SPECTATOR'S LIBRARY.

REITTARY HISTORY,

The Dispatches of Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington, during his various Cam- paigns in India, Denmark. Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries, and France. Com- piled from Official and other Authentic Documents, by Lieutenant-Colonel Gar- wood, C.B., K.C.T.S., Esquire to his Grace as Knight of the Bath, and Deputy- Lieutenant of the Tower of London. (An enlarged edition, in eight volumes.) Volumes 1. and II Parker, Furnirall, and Parker.

rTHICS,

The Book of Symbols; or a Series of Essays, illustrative and explanatory of Ancient Moral Precepts Chapman and Hall.

THE INDIAN DISPATCHES OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

WE noted the bibliographical features of this new edition of The Wellington Dispatches when the first part appeared ; but it may be useful to recapitulate the principal points,—which consist of compression, addition, and arrangement. The original twelve volumes are to be printed in eight. Great additions are made to the letters, from originals which were hunted out in the archives at Madras, Hyderabad, and Nagpoor, or found in other places; "the letters and General Orders, copied by the Deputy-Adjutant-General from the original manuscripts of the Duke of Wellington when commanding in India, have been inserted according to their re- spective dates ; and extracts from the Instructions for the move- ments of the Army, and from the General Orders circulated by the Quartermaster-General and Adjutant-General, in the Peninsula, France, and the Low Countries, have also been added to this edition." The documents relating to India are arranged as an in- dependent work, with an index of its own ; and it seems likely that the other volumes will have some distinction of arrangement, such as Portugal, the Peninsula and South of France, the Nether- lands, and the Army of Occupation.

The tangible saving of the present over the previous edition is

as self-evident as the difference between eight and twelve. The additions which will be made to it we cannot tell ; but the " drafts of a number of Indian letters, found accidentally, and too late for insertion in the order of their dates," alone fill an appendix of eighty pages of the two volumes under our notice, or about one- twentieth of the whole.

With the exception of four letters, written during the campaign

in Holland of 1794-95, the letters of the section immediately before us commence on the 3d October 1798, at Madras, where Colonel WELLESLEY had been ordered to join the army preparing to march against Seringapatam under General HARRIS, and end on the 9th July 1805, with some epistles written from St. Helena during the homeward voyage of Major-General Sir ARTHUR WELLESLEY, K.B. Memorandums on a great variety of civil and military subjects are intermingled with the Correspondence ; papers on Dearth in India, and on a proposed Plan of Employing Negro Troops in India and Sepoys in the West Indies, written on the voyage home, are printed as addenda, together with the Memorandum on Mar- quis Warastsissy's Government of India, composed after the Par- hamentary session of 1806.

The topics which employed the indefatigable pen of the ready

writer during the seven years of his Indian service are of endless variety; but the leading affairs in which he was engaged admit of reduction to some general classification, as this again admits of a division into principal and subordinate. The first principal em- ployment of Colonel WELLESLEY was in settling, in conjunction with a Commission of which he was the head, the territories that we acquired after the conquest of Seringapatam and downfall of TITF0O. When it was arranged what provinces we should give to our allies and what we should keep to ourselves, the Mysore terri- tory was erected into a distinct command, which was given to Colonel WELLESLEY, by his brother the Governor-General ; and he was so far rendered independent of all subordinate authority as to receive his orders directly from the Supreme Government of Calcutta, and to report directly to it. The second great employ- ment was the Mahratta war in the Deccan ; which arose in this way. Nominally the Peshwah was the head of the Mahratta state; but practically he was inferior in power to SCINDIAH, HoL- K.ta, and the Rajah of Berar, each of whom was anxious to get

-possession of his person to act as viceroy over him. At the time in

question, SCINDIAH was the controller of the Peshwah's court of Poonah • but Horacsa, taking up arms to overthrow this ascend- ancy, defeated the united forces of the Peshwah and SCINDIAH, in a battle fought near Poonah, on the 25th October 1802. The Peshwah fled ; threw himself upon the English, who agreed to pro- tect him ; and Major-General WELLESLEY, at the head of an army, restored him to his throne. It was literally a restoration ; for the Mahratta chief had no power out of his capital. HOLKAR, indeed, retired to his own territories, but kept up a threatening position ; whilst SCINDIAH and the Rajah of Berar pushed their armies upon the frontier of our ally the Nizam ; and as they refused to with- draw, war was declared against them. The campaign that followed gave rise to the battle of Assaye, gained over SCINDIAH'S forces, on the 23d September 1803, and the victory of Argaum, in which the united forces of SCINDIAH and the Rajah of Berar were de- feated, on the 29th November following, when a peace was nego- tiated. By a stretch of authority, which if justifiable was perhaps unusual, the Governor-General not only gave to his brother an " ex- traordinary power" for the conclusion of peace or the prosecution of the war, together with the general direction and control of all the political and military affairs of the British Government in the terri- tories of the Nizam, the Peshwah, and of the Mahratta states and

chiefs in the Deccan, but an authority over the forces in Guzzerat belonging to the Bombay Presidency. Hence, besides the diplo- macy, policy, and military matters of the Deccan branch of the Mahratta war, a good deal of the internal economy of the Bombay Government was brought under the notice of Major-General WELLESLEY.

The more subordinate matters of action were the campaign against Seringapatam ; the pursuit and destruction of a Mahratta freebooter or chieftain called DHOONDIAH WAUGH, whilst Colonel WELLESLEY held the command of Mysore ; and the surprise, celebrated, in the Duke's mind, for its forced march, of another predatory body, after the peace with SCINDIAH and the Rajah. Two other affairs, though not ending in action, are also embraced in the letters,—the preparation of an expedition against Mauritius, subsequently changed to Egypt, to which General BAIRD was appointed over Colonel WELLESLEY'S head, (whereat the Colonel was exceedingly angry) ; and opinions on various matters, written at Calcutta and other places, between his return from the Deccan in June 1804 and his embarkation for England in March 1805. The most interesting of these miscellaneous papers relate to LAKE'S campaign against HOLKAR in Hindostan.

