THE SIEGE OF RICHMOND.
ELEVEN months of hard, unfaltering, incessant warfare, waged upon a field extending from the Potomac to the Mississippi, from the ocean to the central mountain ranges of the eastern half of the North American continent, have been required to wrest the capital of the once formidable Confederacy of the Slave States out of the hands of the slaveowners. The operations of those eleven months we may call collectively the siege of Rich- mond, for the capture of Richmond and the defeat of the armies defending it —defending it in Georgia and the Carolinas, as well as in Virginia—were the motives which governed the conduct of the Federal Generals ; and if the object in view has been attained more speedily than the Federal Generals could have anticipated, we must attribute that to Grant's superb tenacity and readiness
In the spring of 1864 the Federals had only established them- the first to reach the Chickahominy. In the meantime the Federal selves in the fringe of the Confederate Slave States east of the left army, under Butler, had surprised City Point, but had failed Mississippi. Nowhere in Virginia were they more than three to seize Petersburg, and had been driven to intrench itself at marches from Washington. They were masters of the strategic Bermuda Hundred. Grant again tried force against Lee, who points of Tennessee, they prevailed throughout the course of the swiftly hurled him back, and then Grant, still resolute to " fight Father of Waters, but on the Atlantic coast Mobile, Savannah, it out on that line," cleverly marched round Lee for tb,e third Charleston, and Mrilmington defied them. A swarm of gunboats, time, and crossing the James appeared before Petersburg, monitors, and larger ships cruised painfully to and fro, but were but failed to snatch it. Lee, marching by the chord of the unable to prevent daring sailors in swift craft from entering and arc, took post in and about Petersburg, where he covered quitting at least two ports. A network of railways, as yet un- Richmond and its arterial railways. Now was the time to try broken, radiated from Richmond, ran north-west as far as the stamina of Grant. His plan had failed, his able foe had Staunton, with a branch from Gordonsville to Lynchburg, ran refused to be put off the roads to Richmond ; there he stood as south-west by Danville to Augusta, Macon, Selma, Mobile, hardily as ever. But though the letter of the plan had failed, in ran south-east and smith by Weldon through Wilmington to the spirit it had succeeded, for Grant had planted himself ins- Charleston, Savannah, and Florida, while a line from Charleston pregnably close to the great Confederate lines of communication, to Augusta, and a line from Wilmington to Greensboro' through and there he resolved to remain ; that advantage he resolved to im- Raleigh, and a line from Savannah through Atlanta towards the prove. When Hunter's unsoldierlike advance upon Lynchburg left Tennessee, and from Augusta through Atlanta to the mighty the valley undefended, and when Early, rushing out of it, careered Alabama, connected State with State, and the whole with the through Maryland, and insulted Baltimore and Washington, capital. Upon the entirety of this railway system the safety of Grant rightly estimated the peril and, not a whit frightened, sup- the Confederacy depended. No waggon transport could feed the plied a prompt reinforcement, and again selected the right man, armies and keep up stores of ammunition, because the distances were Sheridan, to defend the valley road to the rear of Washington. so great that the whole South could not have supplied animals Moreover, he took and kept the Weldon Railroad, and thus re- in numbers sufficient to do the work. This could only be done by duced the Confederate communications to two—the road to Lynch- the locomotive, the canal barges, and the river steamers. An burg and the road to Danville, which intersected each other at army, as Sherman discovered by experiment, could live upon the Burkesville junction. The Confederacy was wounded, but not country so long as it was on the move, but when it halted in a de- mortally.
