BOOKS.
SUPERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT.*
Ix has for long been apparent that, if the Allies have not yet gained the victory, the Central Powers have already incurred defeat. It is now possible to make a more hopeful and confident forecast of the future. All recent facts go to prove that, if only we have the strength of will to endure, not merely victory, but decisive victory, will eventually be within our grasp. One, and probably the greatest, of the dangers for the moment is that, under the influence of a very natural desire to put an early stop to the Aceldama of which the world has now for more than two years been a horrified witness, we may be lured into patching up a premature and unsatisfactory peace. The past, the present, and the future alike call loudly on us and on our Allies to stand firm against this temptation—the past because the best atonement we can make to the shadea of those countless Frenchmen, Russians, Italians, British, Belgians, and Serbians who have sacrificed their lives in the cause of civilization is that they should not have died in vain ; the present because a peace which would be a mere truce would cripple all true progress for an indefinite period ; and the future because we owe it as a duty to posterity to guarantee them against a recurrence of circum- stances such as those which have temporarily wrecked the hopes of the present generation. Dr. Fried,' who is a Pacificist Austrian, in advo- cating the cause of Internationalism and condemning that of National- ism, starts from the assumption that " this war will not end with a victorious conqueror dictating terms of peace to a vanquished opponent." If this prognostication be correct., the prospects of the future will, indeed, be gloomy. In spite of all the fair dreams in which Pacificists may indulge, and the seductive guarantees against war which they may elaborate on paper, it would, on this hypothesis, be not merely probable, but almost certain, that the world would merely relapse from armed conflict to that latent and pernicious state of hostility which all alike, whether avowed Pacificists or not, condemn. Dr. Pried's premisses are wrong. " There is," he says, " a mutual desire to subjugate because there has been a mutual threat." The threat was never mutual. It came from only one side—that of Germany. Dr. Fried is also wrong when, in setting aside the crime of Serajevo as of slight importance, he speaks of the "deeper motives" which brought on the war. There were no " motives." There was only one motive—namely, the fixed desire of Germany to dominate the • (1) The Restoration of Europe. By Dr. Alfred H. Pried. Translated by Lewis Stiles Gannett. London : Macmillan and CO. [45. Od. net.'—(2) The Perils of Peace. By Cecil Chesterton. London : T. WernerLanrie. ps, net.) (3) Into- national Government. By L. S. WWI. London : Fabius Society, and AUen and
tawin. new world. Of course, as Dr. Fried says, the official collections of diplo- matic papers which the Powers, with the significant exception of Austria, who did not dare to expose German statesmanship, have published, are ex perle statements, but that does not seriously detract from their value. The man who, under the cloak of an assumed lofty impartiality, lumps
all these collections into a single category, and holds that the blame for the war should be equally divided amongst the belligerents, is either prejudiced or is incapable of weighing evidence. The bounden duty of the Allies is not to lay down the sword until the danger of stalemate, to which Dr. Fried looks forward as a certain result of the war, is defi- nitely averted. They must not on any account compromise. They must dictate. Although it is most desirable, in the interests of justice and humanity, that individual Germans should be punished for the atrocities which many of them have unquestionably committed, I should regard it as little short of criminal to continue the war merely in order to wreak vengeance on Germany and to humiliate the German people. But if we may in some degree quench the desire for-vengeance, do not let us abandon the fixed intention of obtaining full security for the future. I cannot but think that any one who looks the facts of the present situation fairly in the face must arrive at the conclusion that the only hope of securing a durable peace lies in the absolute and decisive defeat of the German naval and military forces. There is, indeed, as I have frequently pointed out on other occasions, only one way in which there might conceivably be a chance of somewhat modifying this conclusion. It is that the Germans should themselves take the initiative in making a radical change in their existing institutions, forms of government, and national habits of thought. Is there any proba- bility of their doing so ? I cannot say, but all the evidence at present available unfortunately points to the conclusion that, in Mr. Cecil Chesterton's words? " the time has long gone by when Prussianism was the mere inheritance of a dynasty. It has become tho religion of • people."