If this exposition be shortly recapitulated in chronological order, it will be seen that the " argument " of the Indian Dispatches consists of-1. The campaign against Seringapatam : 2. The settlement and command of the Mysore territories, including the campaign or harrying of DHOONDIA11 WAUGH : 3. The organi- zation of a force assembled at Trincomalee, and subsequently carried to Bombay, where Colonel WELLESLEY was left behind sick, General BAIRD proceeding to Egypt : 4. The Mahratta war of the Deccan, and the negotiations for peace : 5. The winding up of the drama ; with miscellaneous matters, in which the pre-' sentation of addresses and offerings as acceptable bear a part.

The substantial matter of the letters relates, as we have inti- mated, to the policy, diplomacy, and military matters of India during the period in question. The military as a whole predo- minates ; exhibiting by special instances the interior economy of the service, and illustrating by examples, criticism, or remarks, the principles of Oriental and general warfare. A strongly- marked character is visible throughout, especially in the private let- ters ; and the orders or quasi-orders are strikingly exhibitive of the qualities of the writer.

Descending to more critical particulars, the impression of the reader of the Selections from the Dispatches, &c. will be rather en- larged and matured than materially altered. Perhaps the first and most obvious feeling will be the early period at which the author had formed his style. The four letters written in Holland, though upon mere military business, have a transparent clearness which he never surpassed, and which when he got into more extended subjects he sometimes lost sight of. They have also as much straightforward- ness, and as complete a grasp of the whole, such as it is. From an early period, though not so early as this, he displays "the usual concomitant of great abilities, a lofty and steady confidence in himself, perhaps not without some contempt of others." The imperatorial style seems to have grown with command and success. The Major-General in the Deccan appears to us to issue directions more like an Imperator than the Colonel in Mysore. The caus- ticity and indifference—the naiveté, which may imply either an obtuse simplicity or a bitter and mocking rebuke—also grew up, and rapidly. In any case the writer is bounded by his subject; whatever it naturally is, or his disposition makes it, such and no more is the effect produced: he cannot, like the Marquis of WEL- LESLEY, endow commonplace with a kind of pompous dignity, ore with some other writers, animate it by lightness of touch or force of diction. He does not overlay a subject by needless words ; but he imparts no adventitious interest by arrangement or treatment. On great occasions, where description or narrative rather than criticism or exposition is involved, he does not even rise to this merit. His official accounts of his battles are inferior—dry and technical. Those in his private epistles are better; but the reflec- tive predominates over the descriptive : be dwells upon the mili- tary means or the military results, or he deduces some practical con- clusion from his experiment in corpore vile. We believe he enter- tains an opinion that a battle cannot be properly described—that is, its story cannot be truly told : but perhaps " the wish is father to the thought "—as he cannot do it, he may think it cannot be done. However, here is an example of what we mean.

THE VICTOR ON THE VICTORY OF ASSAYE.

To Major Miticolm—" As the enemy have still several brigades undefeated, I almost doubt the propriety of the expedition into Berar by one of our di- visions only. Their infantry is the best I have ever seen in India, excepting our own ; and they and their equipments far surpass Tippoo's. I assure you that their fire was so heavy, that I much doubted at one time whether I should be able to prevail upon our troops to advance; and all agree that the battle was the fiercest that has ever been seen in India. Our troops behaved admirably ; the Sepoys astonished me. "These circumstances, and the vast loss which I sustained, make it clear that we ought not to attack them again, unless we have something nearer an equality of numbers."

To Colonel Stevenson (the second in command).—" Supposing that you de- termine to have a brush with them, I recommend what follows to your con- sideration. Do not attack their position, because they always take up such as are confoundedly strong and difficult of access; for which the banks of the nu- merous rivers and nullahs afford them every facility. Do not remain in your own position, however strong it may be, or however well you may have in. trenched it ; but when you shall hear that they are on their march to attack you, secure your baggage, and move out of your camp. You will find them is the common disorder of march; they will not have time to form, which, being s JOHNSON on MILTON, in the Life of Milton.

but half-disciplined troops, is necessary for them. At all events, you will have the advantage of making the attack on ground which they will not have Chosen for the battle; a part of their troops only will be engaged ; and it is possible that you will gain an easy victory. Indeed, according to this mode, you might choose the field of battle yourself some days before, and might meet them upon that very ground. " There is another mode of avoiding an action, which is, to keep constantly in motion : but unless you come towards me, that would not answer. For my part, I am of opinion, that after the beating they received on the 23d Septem- ber, they are not likely to stand for a second ; and they will all retire with pre- cipitation. But the Natives of this country are rashness personified ; and I acknowledge that I should not like to see again such a loss as I sustained on the 23d September, even if attended by such a gain."

It is also remarkable, how early the Duke of WELLINGTON must have discovered those principles of war which render a battle but a climax of many other things, or sometimes an accident of the strategic action, opposed so curiously, and in the long run so fatally, to NAPOLEON'S system, under which a battle was all in all, and the support of the army trusted pretty much to the chance of the locality, and its interior economy neglected altogether except as regarded military matters. In fighting a battle there is always an inevitable risk ; but there are other ways in which an enemy may be rendered powerless, or eventually destroyed, though that enemy should at first be equal or perhaps superior in mere fighting power. These principles, so grandly developed in the Peninsula, seem to have been early formed in WELLINGTON'S mind ; for their germ will be found in a remarkable memorandum with which he fur- nished General BAIRD, when illness prevented Colonel WELLESLEY from accompanying the expedition to Egypt.