fensive position it must have a railroad or a river to feed it, go, or The other grand army, that in the hands of Sherman, moved die. The railways were at once the great element of the strength out of Chattanooga when Grant crossed. the Rapidan. Its direct and the great element of the weakness of the South. They were line of advance was the railway which winds through the moan- the strength, because they made the armed men in a sparsely- talus of northern Georgia and, crossing the Chattahoochee, peopled and half-cultivated country available on its frontiers ; emerges in the plains. Along this line, sometimes on one side, they were the weakness, because if broken the armed men would sometimes on the other, Sherman directed his columns, flanking be no longer available as they bad been before. In former Johnston out of mountain strongholds, forcing him back over years the Federal Government employed separate commanders, rivers, pressing on ever deeper and deeper into Georgia, until he but now they adopted the wise plan of appointing a military dic- crossed the Chattahoochee, and by a most skilful and decisive tator. They selected General Grant to direct the whole of the flank movement cut the Confederate Army in two and won military operations, and the result has amply justified the choice. Atlanta, the prize of a strenuous campaign. And while he had Grant decided that there should be only two great lines of opera- preserved with jealous care his own railway communications with tion and two great armies, and that all partial attacks should Chattanooga, he had broken up the lines converging in Atlanta cease. He determined to assail the railways of Virginia and from the east, west, and south. Now came the real crisis in the Georgia, —of Virginia, because there stood the capital of the Con- war. The Confederate President made a false move, Sherman federacy ; of Georgia, because in the heart of that State lay the fixed it by one of those great and unexpected strokes which are nexus of the railway lines, and because possession of that nexus the outward signs of true military genius. Mr. Davis thought opened the plains to the Federal troops. Therefore he eoncen- that Sherman was an ordinary general, who would tremble trated a great army in Virginia under his own hand, and he and fly if his line of retreat were threatened. Mr. Davis directed united the three armies of the south-west, armies which he himself Hood to throw himself upon that line of retreat, and sent Bean-
had led to victory, and entrusted them to Sherman, his ablest regard to help him. The stroke was made between Atlanta and
lieutenant. It is these armies which have destroyed the Con- Chattanooga; it failed, and Hood was forced to retreat into Northern federacy by defeating its soldiers and capturing its capital. Much Alabama, followed by his foe. Hood ought now to have returned they have owed to superiority of numbers and resources, much sharply towards Atlanta, but—" Quenz flees "—instead of doing they have been favoured by fortune, but the chief cause of their so he resolved to invade Tennessee. The blunder was flagrant, success is to be found in the skill of their leaders, who have known for Sherman, seeing the whole of Georgia at his mercy, resolved
when to strike and when to wait, and above all how to make a to profit by it, and marching to Savannah, destroying all the great blunder on the part of the adversary an irreparable calamity. railways in his paaange, to find a road to the sea, and bring his General Grant designed to strike across the Virginian railways, army through the heart of the Slave States to aid in the capture isolate, and capture Richmond. His main army was massed on of Richmond. How that was done our readers know, and there the North bank of the Rapidan, but his wings, each separate are few, very few, finer things in the whole range of military
columns, each supposed to be strong enough to take care of history. Hood's army for months counted for nothing in the itself, were at Harper's Ferry and Fortress Monroe. The right contest, and never recovered the crushing blow it received at
column was to fight its way to Staunton and march on Lynch- Nashville just as Sherman found himself on the deck of one of burg, the left was to ascend the James and surprise the southern Foster's gunboats. General Grant could not have anticipated approaches to Richmond, while the main body crossing the that Sherman would be on the Atlantic coast so early as Rapidan was to fight Lee, defeat him, and marching on the James December, 1864, but having him there, he made instant use cross it above Richmond, and thus secure its fall. It was Lee's of him. As he had swept over and destroyed the Georgian business to frustrate this scheme, and well he did it. Lee was railways, so Sherman, striking at the centre of the long and encamped on the road to Lynchburg and on the flank of the weak Confederate line, swept over and tore up the railways
to seize occasion, and Sherman's fine military insight, which direct road to Richmond, and when Grant suddenly cre.....:1 the enabled him to see, and his high courage, which enabled him to Rapidan last May, before he could completely array his immense profit by the huge blunders of his adversaries. It is the wonderful army, Lee sprang upon him like a panther, thrust him into the unity—a unity rarely attained by separate armies in war upon so depths of the Wilderness, gained time and opportunity to march grand a scale—of the operations of 1864-65, constituting them across his front, and re-appear at Spottsylvania, barring the one campaign which, when they are properly described, will make road to the Confederate capital. Grant, undismayed by this them of perennial interest not only to military and historical rough collision, closed in turn with his stout adversary, students, but to general readers. Intrinsically the operations of sustaining and inflicting great losses, losses he could bear better this year are worthy of the dosest attention of professional soldiers, than his foe. But when he found that he could