COLONEL MAURICE ON WAR.*
STUDENTS of what Colonel Maurice very properly will not allow us to call " the art of war," will be glad to find his able article in the Encyclopmclia Britannica reproduced in book form, with comments and additions. The volume is not, nor does it attempt to be, a popular exposition of the modern theory and practice of war, but rather carefully written prolegomena to military science. It lays down, shortly and concisely, the conditions under which victories are lost and won, and brings out what is essential for a proper under- standing of the General's duty. War is discussed under the two heads of " Strategy " and " Tactics,"—strategy being treated as the placing of armies in certain positions in order to stop or surround an enemy, tactics as the actual manipulation of battalions in the field. For example, Napoleon's celebrated • War. Reproduced, with Amendments, from the Article in the last edition of the Encyclopadia B itannica. To which is added an Essay on Military Literature and a List of Books, with brief Comments. By Colonel Maurice, Royal Artillery, Professor of Military Art and History at the Royal Staff College. London: Macmillan and Co. 1891.
march from Boulogne against Austria, which resulted in the capitulation of Ulm, was an act of strategy. His disposition of his troops at Waterloo belongs to the field of tactics. In treating both these subjects, Colonel Maurice has re- peatedly to ask how far the practice of former times has become obsolete, and in what respects modern war differs from war as understood by our fathers. As might be ex- pected, the rock-bed, the fundamental principles of war are the same, but a thousand circumstances have modified the phenomena which they display. For example, one of the essential conditions of victory—war, when studied, means victory, for no one studies how to be beaten—is opposing a greater to a lesser force. When Napoleon said that fortune always favoured big battalions, he was merely stating the truism that the surest way of beating a hundred men is to attack them with two hundred. Hence the strategist is always endeavouring to get the greater military force at a particular place and at a particular moment. From these premisses arose Napoleon's favourite manceuvre,—a manoeuvre similar to that of breaking the line at sea. Napoleon liked to drive his army like a wedge into the middle of his opponents. This done, he bit out left and right, and drove back the disunited enemy on separate lines of retreat. Then came in the application of the rale that the greater beats the less. He singled out one or other half of the divided army of the enemy for attack, and crushed it with his whole strength. To do this, he swiftly brought over, say, the left wing of his army, joined it to the right, and then threw his united force on one half of the army opposed to him. As a rule, numbers prevailed; he crushed his foe, and then hurled himself on the other and still unconquered half. This, it may be remembered, was the central idea of the Waterloo Cam- paign. It failed, however, on that occasion, partly because Wellington refused to be crushed even in spite of his in- feriority in troops, and partly because Blucher refused to be split off as completely as he ought to have been by " the wedge " manoeuvre. Now, it might be supposed that this opera- tion must remain as practicable now as it was a hundred years ago. Oddly enough, however, it is no longer sound generalship. And for this reason, as Colonel Maurice points out, a modern army, partly from its size, possesses much greater possibilities of delay and of fighting a waiting battle, than did those of two generations ago. A weaker force, that is, can more easily hold in play a stronger. Hence, when A's force has united and tries to crush one half of B, that half is able to hold A in check till the other half comes up and unites with it. What Colonel Maurice says on this point is worth noting :—
" If, in their general character, the nature of battles and the circumstances under which battles have to be fought change very materially, that in itself involves a further change in the com- binations which are open for manmuvres in the field of which the ultimate object is to lead up to battle. Once more, the size of the armies which will enter into the next great campaign in Europe will be so vastly different from those which fought out the great wars of the past, that their manceuvring in campaigns must necessarily be very different from anything that Napoleon under- took. Now, even during the later wars of Napoleon, Jomini was obliged to admit that many of the experiences of the past must be materially modified as armies increased in size. One of the most familiar forms in which Napoleon exercised his strategic skill lay in defeating with his own entire army a fraction of the forces opposed to him, before it could be reinforced by the remainder of the enemy. Thus the element of time essentially entered into the question. Even during the great campaign of 1813, when Napoleon, holding a central position on the Elbe, endeavoured to strike from thence against the masses of the allies formed in a great circle round him at Berlin, in Silesia, and in Bohemia, experience showed that it was by no means easy to crush with sufficient rapidity armies of 120,000 men so as to prevent them from being sup- ported in time by others. As the allies gradually closed in on him, and the distances between their different forces diminished, this became continually more and more apparent. In fact, it became clear, if it had been doubtful beforehand, that the ques- tion was altogether a matter of proportion between time, distance, and the resisting power of the several armies concerned. On the other hand, in 1814, when the nature of the country invaded caused a reduction in the size of the armies moving forward separately, Napoleon was able as of old to strike his blows right and left with telling effect. Now, if it were possible for an army of our day, supplied with all the implements with which modern science has provided it, to meet any army of equal numbers equipped as Napoleon's armies were equipped, the difference in power of the modern army would be such that it would almost be able to deal with its enemy as civilised armies provided with fire- arms were at first able to deal with savages possessed only of bows and arrows. The artillery of the days of Napoleon would not be able to act at all, for our modern infantry can fire with effect at a distance greater than could Napoleon's big guns. Our artillery would be able to destroy Napoleon's army before either
his artillery or infantry could act against us. Thus an army of 50,000 men of our own time must be reckoned as possessing, at least, the resisting power of 100,000 of the days of Napoleon. It is obvious, therefore, that the relationship between time, distance, and the resisting power of armies has been greatly affected by the change in the character of weapons, and that calculations as to what a superior army can do in a given time to break up the force of an army opposing it, and to be free to deal with another army, are greatly modified."