To talk as the parasites do of this immense collection of business- letters being unequalled examples and models of this, that, and the other, would be uncritical. " Of every large composition," says REYNOLDS, " even of those which are most admired, a great part may be truly said to be commonplace." If this be true of the chefs d'oeuvre of art, where choice and selection are essential means of success, it must apply still more to letters often written on the de- tails of common affairs, very often so common as even to be below commonplace. What is possible for the unimaginative mind to ac- complish, is accomplished by WELLINGTON. He passes a sound and rational judgment upon the endless variety of matters sub- mitted to him ; in pronouncing upon a particular instance, he very often rises to the general principle which governs all other examples of the same kind : he so thoroughly penetrated the nature of the larger questions that came before him, that the rules of Indian warfare, and of Indian policy, (ca teris paribus,) may be deduced from his writings. He even goes further than this ; discovering bidden truths, or at least truths whose material shape is not directly before him. For example, the Governor-General wished that no European should be permitted to take service under the Mahrattas. The Duke profoundly argues—

ENCOURAGE A HOSTILE NATION TO CHANGE ITS NATIONAL ARM.

It appears, however, that the Governor-General is desirous that they should not have any Europeans at all. This prohibition will go to their having no infantry or artillery ; and this is a point which I think deserves consideration. Scindiah's armies had actually been brought to a very favourable state of discipline, and his power had become formidable, by the exertions of the European officers in his service : but I think it is much to be doubted whether his power, or rather that of the Methane nation, would not have been more formidable, at least to the British Government, if they had never had an European, as an infantry soldier, in their service, and had carried on their operations in the manner of the original Marhattas, only by means of cavalry. I have no doubt whatever but that the military spirit of the nation has been destroyed by their establishment of infantry and artillery—possibly, indeed, by other causes : at all events, it is certain that those establishments, however formidable, afford us a good object of attack in a war with the Marhattas, and that the destruction of them contributes to the success of the contest, and to the reestablishment of peace ; because, having made them the principal object of their attention, (which they must do in order to have them at all,) and that part of their strength on which they place most reliance, they become also the principal reliance of the army ; and therefore, when they are lost, the cavalry, as is the case in this war, will not act.

Two questions occur here : one is, whether the Marhatta cavalry were ever better than they now are ? if they were, whether they would regain their spirit, if the infantry establishment were to be destroyed ? I believe they were for- merly better than they now are. In regard to the second point, I hare to ob- serve, that if there were no infantry in a Marbatta army, their cavalry would commence those predatory operations for which they were formerly so tamoue; and although I am aware of the greater difficulties they would now have to en- counter than their ancestors formerly had, from the practice which is universal in the Deccan, and, I believe, in Hindustan, of fortifying every village, (and I know that these are means of opposing them successfully,) I should still con- eider these operations to be more formidable to the British Government than any that they can ever carry on by means of the best body of infantry that they can form. On this ground, therefore, I think that they should be en- couraged to have infantry rather than otherwise.

As a written work, The Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington are a storehouse of military and political wisdom, as well as the most valuable collection of historical documents that perhaps ever ema- nated from one man. On lesser subjects they are frequently inte- resting and attractive from the force and character which his pecu- liar disposition imparts to particular incidents; though the general curiosity as to the Duke himself may give some additional zest to points of this kind. But, as we observed when reviewing the Selections, some years ago, a good deal of the correspondence is upon particular matters whose interest has ceased, or which never had any except for the persons concerned in the business. There is besides a great deal of repetition, where the same facts or senti- ments are addressed to different individuals ; and this is more felt in the entire work than in the Selections, though the whole possesses pore interest and character. In one point of view, many of these letters would furnish the model of a business, legal, or official style, from their clearness, firmness, and unimpassioned character. In this light, a selection of the best would deserve to be studied as literary models, though rather by principals than subordinates. But their coldness, on questions where warmth or feeling are necessary to the subject, imparts to them a singular air ; the strength of the terms contrast- ing oddly with the immobility of the feeling. This immobility or suppression of feeling extends to matters which concern himself, and upon which it seems likely that he felt acutely. Sensitiveness is a trait of which few would suspect WEL- LINGTON ; yet we think that he was sensitive if the offence came from power. To public opinion he might be indifferent as the Ro- man of HOR&CE—" Populus me sibilat" ; he perhaps cared nothing about the opinion of his fellow-soldiers, or his social equals, even if he thought he stood in a wrong light, but could not explain without " detriment to the public interests." Death itself mostly draws from him full particulars in a long story, or regrets for the military or civil loss. But let authority touch him, and be is sore enough. When the Governor-General appointed General Berm) to command the Egyptian expedition, or as Colonel WELLESLEY has it, to supersede him, he writes in these terms to their brother HENRY- " I then ask you, has there been any change whatever of circumstances that was not expected when I was appointed to the command ? If there has not, (and no one can say there has, without doing injustice to the Governor- General's foresight,) my supercession must have been occasioned either by my own misconduct or by an alteration of the sentiments of the Governor- General.

" I have not been guilty of robbery or murder, and he has certainly changed his mind; but the world, which is always goodnatured towards those whose affairs do not exactly prosper, will not, or rather does not, fail to suspect that both, or worse, have been the occasion of my being banished, like Gen. Kray, to my estate in Hungary. I did not look, and did not wish, for the appoint- ment which was given to me ; and I say that it would probably have been more proper to give it to somebody else : but when it was given to me, and a circular written to the Governments upon the subject, it would have been fair to allow me to hold it till I did something to deserve to lose it.