If this view of the situation be correct, it follows, as a matter of course, that the question of how, in the future, wars may be avoided can only for the moment possess an academia interest. It will, how- ever, become of much practical importance when Prusaianism has been finally scotched. It is as well, therefore, that the views of the Pacifieists should be fully ventilated. Much that they say will, of course, fail to command anything approaching to general assent. At the same time, it is only by full discussion that both statesmen and the general public, will eventually be able to grope their way amidst the changed con- ditions which will certainly spring into existence at the close of the present war. Discussion on this subject will carry with it some advan- tages and some disadvantages. It will tend to clear the air, and will accustom the masses of the British public, who are not distinguished for any very marked readiness to assimilate new ideas, to realize the novelty of the situation. On the other hand, the language used by fanatical and extreme Pacificists is somewhat calculated to arouse • pernicious and perfectly unreasonable class hatred, and to make ill- informed people think that in a few commonplace generalizations, pompously announced, the true philosopher's stone may be found capable of affording prompt solutions to questions of surpassing diffi- culty, which time alone can solve. It is almost a consolation to find that the very well-intentioned but Utopian Dr. Fried, after pouring forth all the vials of his wrath on certain sections of the European newspaper Press, is only able to arrive at the somewhat disappointing and insipid conclusion that the sole remedy is to be found in the " thorough enlightenment of the public." The statement is correct, but is it not a truism?
Mr. Woolf, who has written on behalf of the Fabian Society a work entitled International Government,' is rather hard on his fellow-men when he says that " every one is born either a practical man' or an amiable crank.' " The former class is held to include Cleon, Pontius Pilate, Bismarck, General Boulanger, Queen Victoria, the late Mr. Chamberlain, " and all the nameless gentlemen who write leaders in the daily Press "—assuredly a somewhat curious medley. Examples of the latter class are "Socrates, Plato, Daedalus, Jesus Christ, Voltaire, Mies Jane Addams, at id genus omne." The mass of mankind, however, are probably neither "practical men," in the sense in which Mr. Wool uses that expression—that is to say, men who reject all idealism with scorn—or " amiable cranks," who refuse to listen to any considerations based onhard facts. They stand between the two extremes, and, whilst far from rejecting a sane idealism, ask that it should be tempered in practice by an adequate recognition of realities. In justice to Mr. Woolf it must be admitted that, although he appears to exult in being numbered amongst the " amiable cranks," he makes some very notable con- cessions to the " practical men." He, of course, has no words strong enough to stigmatize those misguided diplomatists who are held in abhorrence by all the school of politicians to which ho belongs. " They labour under the common human delusion that their own personal triumphs and failures are noticed by or affect any one other than them- selves." His fervid imagination also conjures up a picture of British diplomatists, against whom he appears to entertain a somewhat special aversion, possessing qualities which differ widely from any of those which I have ever discovered in such of their class as I have mot in the course of my life. Notably, they " rarely identify the British working classes and their interests with Groat Britain and her interests." At the same time, he gondemns the " enthukaate who believe that was can be abolished by some system of universal compulsory arbitration." He scouts the idea of creating an international police. He thinks that " it is no good building up a brand new beautiful international insti- tution," and he warns us all that we " can no more expel nature by a diplomatic or legal fiction than by a fork." These, I repeat, are valuable concessions to " practical men."