not burst through while the profound tragedy of the contest imparts to its incidents ramparts formed of fallen trees, Grant swept round the right flank a force of attraction wider, deeper, and more powerful than that of Lee, and Lee, not to be outdone, fell back upon the angle which they exert as illustrations of the art of war. We have here between the North and South Anna rivers. Here he was too to deal with the military aspect, and sketch its broad outlines, and strong to be attacked in front ; once more the Federals circled make the reader see them as we see them—if we can. round the right flank, and once more Lee on the shorter line was In the spring of 1864 the Federals had only established them- the first to reach the Chickahominy. In the meantime the Federal selves in the fringe of the Confederate Slave States east of the left army, under Butler, had surprised City Point, but had failed Mississippi. Nowhere in Virginia were they more than three to seize Petersburg, and had been driven to intrench itself at marches from Washington. They were masters of the strategic Bermuda Hundred. Grant again tried force against Lee, who points of Tennessee, they prevailed throughout the course of the swiftly hurled him back, and then Grant, still resolute to " fight Father of Waters, but on the Atlantic coast Mobile, Savannah, it out on that line," cleverly marched round Lee for tb,e third Charleston, and Mrilmington defied them. A swarm of gunboats, time, and crossing the James appeared before Petersburg, monitors, and larger ships cruised painfully to and fro, but were but failed to snatch it. Lee, marching by the chord of the unable to prevent daring sailors in swift craft from entering and arc, took post in and about Petersburg, where he covered quitting at least two ports. A network of railways, as yet un- Richmond and its arterial railways. Now was the time to try broken, radiated from Richmond, ran north-west as far as the stamina of Grant. His plan had failed, his able foe had Staunton, with a branch from Gordonsville to Lynchburg, ran refused to be put off the roads to Richmond ; there he stood as south-west by Danville to Augusta, Macon, Selma, Mobile, hardily as ever. But though the letter of the plan had failed, in ran south-east and smith by Weldon through Wilmington to the spirit it had succeeded, for Grant had planted himself ins- Charleston, Savannah, and Florida, while a line from Charleston pregnably close to the great Confederate lines of communication, to Augusta, and a line from Wilmington to Greensboro' through and there he resolved to remain ; that advantage he resolved to im- Raleigh, and a line from Savannah through Atlanta towards the prove. When Hunter's unsoldierlike advance upon Lynchburg left Tennessee, and from Augusta through Atlanta to the mighty the valley undefended, and when Early, rushing out of it, careered Alabama, connected State with State, and the whole with the through Maryland, and insulted Baltimore and Washington, capital. Upon the entirety of this railway system the safety of Grant rightly estimated the peril and, not a whit frightened, sup- the Confederacy depended. No waggon transport could feed the plied a prompt reinforcement, and again selected the right man, armies and keep up stores of ammunition, because the distances were Sheridan, to defend the valley road to the rear of Washington. so great that the whole South could not have supplied animals Moreover, he took and kept the Weldon Railroad, and thus re- in numbers sufficient to do the work. This could only be done by duced the Confederate communications to two—the road to Lynch- the locomotive, the canal barges, and the river steamers. An burg and the road to Danville, which intersected each other at army, as Sherman discovered by experiment, could live upon the Burkesville junction. The Confederacy was wounded, but not country so long as it was on the move, but when it halted in a de- mortally.
fensive position it must have a railroad or a river to feed it, go, or The other grand army, that in the hands of Sherman, moved die. The railways were at once the great element of the strength out of Chattanooga when Grant crossed. the Rapidan. Its direct and the great element of the weakness of the South. They were line of advance was the railway which winds through the moan- the strength, because they made the armed men in a sparsely- talus of northern Georgia and, crossing the Chattahoochee, peopled and half-cultivated country available on its frontiers ; emerges in the plains. Along this line, sometimes on one side, they were the weakness, because if broken the armed men would sometimes on the other, Sherman directed his columns, flanking be no longer available as they bad been before. In former Johnston out of mountain strongholds, forcing him back over years the Federal Government employed separate commanders, rivers, pressing on ever deeper and deeper into Georgia, until he of South Carolina, forcing his foes upon divergent roads, and compelling them to yield up Charleston without a blow. At the same time part of the army which had defeated Hood at Nash- ville also arrived on the Atlantic coast, and completed the con- quest of Wilmington, began when Porter and Terry won the works at the mouth of the Cape Fear River. Then Sherman once more set his troops in motion for the North, and marched almost unopposed by Cheraw to Fayetteville. For the first time since he quitted Atlanta he found a Confederate army at length pre- pared to dispute his path, but he brushed them aside with half his army, and joined at Goldsboro' the troops which had arrived there both by land and sea from Wilmington. Nor was the arrival of Sherman on the Neuse the only sign of Confederate weakness. Sheridan, so often victorious in the Shenandoah valley, had dashed up it at the head of his effective horsemen, crushing Early, crossing the Blue Ridge, tearing up the railways nearly to Lynchburg, breaking the locks on the James River canal, and riding unopposed to White House on the Pamunkey, and thence into Grant's camp on the James.
