THE NEW PRESIDENT. A LL eyes are fixed on the new
President, and the world is asking what manner of man is he, and what are the views and plans of one who holds power and authority equal to that of the German Emperor in a country with nearly double the population of Germany and with ten times its wealth. We shall surprise many of our readers, both English and American, and yet we believe we shall be in the right, when we answer the first part of the question by saying that President Roosevelt is an old-fashioned American. Though in so many ways a typical modern man, he is at heart and in essentials far nearer the old type of American statesman than the majority of the men who have presided over America during the last sixty years. Mr. Lincoln was a man of genius, and so an exception to every rule—as much an exception among Presidents as Alfred, with whom he has many points of resemblance, was among Kings—but, save for Mr. Lincoln and General Grant, the modern Presidents have not been men of mark. They have been sound and ex- cellent constitutional Monarchs, but not leaders and rulers of men. Mr. Roosevelt is far more like the men of the first three decades of the Republic than the Convention- made Presidents of modern times. When we sayhe is an old- fashioned American we mean that he belongs to that strong, vigorous, authoritative type which has always existed in America, and always been apparent enough in business and in private life, though of late it has been somewhat submerged in politics. The late Lord Sherbrooke declared that what he liked about one of his colleagues—Lord Hartington—was his " you-be-damnedness." That same quality of downrightness, fearlessness, and determination is to be found in Mr. Roosevelt. He is essentially one of those men who know exactly what they want, and mean to get it. But together with this intensity and keenness the new President is a man of moderation. Those who can re- call the last Message sent by him to the Legislature of the State of New York while Governor may remember how essen- tially moderate was its general tone. Especially is this moderation of tone to be seen in all his expressions of opinion on such home questions as those of the Trusts, temperance legislation, and the Tariff. He has always held in regard to the Trusts that the capitalists have done a great deal of good. in organising industry, and that they must not be treated as enemies of the nation. At the same time, however, they are to be carefully watched and kept within reasonable bounds. In regard. to temperance and philanthropic legislation generally, Mr. Roosevelt has, again, always maintained the position of the via media. Apparently it is the same with the question of Protection. Mr. Roosevelt, though he has never put forward Free- trade as an ideal and has always upheld the existing fiscal system, has never been a Protection-at-any-price man. Even in the case of Imperialism and a vigorous foreign policy, Mr. Roosevelt has never gone to extremes, and he has frequently denounced the recklessness of the more violent Jingoes. In truth, there is a great deal of the old Whig moderation—we use the term rather in the English than the American sense—about Mr. Roosevelt. That is the spirit which dislikes extremes in all cases, which is against pushing even a good. principle or a good. policy too far, and is in favour of keeping all things within the bounds of common-sense. But this spirit is a very different one from that of the opportunist or the man of perennial compromise. The true Whig when he has discovered what he believes to be the path of moderation in any question will stick to it through thick and thin. His views may be " central," but they are none the less tenaciously . held, and history has shown again and again that the Whig temperamentmay be both authoritative and uncompromising in action. Lord Palmerston was a good example of the authoritative Whig, and, unless we are mistaken, Mr. Roosevelt will show in a. good many ways a striling resemblance to Lord Palmerston. Of course, no two men are ever quite alike, but impulsive- ness combined with an abstract moderation of view, and authoritativeness coupled. with a strict recognition of law and constitutional right, undoubtedly belong to both characters.
Naturally enough, what in here are Mr. Roosevelt' and especially his attitude believe that attitude can most men are interested s views on foreign policy, towards this country. We be rightly described in a sentence. Mr. Roosevelt is neither for nor against England, but merely for his own country. Ho does not wish this country any harm, but he would not dream of sacrificing the interests of America even in the smallest degree to help England. His sole desire is to serve America. He is, of course, an Imperialist, and he will no doubt do his best to administer the new Imperial posses- sions of America in the West Indies (Ceiba, and Puerto Rico), in the Pacific (the Sandwich Islands), and in the Fax East (the Philippines) wisely and well. But to say that he is an Imperialist is not to say all. The essential thing to remember in regard to Mr. Roosevelt's position as to foreign affairs is, that he is an upholder of the Monroe doctrine in its fullest and most complete form. All his writings and speeches show that he considers that America must prevent the European Powers obtaining any new foothold in North or South America, or extending the settlements they now possess in any form, direct or indirect. His view, that is, is to enforce the full Monroe doctrine at all costs. Coupled with this Mr. Roosevelt holds that the Americans ought to construct and control an Isthmian canal—either at Panama or in Nicaragua—and that such control should be absolute and without any kind of restriction.
