No hiding-place for Amin
Patrick Marnham
Are the Israelis about to kidnap Idi Amin? According to last week's reports, Amin is living with one wife and a few children 'in a lonely beach house on the Libyan coast'. His telephone has been disconnected, his guns have been confiscated, and the new Ugandan Minister of the Interior says that he is 'not very comfortable'.
Until recently any armed Israeli raid on Libya would have been extremelyinadvisable. It might have destabilised Colonel Gaddafi, compromised Libyan oil supplies, caused riots all over the Moslem world and possibly provoked another Near Eastern war. Those risks still exist but they have been considerably diminished by the events of the last ten days. In that period the Colonel has compensated the Americans for riot damage to their embassy, suspended aid to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and expelled its representative • in Tripoli, and taken the first steps towards resuming friendly relations with Uganda. He has also said that he is striving to improve his relations with the United States after receiving unofficial assurances that this might lead America to adopt a 'more neutral' stance in the Near East.
That by itself is slight enough evidence of any significant change in American policy. But lithe Israelis thought that there was any possibility of a real improvement in USLibyan relations they might take the view that Gaddafi could do with some 'destabilising'. An official army raid would never do, even now, but some sort of off-duty operation which could not be blamed on Israel, but from which Israel might nonetheless take credit, could be cooked up. A curious event which took place at the end of the Ugandan war shows that this idea is not entirely far-fetched.
After the fall of Kampala, last May, when the Amin forces had been driven back to the north of the country and were apparently preparing a counter-attack, reports started to appear that the Tanzanian army had been joined by a 50-man group of 'American, British and Israeli' commandos. They were led by a Mr Daniel Waltener, described as an American citizen, who had been hired by an Israeli member of parliament called Samuel Flatto-Sharon. The object of the exercise was to kidnap Idi Amin. Mr Waltener said that the family of Mrs Dora Bloch (the British Jewess who was murdered after the Entebbe raid) had offered a large reward for the capture of Amin, and although he himself was moved solely by humanitarian feelings it was possible that some of his commandos were in it for the money, Mr Waltener's 'Dirty Dozen' did not, in the event, play an imposing role in the downfall of the tyrant. After scouting around the Amin defences they reported that they had seen 'thousands of Arab troops and hundreds of BM21 Russian rocket launchers', and departed for Tel Aviv. The Arab hordes and the Russian missiles both evaporated on their departure, no other observers managing to catch a glimpse of them. And by the time Mr Waltener had reached Tel Aviv with his report it was to find that his patron, Mr Sharon, was facing charges of bribing 3,700 people to vote for him in the 1977 general election. It seemed that some of the bribes had been unpaid and so Mr Sharon had been denounced. Pending trial he was suspended from parliament, and was meanwhile trying to defeat a French application tor his deportation on fraud, forgery and tax evasion. He was sucessful in avoiding deportation, but was tried in France in his absence, and in September the French court sentenced 'him to five years and fined him 0,300.
Cynics in Israel say that Mr Sharon's crucial error may have been when, in another diversionary publicity stunt, he flew the son of .Mr Tshombe, the late president of Katanga, into Israel for an anti-Mobutu press conference. Israel is not anti-Mobutu. It regards Zaire as one of its best chances of re-establishing an Israeli presence in black Africa. The merits of the Katangan case would weigh nothing against Israel's need for allies, trade and influence, and Mr Sharon's Tshombe manoeuvres would not have assisted him in any negotiations he held with the Israeli attorneygeneral. Perhaps, if 'the Dirty Dozen' had not come back empty-handed, Mr Sharon could have presented himself as the hero of the hour and the case would have been dropped. But that did not happen, It is pathetic to think of that bulky despot sitting in the dusk on his veranda, wondering where all the Libyans have gone and peering out to sea for the first sign of a rubber dinghy. As he ponders his fate he may well ask himself, Why Me? Why not old Bokassa, for instance? One difference, as far as the Israelis are concerned, is that Amin never had a diamond mine. Israel has had an important stake in the world diamond trade ever since the country came into existence. Tel Aviv is now second only to Antwerp in the wholesale diamond , business. And according to the president of the Israel Diamond Exchange, the diamond industry is the country's largest area of foreign trade. In 1977 Israel polished 52 per cent of the world's supply of rough gall diamonds. And Bokassa's Central African Empire was a sufficiently important supplier of unpolished stones for the Israelis to offer to take over Bokassa's diamond security — again on an unofficial basis. If Amin and the Israelis had been able to do some diamond business together in his ear/Y days, they might never have fallen out. , So, the arguments in favour of an Ann" snatch include policy, the availability of the victim, and the absence of any compromising business associations with him. And there is another favourable factor. Between 16 September and 21 September the Israeli rate of inflation rose by four per cent in six days, a national record. It is running at the annual rate of 100 per cent, an economic phenomenon which naturally causes considerable social and political strains. Traditionally Israel has been able to overcome its domestic political problems by the need for national unity in the face of the external threat. But the country has seldom seemed so un threatened as it does at the moment. Even military incursions into south Lebanon scarcely cause a stir. Among the few people in Israel who do not have to worry about inflation are the officers of the army. They have very high salaries, their houses are subsidised and very comfortable, they have servants and cheap cars and electrical goods. It would not be a good thing if they were to appear in a new role as an over-privileged ruling caste.
Anyone thinking of mounting such an operation might consider taking a film crew with them as well. The Entebbe raid resulted in two chest-beating Israeli propaganda films from Hollywood, and another one 'about Amin's reign is on the way. To take film cameramen on the operation would result in excellent television news coverage and would assist the subsequent negotiations for film rights.
It could even be said that the matter is becoming quite urgent. After all, it would be a disastrous thing from the propaganda angle if Gaddafi himself were to send Amin back to Uganda.
Previous page
