TIFTE GERMAN EMPEROR AND HIS MINISTRY.
IT looks as if the German Emperor were going to adopt, or rather had adopted, the most dangerous line of conduct open to a Sovereign,—that of undermining his own Ministers, and listening to the advice of a secret and inner Cabinet rather than to that of his properly appointed officers of State. There is, of course, nothing new in such a line of action. All Kings who love to exercise direct personal power are liable to the temptation to adopt it. However real may be a Monarch's sovereign rights, a formal administrative machine is apt to check and hamper him. Directly you set up an elaborate Administration you limit the King's power, even though by the words of the Constitution the King has complete control of the Executive. The King may in theory be able to change his Ministers at will, and to order them to do this and that, but in practice the existence of a complicated series of offices and a hierarchy of officials limits his powers. We all see the same thing in private life. The millionaire who has a house-steward, a groom of the chambers, a house- keeper, and a head-coachman may have things much better done than the man who has no domestic cabinet, but un- doubtedly it is much more difficult for the millionaire to put his will into immediate operation than for the man with one servant in each department. The millionaire is able to hold the head-servants responsible for things being done accord- ing to a standard fixed by him, but he knows that he must not interfere with details. Above all, he knows that it will ruin the peace and comfort of his household if he listens to suggestions from the groom, and. takes his advice before he gives orders to the coachman. That is to put the underling above his superior, and no self-respecting head- coachman will stand it. He will say, I will take the master's orders when they are his real orders, but he's no business to listen to that young ass James, and force me to do in the afternoon what I told James he was a fool for suggesting in the morning. If that's to be the game, the master had better make James head-coachman straight out and get rid of me.' It is just the same in the Departments of State. When once a King or Emperor has named his Ministers, his only safe plan is to be loyal to them, and not to work behind their backs, nor to force upon them what is, in reality, the advice of their subordinates. The loyalty of the superior to the inferior is quite as essential a duty as the loyalty of the inferior to his superior. No man can expect those below him to stand by him, and be frank and open with him, unless he makes it clear that he will stand by them and trust them, and give them his real confidence, just as he expects them to trust him. Loyalty can only exist as a reciprocal feeling, and the moment that the small man feels he is not obtaining it from the great man, he ceases to render it.
But though this seems so clear, it is easy enough to see how a King may, almost without knowing it, slide into the fatal error of undermining his own Ministers, and giving them orders which are in truth based on the advice of their subordinates. Take the case of the German Emperor. As the working head of the State and the head of the Army, he is accustomed to decide a number of ques- tions by the exercise of his own will. No one, of course, objects to that, for it is clearly understood that the German Emperor governs as well as reigns. Consider the War Ministry, where the recent trouble has arisen. It is an understood thing that the Emperor's will is carried out in regard to all points on which he gives a definite Opinion.. His personal opinions, that is, are a well-recog- nised factor in the administration. But the King cannot attend in person to all the details of Army administra- tion. He must, in most cases, depend upon the advice of other people. Hence he has surrounded himself with a Military Cabinet which is much closer to, and has much more intimate relations with, him than the War Office. This being so, it is easy to see how a situation may grow up in which the Emperor's Military Cabinet, by instilling their opinions into the Emperor's mind, may entirely overbear the War Minister. Naturally enough he finds this control exercised over him by a coterie who use the Emperor's personal authority, extremely annoying, and it is not to be wondered at if he resigns, as General von Schellendorf did a few days ago. He is willing to do what the Emperor bids him when the Emperor expresses his real opinion, but he will not allow his views to be overridden when be knows that the Emperor has merely made himself the mouthpiece of a half-secret Committee. No doubt the Emperor may re- tort,—' Your grievance is a delusion, and your contention absurd. You admit that I had an absolute right to decide the points about which you are complaining, and you say that if the decision had really been mine you would have acquiesced in it without a word. But what right have you to assume that the decision is not really my own ? Is it merely because that decision happens to coincide with a memorandum submitted to me by my Military Cabinet ? If so, then you take up the ridiculous position that I must never hold an opinion if I have the misfortune to be anticipated in it by my Military Cabinet. In a word, any opinion is to be held to be absolutely and entirely con- taminated if it has once been set fortb by that body. I may, as a matter of fact, have long privately held the belief that the artillery depats on the-frontier are badly distributed, but the moment the Military Cabinet thinks so too, my cherished plan of reform must be abandoned. It has been blasted by a word from the chief of my Military