"I put private considerations out of the question, as they ought and have bad no weight in causing either my original appointment or my supercession. I am not quite satisfied with the manner in which I have been treated by Govern- ment upon the occasion. However, I have lost neither my health, spirits, nor temper, in consequence thereof."

During the Mabratta war, he ordered a contribution to be levied on a town called Burhampoor. This came to the ears of the Governor ; whose lofty ideas of British statesmanship seem to have been startled by this French or freebooting system of making the war maintain itself. But he merely proceeded to "hint a fault and hesitate dislike," when the Major-General flares up, and writes as follows to his friend MALeor.m- I am much annoyed by the receipt of a letter from Sydenbam, written by the Governor-General's order, from which I perceive that some suspicion is entertained respecting the propriety of demanding the contribution at Barham- poor, the report of which had reached the Governor-General through a private channel. Great pains are taken in Sydenham's letter to prove to me that no suspicion is entertained, that the questions upon the subject are asked merely for information : but those very pains prove the existence of the suspicion; and in fact, why is he in such a hurry to ask for information upon a subject upon which information must be given, unless some suspicion is entertained ?

" I have answered this letter, and have shown, that from the increase of my expenses, by measures not mine—by the total want of funds provided for this army—by my being left to chance—and by the Governor-General having em- ployed the frigate sent to Bengal for money—and by not paying my bills at Benares and not furnishing money to pay them at Bombay—there was every reason to expect the loss of the campaign from the deficiency of funds to carry it on ; and that, in fact, I could not have paid the troops in December, if it had not been for this very sum of money raised by contribution at Burhampoor, and the sales of goods captured at Asseerghnr.

" I have told the Governor-General, that if he disapproves of the measure, he may order the money to be restored: but I have warned him, that if be does give those orders, Scindiah will certainly put the money into his pocket. In fact, if I had not exerted myself to keep in my hands a command of money, what would have become of the campaign ? Where would have been the na- tional honour or character if the campaign had been lost ? "

And in another letter to Major SHAWE, the Governor's Private Secretary, he enters into the grievance at full length.

But though imperturbableness and indifference are the rule, there are exceptions. He is sometimes excited into panegyric by an action in which courage is combined with conduct, and be dis- plays towards his personal intimates more of friendliness than we think characterized him at a later period of life. There is one letter to MUNRO, (page 35,) which is distinguished by great con- sideration, and almost tenderness ; and this to MALCOLM is a kind compliment, resembling one of JOHNSON'S to BURKE.

"I have received your letter without a date, but written, I suppose, on the 13th. My last letter will have convinced you that you have not written a line too much, at least to me, on the subject of Gwalior ; and you will have ob- served that I have not received one of the letters which you supposed that I had received previous to the 7th. But I wonder how you could imagine that you could write too much to me on any subject."

Philosophy is another quality scarcely expected in WELLINGTON; yet he has the philosophy which, disregarding the forms of things, looks only to their nature. Instances might be produced in apparent opposition to this opinion, but we think they will be found to be questions where the nature of the business is formal and a dis• regard of conventional practices would produce far more evil thaa any compliance with customary usage. The puppet potentates of the East are estimated at their true value ; the meanest Native is not rated below it—except in war, when philosophy yields to "force and arms." There is, however, a similar limit to his philosophy as to his immobility—it melts before the glance of power. Had his lot been cast among the ancient philosophers, he would have resem- bled the sage at the court of HADRIAN, who would not confute the master of so many legions. He seems through life to have looked upon supreme authority, not with servility, not with superstitious reverence, (for he is ready to criticize,) bat with that unresisting submission which mankind pay to the laws of nature. He would as soon have thought of opposing established power, to which he owed allegiance, as men would think of living with their heads under water.

One very curious point in the volumes is the total want of moral sense displayed throughout. Rules for regular living, maxims of civil, military, and political morality, may indeed be drawn from them, and upon a larger and loftier scale than from writers who may have more of morals in their mouths. But they are not founded on any inherent law of nature, or upon any effect to be produced upon human happiness or human misery, but upon the results that will follow to the public service. In giving orders that the greatest care should be taken to protect the women in an assault upon a place belonging to an ally, he assigns as the reason, that the potentate would be more offended at any violence offered to his ladies than gratified by the exertion of our valour and dis- cipline in his cause,—outrage, anguish, and wounded honour, going for nothing. Here is a similar example.

WIVES, CONCUBINES, AND HUSBANDS.

There ought to be no restriction whatever upon the Princes [Tippoo's family] taking as many women, either as wives or concubines, as they may think proper. They cannot employ their money in a more harmless way; and the consideration of the future expense of the support of a few more women after their death is trifling. Let them marry whom they please. Their marriages with Mussulmann families only create an additional number of de- pendents and poor connexions, and additional modes of spending their money.

The Princesses ought not to be allowed to marry. A Mussulmann would found a pretension either to a large pension, or even to the Government of Mysore, upon his connexion with one of Tippoo's daughters. It is as well to avoid this; and therefore these ladies must continue in their present state. They ought, however, to have any additional comfort or allowance which can make them happy and reconcile them to their fate. I do not think the same objection sill exist hereafter to ellosing the Princes to marry their daughters to whomsoever they please.

