should be relieved and glad, therefore, to know that there was not likely to be any further occasion for drawing the Foreign Office—even to the moderate extent which the obligations of justice and courtesy might require—into a bargain between the Lynch Company and the Turkish Govern- ment.
The chief strength of British foreign policy has lain in the fact that the Foreign Office has for a long time refused to risk its relations with other countries by confusing politics and commerce. We have heard of other Powers vying with one another at Constantinople to obtain the position of most-favoured nation in the eyes of the Sultan. At one time France was in the ascendant, at another Germany. Great Britain stood outside this competition, restraining or rebuking the late Sultan according to circum- stances, without any ulterior thoughts as to whether her policy would "pay " her or not. The situation in Turkey after the revolution was one of the most remarkable vindications of the British method that we can remember. It turned out that all the time that Great Britain had been making herself disliked by the Sultan and his gang of corrupt place- seekers she had been a source of consistent inspiration and encouragement to all the valuable but obscure elements in the country. The revolution brought these elements to the surface. Great Britain was at last in the ascendant. Well, it is agreeable to every one to wield a predominating influence, and of Course we desire nothing more than that Great Britain should retain it. But this must be done by exactly the same policy as before,—by proving to the Turks that it will always be absolutely foreign to our methods to use political favour to commercial ends. " Neutrality " should be our motto. The extreme reverse of that policy is to be seen in the grossly unfair kilometric guarantees on the Baghdad Railway with which the late Sultan was induced by Germany to saddle his unhappy country.
The Times of December 11th published from its Con- stantinople correspondent a very interesting account of the negotiations between the Lynch Company and the Turkish Government. The correspondent began with a summary of the development of steam navigation on the Euphrates. The first two British steamers were put on the river in 1836 by F. R. Chesney, the famous founder of the overland route to India, and Lieutenant Lynch, R.N. The British Government thereupon obtained permission from the Porte to maintain two steamers, flying the British flag, to carry cargo and mails. In 1860 the steamers were transferred to a Company directed by Mr. B. Lynch, brother of the naval officer. Some years later the Turkish Government established a line of its own on the Euphrates and Tigris. At first the Turkish steamers were managed by the Minister of Marine, but five years ago they became to all intents and purposes the private property of Abd-ul- Hamid. His ownership cast a blight over the Ottoman Hamidieh Company, as it did over everything else ; the Company was badly managed, and cargo was often left lying out for months before it could be shipped. Often the Lynch Company, by its enterprise, rescued the unfortunate owners of goods from their plight ; it got permission to add towing-barges to its flotilla. During Abd-ul-Hamid's reign there had been proposals for the fusion of the two lines, but the negotiations fell through, as the Lynch Company was averse from the stipulation that the combined companies should be subject to Turkish law. The idea of fusion was willingly revived, however, by Hilmi Pasha—the Ottoman Hamidieh Company had become State property again after the Revolution—who made the debate on the subject the opportunity for demanding a vote of confidence in the Government. He obtained his vote of confidence, as we recorded at the time, but it was a Pyrrhic victory, and in a few days he was forced to resign. A good deal of the opposition to the scheme has undoubtedly been factitious, but there are many worthy adversaries who support the principle of freedom of navigation on principle. It need not be denied that Hilmi Pasha, on the other hand, had an arguable case. He desired, for one thing, the withdrawal of the British flag from inland waters, and he thought that by means of the amalgamation he could effect this without wounding British susceptibilities. Again, there seemed a fair prospect that the amalgamation would bring increased revenues to the State. Moreover, Hilmi Pasha considered, probably quite sincerely, that the terms of the arrange- ment would prevent, in the Times correspondent's words, "anything in the nature of monopolist exploitation of the public." The amalgamation was to be controlled by a. British president, supported by four British and four Ottoman directors, and was to last for seventy-five years. Although Hilmi Pasha declared that the amalgamation would not exclude other navigation from the Tigris and Euphrates, it seems to us that it would. have been suspiciously like a monopoly. We intensely dislike monopoly on principle. And we dislike it even more when there is a possibility of its being said that the British Foreign Office has gone out of its way to secure it. Of course we have nothing whatever to say against the Lynch Company, which has notoriously performed valuable services, and which has every right to make the best terms for itself and its shareholders that it can. For all we blow, the proposed amalgamation, if it were yet to be brought about, would be greatly to the advantage of Turkey. But if so, it ought to appeal to the Turkish people on its merits, and not require even a semblance of deliberate support from our Foreign Office.
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