The French Socialists
The central distinction between the Third Republic and the Fourth is that whereas under the former the crises occurred and the Govern- ments fell, under the latter the crises occur and the Government does not fall. The reason usually given—and M. Ramadier repeated it at the party Congress at Lyons last week-end—is that, caught between the opposed perils of Gaullism and Communism, the coali- tion of Socialists, Radicals and M.R.P. can only avoid handing power to either by hanging together and excluding both. Whether or not this is an adequate explanation will now be put to the test For M. Ramadier has come back from Lyons saddled with a party direct- ing committee zo of whose 31 members distrust his policy, and with an instruction to practise a doctrinaire Socialist policy even if by so doing he destroys the coalition. If he succeeds in remaining Prime Minister of France at the head of a minority group in a minority party then indeed the forces prohibiting a change of Government
must be strong. Yet there are reasons to believe that he will do it. The Socialists took office last January in the face of the disapproval of many members of the party and it may yet turn out that the talk of Socialist principles at the party congress was a blowing off of steam, and that the Government can succeed in its policy of holding down wages and prices against the advice of the trade unions. The immediate issue is the rather different one of the Statute of Algiers. M. Ramadier is now committed to a version which will lead to a predominance of Muslim power in the new Algerian Assembly. The M.R.I?. are doubly opposed to this since they favour the strengthening rather than the weakening of the tie with France and since the version has the approval of the Communists. The issue is one which strongly marks the dividing line between Right and Left in France and in making up its mind the M.R.P. determines its own future. If it votes for M. Ramadier it saves the Government and forfeits the principle. If it votes against, it may fall into the open arms of General de Gaulle while driving the Socialists into those of the Communists. It is doubtful whether the forces of moderation in France could survive such lethal embraces.