The crisis was now at hand. There was no armed force on foot of any moment throughout the Confederacy, except the garrison in Richmond and the weak army of Johnston in North Carolina, and of the extensive interior railway system naught remained intact except a part of the lines between the James and the Con- garee. Lee felt, had long felt, his danger in all its fulness. His foes had gathered in council at City Point, for Sherman had come up in person from Goldsboro' and Mr. Lincoln from Washington. To anticipate the blow he saw about to fall, Lee made a desperate inroad upon Grant's lines, hoping to cut them in two and ruin the Federal army. Successful for a moment, he was soon repelled with heavy loss. Four days afterwards, on the 29th, Grant began his decisive movement. He marched out of his lines and flung his whole weight upon the Southside Railway, possession of which would give him Richmond. For three days, so strong were the Confederate lines, so valorous were their defenders, so densely wooded was the vast battle-ground, that the contest looked doubt- ful, but on the fourth day, April 1, Sheridan got well on the right flank of the Confederates, and by sheer fighting laid it flat and swept up the rear. Then the rest of the army made a combined attack, took redoubts and breastworks with the bayonet, and drove the Confederates over the Appomatox. This decided the fate of Petersburg and Richmond, which were abandoned by Lee in the night and occupied by the Feclerals in the morning, the first troops to enter Richmond being a coloured brigade.
Lee's only hope of escape lay in a swift march upon Burkesville junction, where he would have been in communication with John- ston and Lynchburg. But Grant now showed that he could pur- sue with as much vigour as he could fight. Moving himself with two corps along the Southside Railroad, he sent Meade with three corps and Sheridan's horse along the roads on his right direbtly upon Lee's line of retreat. Sheridan, whose perception of vital points is so keen, fastened upon Jettersville, a station on the Dan- ville road, a few miles from Amelia Court-house, so that when Lee reached that town he founed the road to Burkesville junction bar- red. Lee turned off to Painesville, seeking a circuitous path to Lynchburg. Sheridan learning this, urged Meade to exertion, and bothdirected their columns upon the road by which Lee mustmarch. As he came up Sheridan, with his own men and such infantry as he had in hand, fell fiercely on Lee's flank, and captured six generals, many guns, and thousands of prisoners. Had Meade been well up, Lee must there and then have been destroyed. Meade came up at the end of the fight, in time to quicken the rush of the fugitives over Sailor's Creek, an affluent of the Appomatox, five miles west of Burkesville junction. From this point, by flank move- ments, Lee was driven west of Farmville. There the news leaves them, Meade and Sheridan being close on the heels of Lee, Grant and Ord being between Lee and Johnston, while Hancock, with 30,000 men, was on the march from Winchester to Lynchburg— Lee's only line of retreat and place of refuge. It was this swift and well-directed pursuit of Lee, not less than the steady and skilful operations against his lines, that made this the decisive stroke of the war. The Confederacy is ruined from foundation to roof-tree, and is already a thing of the past.
If we have made ourselves understood, the reader will marvel with usat the astonishing skill with which the Federal Generals have used the immense forces placed in their hands; and if we are not mis- taken, the military student will in future years turn again and again for instruction to the campaigns of 1864-65, which abound in examples of the art of making war under the new conditions— railways, torpedo, telegraphs, earthworks, rifled cannon—and which have given a mortal blow to the once threatening Slave Power.
Previous page