The indefatigable application of WELLINGTON is common know- ledge, but no one can have a full idea of it without going over his Dispatches. The sense of the work he must have gone through is almost overwhelming to the mind. On some days the mere writing of the letters would appear to have been employment enough for any one ; yet, in addition to this, he must have had all the routine and formal duties of a commander-in-chief and of principal diplomatist to perform : nor does it seem likely that on any day he could have escaped from questions of much temporary importance to the parties concerned, especially as every Native insisted upon dealing personally with him : and all this work was done amid the fatigues of marches and the relaxing nature of an Indian climate. Yet he is probably not a lover of labour for its own sake. Had he followed authorcraft, he would have weighed " solid pudding against empty praise." The only paper which has an abstract character—which was written without some ne- cessity, or some bearing upon action present or in prospect—is the article on Dearth in India. The choice was voluntary—suggested by a speech of MACKINTOSH, which he " read in a Bombay news- paper," and his own experience of the famine in question. The subject was important, for the writer himself had known fifty per- sons die daily in a single city, notwithstanding a sort of poor-law be had established to feed the destitute from the public stores. It was written on the voyage home, when he was at leisure; and it bears marks of care and condensation. It has a largeness co- extensive with its subject ; it contains the knowledge of the geo- grapher, the economist, and the cultivator, shown in conjunction with the close observer of every thing that came before him ; the country and its cultivation, as dependent upon natural pltmnomena and human art, are exhibited as in a pictured plan ; and the con- clusions are just and true : but no public authority had demanded it, nothing could " come of it," and it is left unfinished.

The most striking, and, looking to the autobiographical nature of the publication, perhaps the most curious trait iu the volumes, is their astonishing variety. Subjects the most opposite were con- stantly submitted to the writer for decision ; and each receives a consideration rather according to its own nature than to its appa- rent importance (though he may rebuke the litigant of trivialities). Laws military and municipal, and sometimes nice points, were sent to him,—as when certain persons had pledges for loans, which pledges were plundered, or said to be plundered, in the sack of Seringapa- tam, and the borrowers came to demand their gage. The rate of exchange, the principles of profit and loss, the practice of house- building, road-making, boat, bridge, and carriage-building, were brought under his consideration. Sometimes his talk was of oxen, very frequently of the horse : straw and green meat—rice and dry grain, with their various qualities and nutritive effects—military equabblea 'and military misbehaviour—regulations of police and hygiene—with " many other particulars, too numerous to mention," all came before him, mingled with the larger questions of military discipline—the principles of warfare, modified by the character of the people and the country—the position, interests, and actors of the Native courts, and the policy which should regulate our inter- course with them. In all these a sound mind generally leads to a pound conclusion ; though hard or harsh, with perhaps some of the stern indifference to individual feeling which philosophical poets have ascribed to superior beings in contemplating mundane mat- ters. It was this training which gave him his vast insight into human affairs ; and, with success, inspired him with that self-confidence which subsequently supported him through the more trying scenes of the Peninsula, when be had to contend with the power of France and the incapacity of the British Government, as it enabled him at a later period of life to engage successfully in civil affairs, to the nine days wonder of the world. It must not, however, be con- cealed, that in India he had advantages such as no other man in a subordinate capacity perhaps ever enjoyed. If his brother did not use his influence as Governor-General to advance him unduly, he certainly gave him unexampled power and support. Those who wish to test the opinions advanced in this notice must examine The Dispatches, and with some care, for by no other evidence can the deductions be supported : but we will take as many quotations as we can, that have a bearing upon the variety of the matter, or the style and character of the writer.

STATE OF A SACKED CITY.

[Seriugapatam,) 5th May, 10 a.m.

To Lieut.-Gen. Harris.—" We are in such confusion still, that 1 recommend it to you not to come in till tomorrow, or, at soonest, late this evening. Before I came here, Gen. Baird had given the treasure in charge to the prize-agents. There is a guard over it, and it appears to be large.

" As soon as I can find out where the families of the great men are, I shall send guards to take care of them. At present I can find nobody who can give tee any information upon the subject. • • • • "P.S. There are some tigers here which I wish Meer Alum would send for, or else 1 must give orders to have them shot, as there is no food for them, and nobody to attend them, and they are getting violent."

" 124 p us.

To Lieut. Gen. Harris.—" I wish you would send the Provost here, and put him under my orders. Until some of the plunderers are hanged, it is in vain to expect to stop the plunder. I shall be obliged to you if you will send positive orders respecting the treasure."

" Seringapatam, 5th May 1799.

To Lieut.-Gen. Harris.—" Things are better than they were, but they are still very bad ; and until the Provost executes three or four people, it is im- possible to expect order, or indeed safety. " There are at this moment Sepoys and soldiers belonging to every regiment in your camp and Gen. Stuart's in the town. It would surely be advisable to order the rolls to be called constantly, end to forbid any people to leave camp. For a few days, likewise, it would be very advisable that the officers of the army should suspend the gratification of their curiosity, and that none but those on duty should come into the town. It only increases the confusion and the terror of the inhabitants. Till both subside in some degree, we cannot ex- pect that they will return to their habitations. " P.S. I hope the relief is coming, and that I shall soon receive your orders respecting the treasure."

" Seringapatam, 6th May 1793.

To Lieut.- Gen. Harris.—" Plunder is stopped, the fires are all extinguished, and the inhabitants are returning to their houses fast. I am now employed in burying the dead, which I hope will be completed this day, particularly if you send me all the pioneers." The late attack on the Directors would seem to be the requital of a grudge of more than forty years standing. He thus writes to MALCOLM touching the Leadeuhall Street folks of 1802— ., The degree of approbation which will be given to them [measures] at home will he in proportion to the knowledge which people have of the cha- racters of the leading men in India, particularly of those of the favourites of the Court of Directors. 1 hope, therefore, that Lord W. has taken care in his dispatches to bring a few facts to the knowledge of his friends in England. I rejoice to bear that he intends to go home if justice is not done to hint by the Court of Directors; and if the Ministers do not give him security that he shall not be again liable to the corrupt and vulgar interference of Leadenhall Street in the operations of his government. Their appointment to all the principal offices at Fort St. George, and the encouragement which I understand they have given to their Councils to oppose the acts of their Governors, are incon- sistent with the spirit of, if not directly contrary to the law ; and their sending out to India all those who have been sent home for misbehaviour, must, if not prevented in future, end in the annihilation of all British power in India. All these measures are aimed directly at Lord Wellesley ; and be cannot remain in the government, and no gentleman can succeed to him, if means are not taken to prevent them in future."

