THE FABRIC OF DEFENCE
DECEMBER 25th was a pagan festival before it was a Christmas festival in these islands, and there might seem more fitness in investing the date this year with the former associations than with the latter. For this Christmas dawns, not indeed amid the clash of arms, except in Korea, but amid the clash of the fabrication of arms and preparations for their possible use. That, for all it may be worth, must be con- ceded to the cynic. There is no answer to him except the ancient and doubtful answer that peace can only be preserved by men equipped to defend it in arms. There are times, and this is one of them, when no better way can be discerned. That is the justification for the military talks at Brussels, for the declaration of a state of emergency in America, for the lengthening of the conscription period in this and other countries, for the decision to provide 55 divisions for service in Europe under a Supreme Commander of Western European Defence, for the creation of a Defence Production Board, for the invitation to Germany to make her due contribution to the forces to be mobilised against the Communist danger. Such is the Christmas task and so it must be, for no visible alternative offers. In a world in which peace was prized and goodwill prevailed precisely the opposite would be happening. Differences would be under settlement- by discussion, disarmament by general agreement would be in pro- gress, co-operation between nations in all fields would be in steady process of development. In a word, the principles of the United Nations would be in course of diligent application.
But that would be in a different world from this—a world whose existence Russia vetoes. That is an objective fact. Nothing is gained by stating it as a criticism or a reproach. The plain truth is that nine-tenths of the ills the world is suffering from, in Korea, in Indo-China, in Malaya, in Eastern Germany, in South-Eastern Europe, are due ultimately to Russia and the pernicious creed she assiduously propagates. It is largely pernicious as applied within Russia, it is pernicious—though probably less so—as applied within China, and in both those countries it is imposed on the vast majority of the people by a comparatively small but ruthless minority. But that in each case is a domestic concern. In neither case, least of all in China, does anyone propose to interfere with the country's domestic affairs. It is when Communism becomes allied with imperialism, when neighbouring States are subjected politically and ideologi- cally, as they are by Russia, or when a sudden aggression is committed on international forces engaged in the restoration of the rule of law, that Communism stands revealed as the world's greatest danger. And since it does so stand revealed it is imperative that the non-Communist nations should be concern- ing themselves primarily this Christmas with planning the erec- tion of barriers against the threatening tide. There is no question whether they ought to be doing that. The only question is whether they are doing it fast enough and efficiently enough.
That cannot be answered till the full report of the Brussels meetings is available. A good beginning has been made in the appointment of General Eisenhower as Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Treaty forces in Western Europe. It was clear from the first that, given General Eisenhower's willingness to serve, no other name would be so much as considered. His willingness springs unquestionably from that high sense of duty which has animated him perpetually since President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill agreed on his nomination as Commander-in- chief of the Allied forces ra,nged against Nazi -Germany. Now he takes command against a potential enemy no less dangerous, charged with the supreme task of frustrating its endeavours. not by war, but if it be possible without war. His acceptance of the task will create confidence as no other appointment imaginable could, by reason not only of the eminent American soldier's professional competence but of his integrity, his strength of character and his political wisdom on occasions when decisions in part political fall to be taken. The sooner General Eisenhower can establish himself in Europe the better for the Western European nations. For the Commander-in-Chief, with the international staff he will gather round him, will vitalise both the War Departments and the Cabinets of the twelve nations united by the North Atlantic Treaty, and will, it may be hoped, find means of imbuing them with that sense of urgency in which too many of them have so far shown themselves deficient.
But invaluable as a commander is when he is an Eisenhower he can do nothing without the forces he is designated to command. The forces are not there, apart from an insignificant number of divisions which are there at present for other reasons. It is true that plans for providing them are reasonably far advanced. America's armed forces, as President Truman told his countrymen in a broadcast address last week, have been raised from 1,500,000 to 2,500,000 and are to be increased by a further million forthwith. No comparable effort has yet been made by Great. Britain, or by France, or by any European country. Yet it is primarily for the defence of Western Europe, on the soil of Western Europe, that America is committing herself to this vast mobilisation. The urgency of the insistence of the American Army Secretary at Brussels that the European States shall- exert themselves on a comparable scale and with compar- able speed is fully justified. For this purpose the European States must include Western Germany. That conclusion is inescapable. That, if Western Germany is to be defended, Western Germany should take her part in the defence is elemen- tary. Yet the difficulties about that conclusion are formidable, and they are not yet solved. Germany, which is surprisingly (or perhaps not surprisingly) but unmistakably pacifist, has no desire for any military service, but if she does accept that duty she will insist on its being on equal terms ; it seems highly doubtful whether the discriminatory plan for the embodiment in the Atlantic Treaty force of German units limited to 6,000 men will get through the Bundestag, or even be accepted by Dr. Adenauer and his Cabinet. France, which is the only radical objector to -the German demand for equal treatment, will then have grave decisions to face.
Meanwhile the Soviet Note of protest against the arming of Western Germany (a misnomer, since there will be no German army with a separate existence) has to be seriously considered. Logically, of course, its arguments are derisory. To invoke the Potsdam agreement when the whole fatal division of Germany is due to Russia's violation of the Potsdam agreement, and to protest against the incorporation of Western German units in a Western European Defence Force when Russia has been methodically arming Eastern Germany behind the Iron Curtain, is sufficient demonstration of the hollowness of the protest. But the protest, couched in unusually moderate terms, is there. and it has seriously alarmed the French, some sections of whom at least believe that the arming of the Germans might become an actual casus belli. The French Government does not appear to take that view, and the planning of the Defence Force at Brussels has proceeded unaffected by the Soviet coMminationS. But the French are right in reminding their allies that Font Power talks, with Russia as one of the four, may be impending —that depends on whether, as preliminary, an- agenfla can be -agreed—and that in view of the possibilities, such as they may be, thus opened up the success of the talks should not be com- promised more than necessary by faits accomplis. There is reason in that, and since discussions with Germany about her contribution are not likely to be brief final decisions here could with advantage be deferred till the Russians have met the Western Powers round a table—if they do so meet them. It is, after all, conceivable that some Four-Power agreement may be reached ; otherwise why contemplite Four-Power conversations at all ? If reason prevailed agreement would be simple, just as, if reason prevailed, agreement between the United Nations and China would be. Ground for optimism is slender, but the attempt at agreement must be made. A double course alone is open, to labour diligently for peace, and no less diligently at defence.
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