The fundamental principle advocated by all Pacificists, however much they may differ in detail, is the same. Internationalism is to take the place of Nationalism. Without going so far as to treat ex- clusive patriotism as a vice, Mr. Woolf evidently considers that it is by no means a cardinal virtue. He terms it a " dangerous and complex passion." Speaking of the British Parliamentary system, he says that " there is no more reason why Northumberland should allow Lancashire and Middlesex to impose their will upon it than why Belgium should allow Germany and England to impose their will upon it." It is pointed out with great truth that Internationalism has of late years made great strides in the treatment of public affairs. Many important questions, such, for instance, as the postal, telegraphic, and sanitary relations between States, have been dealt with internationally and with much success. I am not sure that Mr. Woolf would have waxed so eloquent over the virtues of international administration if, like myself, he had lived for a quarter of a century in cosmopolitan Egypt and had witnessed the extent to which the Egyptians were made to suffer from international treatment; but I readily admit that my experience is perhaps unique, and that it cannot reason- ably be used as a basis for any wide generalization. I must, however, demur to Dr. Fried's idea that the evils of " caste-diplomacy " would disappear if eminent " scholars, engineers, agriculturists, mer- chants, or teachers were called upon to negotiate between nations." I have had frequently to deal with individuals belonging to all these glasses in the treatment of questions which affect international interests, and I cannot say that I have found them more exempt from national prejudices or from national egotism than mere ordinary diplomatists. The example of the celebrated manifesto signed by ninety-three German Professors at the beginning of the war would appear to indicate that erudition does not afford any immunity from excessive militarism.
The actual plan put forward by Mr. Woolf need not be described in detail. Its main features are the creation of two International bodies, one a High Court to deal with cases which Mr. Woolf classes as " jus- ticiable," another a Council which is to concern itself with all the wider Issues leading to disputes between nations. A State which refuses to obey an order of the High Court is to be boycotted. Rejection of the advice of the International Council is to entail no such drastic punish- ment, but all nations and Governments are to bind themselves not to go to war until the expiration of one year after the subject in dispute has been submitted to the consideration of the Council. This latter provision is borrowed from the existing Anglo-American Treaty.
The institution of some permanent machinery for dealing with all international questions would certainly be an improvement, although I do not think that it would produce all the beneficial results which Mr. Woolf anticipates. Speaking of the events in the summer of 1914, he says " Would Austria have waited for a Conference ? If the system had been instituted in June, almost cer- tainly not. But suppose the system had been working ten years, that several disputes had been referred automatically to and settled by tribunal or Conference. We should have had one more and a serious obstacle in the path of War Lords." I do not concur in the view taken by Mr. Woolf. My belief is that in July, 1914, Germany, carrying Austria in her wake, was resolutely determined to make war, and that by no conceivable international machinery could the catastrophe have been averted. This, however, is of course a matter of conjecture and of opinion.
It is quite possible that, at the close of the war, always provided that Germany is totally defeated and obliged to accept the terms of the Allies, some plan may be worked out which will, at all events, render war less frequent in the future than it has been in the past. More than this can scarcely be expected, and, indeed, even Mr. Woolf does not seem to anticipate the accomplishment of any greater achievement. But even this limited amount of success would be an immense improve- ment. The creation of the machinery to keep the peace is, however, by far the least difficult part of the whole business. The gist of the subject is contained in Dr. Fried's pathetic lament. " A beautiful treaty for world-organization," he says, " could be made in twenty-four hours, if only the will were there to give it life and to enforce it." The experience of the past has shown that when a real wish to keep the peace exists, war can almost always, although not invariably, be avoided. The Dogger Bank incident was settled, not so much because a Com- mission was appointed to deal with it, as because neither Great Britain nor Russia really wished to go to war. The Fashoda affair was arranged through the ordinary diplomatic channels for very much the same reason. The late Lord Salisbury once said to me that if only a traveller could reach the foot of the mountains, he could generally discover some path up which he could crawl in order to get him to the other side. This is quite true, but the discovery of the path would be quite useless to any traveller who had no real desire to get across the moun- tains at all. The great fault of the Pacificista appears to me to be that they trust too much to machinery, and that they endeavour to establish a difference, which in democratic countries does not exist, between the wishes and habits of thought of the rulers and the ruled, whereas the former are generally in reality little more than the agents of the latter. If public opinion becomes pacific), there will be peace ; but the tendency must be universal, and not confined to any one country or group of countries. If not, the old maxim Si via paeem, pars beam, which is so vehemently decried by all Pacificists, wfil continue to be forced on nations, whatever be their internal institutions, as a guide for practical action, and, if not adopted, their existence in
the future, as in the past, will be imperilled. Cumuca.
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