WHAT ANNOYS A MAN WITH. A FEELING MIND.

•• Seringapatam, 20th September 1801. To Capt....41-alcolm.—" I envy your situation upon the river Hoogly. I ant tied here by the necessity of prosecuting, at a General Court-martial, —, —, and —, who robbed the stores when I was absent in the field.

"I am concerned that the Governor-General should have any such cause of uneasiness as you describe. However, it is very certain that nothing annoys a man with a feeling mind so much as the disapprobation of those whom chance has made his superiors for a short time, particularly when he knows that such disapprobation is undeserved."

BEWARE OF BEING OVERCOME.

Seringapatam, 17th July 1802.

G. 0.—Cal. Wellesley was concerned to learn that any officer under his com- mand had been put in arrest for "coming to the parade of his regiment in a state of intoxication ' ; and although it appears, by the evidence which has been brought before the General Court-martial, of which Lieut.-Col. Mackay was president, that Major Bell, the commanding-officer of — --, may have been mis- taken on this occasion, Col. Wellesley is concerned to be under the necessity of observing, that if there had not been good reason to believe that — — was in the habit of drinking intoxicating liquors at undue hours, Major Bell would not have attributed his staggering upon the parade to intoxication, but would have supposed that it was occasioned by other causes. It is not to be imagined that any officer would cast such an imputation upon another upon the first symptom of his deserving it ; and the observations made by - in his defence, that his staggering ought to be imputed to indisposition, would be correct, if circumstances had not given too strong reason to believe that in- toxication alone was the cause of it.

Col. Wellesley, therefore, in reprimanding -- for the crimes of which be has been found guilty, cannot avoid calling his attention, and that of the troops under his command in general, to the other crime of Aich he has been acquitted. It is one of the most degrading to the character of an officer, which renders him unfit for any part of his duty ; and by the practice of it be fails in that moat essential point, the setting an example to the soldiers under his com- mand. Col. Wellesley, however, has the pleasure of reflecting that this failing is rare among the officers under his command, in proportion as it is great; but he warns all against even the suspicion of it.

THE BAKER AND THE BREAD.

Seringapatam, 10111September 1802. G. 0.—Col. Wellesley has received a report from Lieut.-Col. Brown, com- manding at Hullihall, dated the 5th instant, upon the subject of the conduct of certain officers of the First -Batt. — Bombay Regt., regarding a baker at which appears to him so extraordinary as to require this public mode of expressing his sentiments upon it. It appears that Ensign —, of the First Batt. — Regt., beat the bakes of the place ; in consequence of which, Lieut.-Col. Brown issued an order to prohibit all officers and soldiers under his command from molesting the inha- bitants of Hullihall in any manner. Col. Wellesley entirely approves of that order issued by Lieut.-Col. Brown ; and he desires that be will see it carried

Into execution, and that he will put in arrest and report to him the name of any officer who disobeys it.

In consequence of the beating given to this baker, or for some other reason, it appears that he does not choose to bake any longer at Ilullihall, and that he quits the place and proceeds to Goa. Some of the officers of the First Batt.

Regt. then write letters to Lieut.-Col. Brown to complain that they have not bread for their breakfasts ; and others wait upon him to make similar corn- plaints, having omitted to put on their side-arms. The officers of the First Batt. — Regt. must be informed, first, that Lieut.-Col. Brown is by no means obliged to find a baker to bake bread for them; secondly, that, living in the same fort with their commanding-officer, it is their duty to wait upon him, to make their complaints known to him, and not to write to him upon all these trifling occasions; and thirdly, that if they should find it necessary to wait upon him, or even to quit their quarters at all, the standing orders of this Army, and the customs of every military service, require that they should wear their side-arms.

THE WELLINGTON-ORIENTAL STYLE.

21.t September 1802. To his Highness the Nizam.—After the assurance of devoted submission, the representative of the sincere welts isher, Col. Wellesley, has the honour to state to the attendants on the presence, the treasury of bounty, of the un- sullied Nabob of exalted titles, whose turrets are the heavens, and whose origin is celestial, (be his dignified shade extended !) that two purses, containing the illustrious enayetnamahs, replete with kindness, the one vouchsafing the acknowledgment of the bark of the Murgosah trees, and the other communi- cating the extensive benefit which had been effected by it, with an order for the transmission of some bark from the trunks of both the trees, sealed, and under the charge of the camel hircarrah of the prosperous Circar, honoured and ele- vated me by the grandeur of their approach and the dignity of their arrival.

On learning the circumstance of the benefit which had been experienced by the brilliant constitution, from the attendants on the presence, from the appli- cation of the aforesaid bark, I derived the utmost happiness. • * The desire of my heart, the seat of constancy, is that the exalted attendant will confidently regard and esteem the aforesaid bark as a memorable instance of the loyalty of the wellwisher, and as a testimony of the anxiety of British officers to effect all arrangements which may be desired by or beneficial to the noble presence.

May the God of his slaves grant that the orb of your prosperity may shine and glitter from the eternal horizon, like the sun in the zenith I PECUNIARY STATE OF THE MAHRATTAS.

I have to observe, that the more I see of the Marhattas, the more convinced I am that they never could have any alliance with the French. The French, On their arrival, would want equipments, which would cost money, or money to procure them ; and there is not a Marhatta in the whole country, from the Peshwah down to the lowest horseman, who has a shilling.