Cabinet. In fact, then, it comes to this,—I am only to have any voice in the management of my Army when I agree with you and the War Office, or when I can show that the Military Cabinet either disagrees with me or else has never considered the matter. You must see yourself that such a position is utterly ridiculous, and cannot possibly be maintained by a. sane man.' Of course the Emperor could, if he liked, achieve a dialectical victory after this manner ; but he would be a very unwise man to rely upon such logic-chopping for the conduct of State affairs. Logically, it may be quite absurd to take up the position of the War Minister. Practically, his argument is a per- fectly sound one, and ought to have great weight with a wise Sovereign. Every wise man, however self-confident, knows that if A B, who is possessed of a great knowledge of details, is daily admitted into his presence to talk upon a particular subject, A B will influence his mind and, unconsciously perhaps, but none the less really, will affect judgments and decisions given on the same subject to a third person. What, then, is a ruler like the German Emperor to do? He cannot, of course, give up taking a. great share in the decision of Army matters, and therefore he cannot give up his Military Cabinet, for he must have expert help at hand. Again, he cannot make the War Minister himself act the part of intimate adviser and helper on military affairs, for that would be extremely inconvenient. The War Minister is too busy and too big a man to be constantly dancing attendance on the Emperor. The Emperor wants a set of active men round him to whom he can instantly refer for information, or who can be deputed at a moment's notice to do this or that special piece of work. In our opinion, the wisest plan would be to make the War Minister himself choose the Military Cabinet, and so ensure solidarity between them and the Office. Of course, the objection to this is that the Emperor is at once deprived of half the advantage which he gets from his Military Cabinet. He wants to get at an independent opinion on military matters. But under the proposed arrangement the Military Cabinet would be a mere echo of the War Office. That is true, but a little tact would get rid of the diffi- culty. If the Emperor could once inspire the War Office with the feeling that he was at heart. loyal to them, and that he was not through his Military Cabinet spying upon the War Office, all would be well. It must, of course, always be a delicate position for the head - coachman to feel that his master is getting opinions about the stable from one of the grooms who has been made an indoor servant for the time, but if the master can manage to make it clear that he is all the time perfectly loyal, and has full confidence in Mr. Bantling, such a situation may exist without undue friction.
Apparently the German Emperor was unable to make General von Schellendorf feel that, in spiteof the Military Cabinet, he had the loyal support of his Sovereign. Probably the German Emperor would always find it difficult to convey such an impression. It is, too, by no means unlikely that the late Minister of War did not enjoy the confidence of his master on military matters, and that the Emperor was sincerely determined to use the machinery of his Military Cabinet to make a new War Office which should be over the old War Office. But, it will be asked, why in that case did not the Emperor simply change his War Minister? Those who ask this forget that even in Germany the War Minister has to be something more than merely persona grata to the Emperor. He must, to begin with, be something of a Parliament- arian, and capable of managing the War Office business in the Reichstag. Next, he must be more or less accept- able to the Federal States, and especially to Bavaria, which has a separate Army organisation of its own. Probably the Emperor, realising this, chose General von Schellendorf rather as a useful buffer between himself and the Reichstag and the Federal States than as a military administrator. The Emperor's idea, no doubt, was that the War Minister should manage the Parliamentary and Federal side of the Army, and smooth matters down in those quarters, while the Emperor's Military Cabinet should really rule the Army through the use of the Royal prerogative. If this was really the plan at the bottom of the Emperor's mind, as we expect it was, he mistook his man. General von Schellendorf had evidently no mind to play the part of buffer, but wanted to have a free hand with the Army, and when he found out the true position, regarded it as degrading to an officer of ability, and resigned. What will be the end we cannot say, but it looks as if the system of government by inner influence had not been confined to the War Office. It is said, indeed, that Prince Hohenlohe, the Chancellor, has actually resigned on much the same grounds as General von Schellendorf, but that the Emperor has persuaded him to defer the announcement till after the Czar's visit. Whether this is rumour or truth we do not know, but one thing is clear. The Adminis- tration of the German Empire is not what it once was. That delicate and subtle piece of machinery is beginning to show signs of the rough handling it has received from the vehement young man into whose hands it fell as a plaything. Perhaps, however, the wiser mind will not greatly grieve that this is so. It might be well for Ger- many if the machine were broken altogether, and a new and simpler one put in its stead. This being the case, we may rejoice, even though the actual injury has been given by one whose last wish would be to make Germany freer or to let her shake off her official swaddling-clothes.
Previous page
