HEADING FOR PRE-WAR?
By BRIGADIER-GENERAL E. L. SPEARS, M.P.
"THUS ended the post-War period." So might a historian of the future conclude his account of the recent Franco-British conversations in London ; and no doubt the student would be delighted to find he had come to the end of a chapter which was a tale of frustrated hopes, conflicting aspirations and mutual fears. The reader, turning the page, would look to see what was the subject of the next chapter. He would know what to expect. After every war there has been a post-war period, one which the nations, ruined and sick of blood- shed, have consecrated to recovery. Then, inevitably, as the years passed, a fresh chapter opened, with the invariable heading "Pre-war period."
Is the new chapter going to be headed in the same old way, or are things at last going to be different ? None can tell as yet, but what is certain is that great skill, dig- cernment and other qualities which nations have so far failed to develop, will be needed if posterity is not to see inscribed on that still blank page the same dismal heading.
On the credit side we have a great will to peace in many countries. But it must be "admitted that even this is not new, for nations which have been successful in war are generally pacific afterwards, not being anxious to jeopar- dize their gains. Pacifism amongst some nations is not enough, for war differs from other disputes in that it does not take two to make a quarrel ; one is quite enough. Moreover we cannot but observe that the desire for peace is not universal. There are some countries where this feeling does not prevail. Two small States are actually at war, and it is generally admitted that peace is not the guiding policy of Japan.
But let us consider Europe. The key problem there is Germany's rearmament. She is rearming at such a rate and so effectively that the closer you get to the men re- sponsible for the guidance of their countries, the greater the disquiet you find. Germany no doubt at the present time does not intend to attack anyone. Her desire for equality is natural. It may well be that she feels she cannot be comfortable amidst armed neighbours unless she is armed herself, but her mysterious and formidable rearmament inspires fear, and fear is the heaviest item on the debit side of the peace and war balance-sheet. It can only be counterbalanced by an understanding amongst the peace-loving nations to stand by each other if attacked. In so far as the Air Convention proposed at the London Conference is a step in this direction, a very real factor has been added to the credit side of the balance-sheet.
But if we turn back the pages of history we find that this is not the first time that nations, genuinely desirous of peace, have come to an understanding for the purpose of maintaining it, yet they have always failed. This fresh attempt must be very different if the same result is to be avoided. If we are not to fall into the old errors we must above all things be completely honest with ourselves and others. In the first place, let us admit frankly that this proposed air convention is not inspired by altruistic motives on our part. So long as we felt perfectly safe we were content to read lectures to others on the advantages and the high moral value of scaling down armies and air forces, but when we ourselves became alarmed we began to see to our long-neglected armaments, and then to look about for some other form of protection.
This may sound brutal, but it is true ;- and if we don't admit it everyone in Europe accepts it as the evidence of -their own eyes. We are in fact adopting, and for the same reasons, the point of view which has for So long swayed the French people. The proposed air convention is born of a common fear of Germany on the part of the French and ourselves. True the convention is open tO Germany also. We are willing and anxibus she should join it. But does anyone over here imagine that, if it materializes, we will ever be called upon to protect Berlin against a French air attack, or that France may be called upon to stand by Germany against an attack by us ? The simple truth is that 'both the French and ourselves are afraid of German air-power.
The arrangement is balanced, as an architect balances the facade of a building by putting in a false window for the sake of symmetry, by .inviting Germany to join the convention. Symmetry is not a bad thing, and one day that window may be opened to let the fresh air in ; but that day is not yet, and it will never come 'so long as the proposed arrangement is merely an affiance in disguise between France and ourselves.
Nor is this the whole Story. France is about to sign a convention' with Russia. Russia insists ur o:i this. Her only preoccupation is to be sure she has powerful friends in Europe against the eventuality of war with Japan.
France will try to find a formula to include Germany, but is unlikely to succeed. A form of words that would tempt Germany to bind herself to France and Russia and abandon her ambitions in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe will be hard to find. Once France has signed a convention with Russia, and we an air convention with -France, will there not be disquieting points of resemblance between the Europe of 1913 and that of today, unless Germany enters wholeheartedly into the "Air Locamo " and returns to Geneva ?
In 1918 there was a Franco-Russian alliance. We had an entente with France and a military convention, as we shall again most certainly have to have if the air con- vention is to have any practical value. It would be foolish not to rewgnize the analogy in a situation born of the same cause, fear of Germany. If we pursue the course of recognizing facts, we must also admit that Germany has gained much with every month that has passed since she left the League. She is stronger now by hundreds of thousands of men than she was last year, and next year she will be stronger still, in men and in war material. She has steadily gone on arming whilst the French quoted the text of the repudiated Treaty at her, and we solemnly computed the value of disarmament formulae. Why pretend these things are not so ? Who gains by our refusing to recognize facts ? Certainly not ourselves.
What conclusions may we draw from these not very cheerful considerations ? The first is the necessity to recognize Germany's fair claims. Although the British people are no friends to Hitlerism, if trouble should arise they would refuse to take action against Germany unless they were persuaded of two things :- that she had been treated fairly and that she was hopelessly in the wrong. Our rulers and our friends should both have this in mind. Of France and her fears I need not speak. I have spent years defending her point of view, but now that her natural apprehensions are understood here she needs no advocate in me. The second is, that it is essential to establish within the frame- work of the League a real system of collective security which will discourage any country from breaking .the peace. If we are to avoid war, we must steadfastly insist upon settling all major matters at Geneva. It is just because I attach great price to a good understanding with France that I say- this. We are too different and our problems too dissimilar to work in close - co-operation without danger outside the orbit of the League. To have a- French Prime Minister talk our- language is flattering, but may prove a dangerous illusion. He may think and lead us to imagine he understands us ; but even if he did he could not make his people understand our point of view.
I believe the solution will be found in the creation of a series of concentric circles, neighbouring countries guaranteeing each other's frontiers, with, in the back- ground, less directly interested powers who are not prepared to fight yet are interested enough to bring economic pressure on an aggressor. if we could establish a system that would deal with Europe's danger-spots first, we might hope in time to extend it to the whole world.
Previous page