WELLINGTON'S MODE OF DEALING.

There is a fellow, by the name of Mouse, at Tellicherry, who supplies the

Rajah with rice, to my certain knowledge. A hint might be given to him that .1 am in the habit of hanging those whom I find living under the protection of the Company and dealing treacherously towards their interests; that i spare neither rank nor riches; but that, on the contrary, I punish severely those who by their example create the evils for which the unfortunate people suffer.

WANT OF SENTIMENT AT BOMBAY.

In the last year, when Government authorized me to order repairs to be made to the latter, I thought that the officers might be trusted to make these repairs themselves; and 1 adopted that mode particularly as there were no en- gineers in the country who could undertake the works to be performed. I am sorry to say that there is such a want of sentiment among the gentlemen of the Bombay establishment, that, although they have charged large sums for buildings for their troops, they have done nothing, and the troops are as much exposed to the weather as ever • and they now look out for a job of this kind sa a matter of legal profit. They have bored me to death with letters upon the subject, and at last they have reached the Military Board through the medium of Mr. Gordon. By one of the letters, which I enclose you, it appears that the fort of Chandergooty is falling down ; which I acknosi ledge I look upon as a fortunate circumstance. * • * Thus we should get rid of a job of the most distressing kind. There is nothing, I assure you, so bad as the Bombay gentle- men.

• BILLS urost nosioun.

These bills upon honour should not be multiplied. The expenses of the

militia:), establishment should be brought under regular heads of account, and there should be a regular mode of supply ing everything for which there is a regular demand. A bill upon honour ought never to be admitted, excepting for an extraordinary service or demand which could not have been foreseen, and for which no provision can have been made by any previous order or regulation

RATIONALE OF OBEDIENCE TO ORDERS.

Camp at Jaunt, Friday, 11th Nov. 1803.

G. 0.—On publishing the sentence of the General Court-martial on the trial of Capt. —, Major-Gen. Wellesley thinks it proper to explain to the troops, that there is much difference in the situations and cases in which an officer is permitted to exercise his discretion.

It may frequently happen that an order may be given to an officer, which, from circumstances not known to the person who gave it at the time he issued it, would be impossible to execute, or the difficulty or risk of the execution of it would be an great as to amount to a moral impossibility.

In a case of this kind, Major-Gen. Wellesley is by no means disposed to check

officers detached in the exercise of their discretion. But Capt. 's case is not of this description : he could have, and had, no information which the officer had not who gave him orders ; and it was his duty to obey.

INFORMATION FOR A POTENTATE.

I will send to the Pagah Sirdars, as the Peshwah wishes it, and let them know that nothing will be done for them through our mediation. But it is proper that the Peshwah should be informed, that, from the highest man in his state to the lowest, there is not one who will trust him, or who will have any connexion or communication with him excepting through the mediation and tinder the guarantee of the British Government. I have no wishes in respect to those Sirdars, or any other person whatever, excepting to forward his Highness's Government. But possibly he will be able to settle it without any assistance from us. lie shall try it; as 1 intend to fix the troops in a place of security, and in such a position as will prevent foreign invasion, and then let him do his best.

TACTICS AGAINST FREEBOOTERS.

The account you give of the state of Holkar's army is very satisfactory. I have served a good deal in this part of India against this description of free- booter; and I think that the best mode of operating is to press him with one or two corps capable of moving with tolerable celerity, and of such strength as to render the result of an action by no means doubtful, if he should venture to risk one. There is but little hope, it is true, that he will risk an action, or that any one of these corps will come up with him. The effect to be produced by this mode of operation is to oblige him to move constantly and with great celerity. When reduced to this necessity, he cannot venture to stop to plun- der the country, and he does comparatively but little mischief: at all events, the subsistence of his army becomes difficult and precarious, the horsemen be- come dissatisfied, they perceive that their situation is hopeless, and they desert in numbers daily; the freebooter ends by having with him only a few ad- herents ; and he is reduced to such a state as to be liable to be taken by any small body of country horse, which are the fittest troops to be then employed against him.

In proportion as the body of our troops, to be employed against a freebooter of this description, have the power of moving with celerity, will such freebooter be distressed. Whenever the largest and most formidable bodies of them are hard pressed by our troops, the village people attack them upon their rear and flanks, cut off stragglers, and will not allow a man to enter their villages ; be- cause their villages being in some degree fortified, they know well that the free- booters dare not wait the time which would be necessary to reduce them. When this is the case, all their means of subsistence vanish ; no resource re- mains excepting to separate ; and even this resource is attended by risk, as the village people cut them off on their way to their homes.

The following remarks have been printed before, but they are too useful in all professions to be properly omitted in an account of the great Duke's writings.

SECRECY.

I believe that in my public dispatches I have alluded to every point to which I should wish to draw your attention, excepting one, which 1 will mention to you, that is the secrecy of all your proceedings. There is nothing more certain than that, of one hundred affairs, ninety-nine might be posted up at the market-cross without injury to the public interests; but the misfortune is, that where the public business is the subject of general conversation, and is not kept secret as a matter of course upon every occasion, it is very difficult to keep it secret upon that occasion on which it is necessary. There is an awkwardness in a secret which enables discerning men (of which description there are always plenty in an army) invariably to find it out ; and it may be depended upon, that whenever the public business ought to be kept secret, it always suffers when it is exposed to public view. For this reason secrecy is always best ; and those who have been long trusted with the conduct of public affairs are in the habit of never making known public business of any description that it is not necessary that the public should know. The consequence is, that secrecy becomes natural to them, and as much a habit as it is to others to talk of public matters • and they have it in their power to keep. things secret or not, as they may think proper.