It remains to consider whether these views of Mr. Roosevelt necessarily bring the policy that will be pursued by him into conflict with British interests. In regard to the Monroe doctrine it is admitted. that we have no cause or desire to quarrel with America. The doctrine only deals with new acquisitions, and does not concern Canada, the West Indies, or our Colonies in Central or South America. In truth, the true Monroe doctrine is in no sense injurious to this country. We do not wish to acquire new settlements on either of the American continents, nor to extend those which we have already obtained. On the contrary, we greatly prefer the status quo. The reasons, that is, which originally induced a British statesman to suggest the Monroe doctrine to President Monroe still hold good, and the more effectively it is applied by America the better we ought to be pleased. We hold, indeed, that it would be wise policy for us formally to notify to America our recognition of the true Monroe doctrine, for while admitting that we had no wish to expand, we should obtain something approaching an insurance of our possessions in North America, in the West Indies, in Central America, and in South America. True, we are well able to defend these places for ourselves if attacked, but still the recognition of the application of the Monroe doc- trine in regard to them might not be without result in ease of European complications. In regard to the Isthmian canal we would. also meet Mr. Roosevelt. As we have insisted again and again in these columns, it is to our interest (1) that the canal should be made ; (2) that it should be held by a friendly Power strong-enough to make the neutrality of the canal a reality, and not a paper formula. Therefore we ought to welcome the construction of the canal in the only way in which Dir. Roosevelt will consent to its con- struction. To urge that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty gives us a right to veto the mating of the canal, and that we ought not to part with that valuable veto-right unless America will consent to some compromise in the matter, seems to us most unwise. What we have got to consider is not our abstract rights in the matter, but our material interests. If it appears that it is to our interest that the canal should be made, let us not stand in our own light and talk big about the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. If we meant really to stand out and to fight America over the Canal question, there might be some sense in our present attitude. But in that case we ought to be busy in all the Chancelleries of Europe getting up a coalition against the American claims in regard to the Monroe doctrine. Unless we are greatly mistaken, we should not find the work a very difficult one. But needless to say, all England would repu- diate such a Machiavellian idea with the utmost indignation. The statesman who proposed such a scheme would be driven from the political stage with ignominy. Even if America were deliberately to denounce the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty —we do not for a moment suggest that Mr. Roosevelt is likely to do so—it would be impossible to get the people of this country either to `go to war alone or to promote any combination of Powers hostile to America. We intend, that is, to remain friends with America, and not to en- courage her secret enemies on this side of the Atlantic. But if we mean, as we assuredly do, to play a really friendly part towards America, is it not worth our while to get the benefit of our friendliness ? Though few Englishmen realise the fact, the Americans are in, deadly earnest about the canal. While even well-educated men here hardly know that the question exists, it is a burning one for all Americans. But just as we misunderstand their eagerness, so they misunderstand our apathy. They do not believe it possible that we can be indifferent on such a matter, and think our lazy non possuinus attitude must Cover some deep and strongly motived enmity. In truth, our Govern- ment, in the matter of the Canal question, appear to be heading straight for a humiliating act of folly. We are friendly and we desire to show our friendliness to America, but yet we seem determined to act in such a way that our friendliness will appear to the Americans like studied animosity. It is, indeed, hardly too much to say that to organise all Europe into an Anti-Monroe Doctrine League would cause little more enmity than will our present attitude if we insist on maintaining it.
And yet the death of President McKinley and the perfectly genuine outburst of national feeling for America and the Americans that has pervaded all classes here—the governing class quite as much as the people—affords us a unique opportunity to settle the Canal question on a sound and sensible basis by giving America a free hand in the Isthmus. We would go further, and as we have said, formally and clearly accept the Monroe doctrine as a declaration by which we mean to abide. The direct advantage bestowed on America by such action would be very great. The indirect advantage gained by ourselves would not be small, for we should make clear to the world that the traditional rivalry between the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race had passed away and could no longer be counted on.. Whether such a forcing of the Monroe doctrine upon the notice of the world would be a wise act on the part of America is, of course, another matter. It might even, though admitted by us, give rise to protests elsewhere which would be dangerous and difficult. That, however, would be the affair of America, not of Britain, and is not a matter on which we ought perhaps to express an opinion. All we need do is to give friendly satisfaction to America on matters which do not injure our own interests. Of America's true interests she, not Britain, must be the judge.
But perhaps we , write on the subject of the canal in too pessimistic a strain. It may be that our Government, since the failure of the Hay-Pauncefote Convention, have come to understand the subject better, and that President Roosevelt will find that a short, practical, and acceptable agreement has already been arrived at between the two Governments. We trust sincerely that this may be the case, and that his first official act in the region of high politics will be to endorse an understanding with Britain already sanctioned by Mr. McKinley.
Previous page