Another modification of the abstract notion that victory is merely the opposition of two hundred to a hundred men, is to be found in the fact that a modern army is a highly complicated organisation, and that unless that organisation is maintained, it is utterly worthless as a fighting machine. But this being so, the breaking up of the organisation is as much an object as the killing, wounding, and taking prisoners of the enemy, or the capture of their fighting material. On this point we may again quote Colonel Maurice :-
" In modern war the effort of the General is directed to main- taining in its full efficiency the vast and complicated machine' which he handles, and to breaking up and destroying the efficiency of that to which he is opposed. This is the central fact to be kept in mind. Generals and soldiers, long accustomed to look at war from this point of view, frequently embody their whole conception of strategy in a phrase which to a reader, taking it in its simple form, is apt to seem like a mere truism—that the great principle of strategy is to concentrate the largest possible force at the right moment at the decisive point. So stated, strategy may seem to have nothing exceptional in its nature, and to involve no study of the nature of the great organisations of men with which it is concerned. But in fact, this study and this knowledge are pre- supposed by those who thus explain their art. It is because armies are not mere gatherings of armed men, but have a vitality of their own, that some very heavy blows may be struck against them without affecting a vital point, whilst a more skilfully directed stroke may destroy their whole future power of action. An army then, as it stands in the field, is of this character, that while the fighting force directly opposed to the enemy is an organism which depends for its vitality upon the trained spirit of order, discipline, and enthusiasm or devotion which holds it to- gether, and on the trained capacity for mutual and effective fighting co-operation which makes it act like one man, it has also, reaching far behind it, a long and weak tail, on the safety of which its very existence depends."
Before leaving Colonel Maurice's very interesting book, we must say a word or two as to the essay on "Military Litera- ture" with which it concludes. We believe that the author
is perfectly right in dwelling as he does on the great importance of " the lessons to be derived by a careful student from the American War." We venture to say that no English General will have done his duty who has not studied that war with the utmost attention. The war was conducted by men of the English race, and the majority of the troops engaged were of the English kin Hence it offers exceptional opportunities for the study of the
morale of Englishmen under arms. No doubt the American Volunteers were many of them of a different class from that of the ordinary English soldier, and certain allowances must
accordingly be made. Still, at bottom, their characteristics are the same. But this being so, to neglect the American War is sheer folly and perversity. It is easy to see how this neglect has arisen. From the regular soldier's point of view, the Civil War was an affair of amateurs, and the professionals have never been quite able to restrain their jealousy of the fact that so many splendid military exploits were performed by men who had not spent their lives in barracks, but had only turned their attention to war when the cannon sounded, and went into action with text-books of strategy and tactics in their hands. Colonel Maurice mentions how Stonewall Jackson " marched into camp at the head of the class to which he had been teaching the theory of war up to the moment of fighting." Colonel Maurice, in com- bating the absurd theory that it is not necessary for a soldier to study to become a good General, notes that Cromwell is often instanced as a man who became a great soldier without ever having studied the profession of arms. He declares, however, his belief that Cromwell must have read the extant works on the subject, though no record of his having done so is to be found. We entirely agree with Colonel Maurice, and we believe there is a piece of evidence as to Cromwell's studies which he has possibly overlooked. Cromwell, in one of his letters, desires his son to read " history and cosmography," as the proper studies for a man who is to deal with public affairs.
But history was in those days largely the history of battles, —cosmography meant geography. If, then, Cromwell studied the subjects he recommended, which we cannot doubt, he must
have made himself acquainted with the military operations of 'I' Tit° the great commanders of the ancient and modern worlds.
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