The Memorandum on the scheme to employ Negroes in the East Indies is complete and conclusive, and has something of the breadth of historical composition. It is also valuable for the mili- tary principles it contains, and curious for some of its facts, and the power of observation they show in the author, as well as his total want of imagination. Circumstances raise the estimate of the soldier in the East ; and the result is to raise his character. The theoretical inference would seem to be, that the experiment would. be worth trying at home : yet we believe the Duke, in his evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons, scouted the idea of such an attempt.

BRITISH SOLDIERS IN THE EAST.

Bravery is the characteristic of the British army in all quarters of the world ; but no other quarter has afforded such striking examples of the existence of this quality in the soldiers as the East Indies. An instance of their misbehaviour in the field has never been known ; and particularly, those who have been for some time in that country cannot be ordered upon any service, however dan- gerous or arduous, that they will not effect, not only. with bravery, but a degree of skill not often witnessed in persons of their description in other parts of the world.

I attribute these qualities, which are peculiar to them in the East Indies, to the distinctness of their class in that country from all others existing in it. They feel that they are a distinct and superior class to the rest of the world which surrounds them; and their actions correspond with their high notions of their own superiority. Add to these qualities, that their bodies are inured to climate, hardship, and fatigue, by long residence, habit, and exercise, to such a degree, that I have seen them for years together in the field without suffering any material sickness ; that I have made them march sixty miles in thirty hours, and afterwards engage the enemy ; and it will not be surprising that they should be respected as they are throughout India. Their weaknesses and vices, however repugnant to the feelings and prejudices of the Natives, are passed over in the contemplation of their excellent qualities as soldiers, of which no nation has hitherto given such extraordinary instances. These qua- lities are the foundation of the British strength iu Asia, and of that opinion by which it is generally supposed that the British empire has been gained and up- held. These qualities show in what manner nations consisting of millions are governed by thirty thousand strangers. For this body, endowed with these excellent qualities, are Negroes a substi- tute? It does not appear that the fidelity of the Negroes can be depended upon ; they are prone to mutiny. They are brave, undoubtedly ; but are they unhesitatingly so as are the English soldiers?

NATIVE ESTIMATE OF FOREIGNERS.

It is a curious fact, but one that has more than once fallen ender my ob- servation, that the Natives of India have no fear or respect for the military qua- lities of the soldiers of any European nation excepting the English. I had under my command for some years the Swiss regiment De Meuron, which, for good conduct, discipline, and other military qualities, was not surpassed by the English regiments ; but the Natives heard that they were foreigners—that they had been bought into the service, and they had no confidence in them. What respect or confidence could be expected from them in a band of purchases Negroes? Let them go to Ceylon, where the establishment is less of the nature of a colony than these are on the continent of India. The climate of that island is said to be more congenial to their constitutions than it has been found to be- to those either of Europeans or Natives of India. Their mutinies or misbe- haviour can do no permanent mischief there, as the body required for the ser. vice of that island must always be small.

SEPOYS AND PRINCIPLES OF VAR.

The Sepoys are to be substituted for the European as well as the Negro troops. There is no man who has a higher opinion, or ought to have a higher opinion, of the Sepoys than I have. I have tried them on many serious oc- casions, and they never failed me, and always conducted themselves welL But• it must be recollected that in India we never, or scarcely ever, undertake any service with the aid of Sepoys only. The operations of war in India are always, or ought to be, offensive, if they can be made so ; and it is possible in an offensive operation to have some of the troops who are to perform it, how- ever desperate it may be, of an inferior description. Accordingly, in proportion. to the service to be performed, we have seen one-third, one-fourth, one-sixth, one-tenth of the number of the operating army English soldiers ; and it has been held by great authorities that one•sixth of the whole army in India. ought to be of that description. This edition of the Wellington Dispatches is capitally got-up, and in all the formal parts is exceedingly well edited. The chro- nological precis of the Duke of Weeentorox's services, the intro- ductory view of the affairs of India, and the explanation of Indian terms, as well as the index, are all useful in themselves and ex- cellent in their way. But the work wants graphical illustrations— maps of the districts on a larger scale than they are represented in a general atlas, and plans of the actions. References are made to the Wellesley Dispatches, which the reader may not have ; whereas a few additional pages in such a work as this could be of no consequence, especially where precise terms are desirable to enable an historical inquirer exactly to understand the point in ques- tion. Notes, too, are required ; for the few that Colonel Guawoon has added scarcely deserve the title, though they are very good as far itS they go. Many minute matters are of necessity obscure as they stand ; sometimes the beginning or end of things does not appear, though perhaps exciting more interest in the reader than greater matters ; and in many cases the characters, or position rather of the correspondents, may be unknown, or their particular situation at the time in question. Thus, there is Major SHAWE, to whom the Duke addresses very important and confidential communications : the Ma- jor was the Private Secretary to the Governor-General, who at last wrote to his brother, "I do not know why you address your private letters to the Private Secretary, and not to me : consult, however, your private convenience." To this the General replies—" I have penerally written to Major Shawe for two reasons : 1st, because it was probable I should get an answer from him ; 2ndly, it was nible that this answer would contain intelligence of matters in gal which it was desirable that I should have." The soldier seems to have seen, what the statesman overlooked, that by writing to him through SHAWE, nothing was on record, and it could be denied even in a court of honour. Thus the Duke could write to KmaPieraics—" P.S. It is but justice to the Governor-General, and to you, to mention that I have had no private correspondence with him on any subject. I have done you justice in my public correspondence, upon subjects which must, at all events, have attracted the notice of the Governor-General." Yet the reader who does not know who Major SHAWE was, and thus see the drift of what is written, must approach the 1000th page before he will find ont ; and then the information is given incidentally, to illustrate a remark in the text.