a faint echo in Paris. What is feared is that
the Liberal party when they come into power, as they must do in a few months' time, will not maintain in its full vigour the entente with France, but instead will allow their foreign policy to be directed from Berlin. It is not, of course, suggested that the Liberals will mean to show want of cordiality to France, but rather that in making special efforts to come to a friendly understanding with Germany they will allow their foreign policy to fall under German influence, and. thus leave France with the feeling that we cannot be trusted to stand by her in case of need. The result of giving such an impression would, no doubt, be to make France reconsider her whole position, and to ask herself whether it would not be better to yield to force majeure, and accept, in spite of the humiliation involved, the open hand which Germany always holds out to her as the alternative to the blow from the mailed fist. But such a result, say those Englishmen who feel the anxieties which we have described, would mean our being left in a position of dangerous isolation. We should not really have conciliated the Germans, and we should have lost the French. In other words, the Germans, after they had used our friendly advances to them to break up the entente with France, would possibly, in common with other Powers, turn upon us as the selfish and foolish nation whom nobody could trust.
We have mentioned these fears as to the future policy of the Liberals, not because we believe that there is any- thing substantial in them, but rather because we are certain that they have no foundation, and that therefore the best thing is to bring them to light and show their absurdity. In the first place, we are sure that none of the responsible leaders in the Liberal party have any desire whatever to alter the present happy relations in which we stand to the French Republic. On the contrary, we are ccinvinced that they wish to maintain those relations, and to render them permanent in the only way in which such relations can be made permanent in our country,— that is, by receiving the endorsement of both the great parties. The Liberals by tradition and by natural feeling are sympathetic with the French Republic, and they have hitherto always desired, and we are sure still iesire, to emphasise the fact that a free Republican Govern- nent is a Government specially suited for friendship with this country. Again, the Liberals by tradition and inclination are anxious to come to terms with Russia, and to treat with her on a friendly basis. But it is obvious that one of the best ways of coming to terms with Russia is by preserving the entente with her ally. In a word, the Liberal party find the greater part of their ideal policy as regards our foreign relations at the present moment already realised. No doubt a section of the Liberal party, and especially that section which is least familiar with the details of international affairs, is inclined just now to take the line that Lord Lansdowne has done the right thing in the wrong way. They are all for being on a specially friendly footing with France, and for trying to reach an understanding with Russia, but they are inclined, as critics of the Administration, to think that these good things might have been accomplished quite as well without irritating the Germans. "Why," they say, "was it necessary, in order to be friends with France and Russia, to put up the back of the German Emperor and make him so angry and suspicious ? Surely we could have managed to come to an agreement with France, and have got on specially good terms with her, without quarrelling with other people. With better management we might have done all we have done, and yet have remained on the best of terms with Germany. It is perfectly right to impress our French neighbours with our goodwill, but why should we do it in so provo- cative a way ? "
That this is a very natural position for an Opposition to take up in the abstract we do not deny. Nor do we which if they had been done a little differently would have been harmless, but as it is have proved most harmful, should look with suspicion upon the conduct of our foreign relations, and should incline to the belief that better management would have produced the result we all wish for,—i.e., more friendly relations with Germany. But though we do not wonder at this abstract criticism, we are well assured that when the Liberals come into power, and the Foreign Office is in their hands, they, will find that in this particular their previous criticism is not justified. They will learn that the present antagonistic attitude of Germany is not due to the fact that we have mismanaged our understanding with France, and given it a provocative appearance, or have made advances to Russia in a way which could give just offence to Germany, but solely because Germany is determined that we shall not be friends with the rest of the world if she can help it. The Liberals will find that in fact, though not in words, Germany has said to us If you and France get together into a corner and make friends and talk secrets, there is going to be trouble for both of you. We do not intend to let you put your heads together in that way. Remember that if we can't hit the big British bully, we can at any rate make it very unpleasant for the big bully's new friend.' The Germans have chosen to take up the attitude that making friends with other Powers is "an unfriendly act" to Germany, and that those who wish to stand .in good relations with them must take note of the fact. "Splendid isolation" is the only position which the Germans will willingly tolerate in the case of Britain.
The Liberals when they study the records of the Foreign Office, and get into touch with international affairs as only a Government in office can, will find also that during the past five years the German Government have perpetually played the part of the wolf in the fable. They have been constantly accusing us of having muddied the water, and of having unfriendly designs, though in reality our acts and intentions have been most peaceable and most friendly. The despatches and memoranda on the files will show that, instead of doing anything hostile to Germany, our Government have been solicitous to obtain the goodwill of the German Emperor, and have again and again placed themselves in what have proved very disagreeable, and even dangerous, positions in order to win his favour. For example, with an extraordinary want of appreciation of American sensitiveness as to the, Monroe doctrine, we entered upon a scheme for joint naval action with Germany in regard to Venezuela. Happily, owing to the friendliness and sound good sense of President Roosevelt, who showed infinitely more insight, and possessed a far firmer grasp of the situation, than did our own Ministry, we escaped from the entanglement without having actually made ill-blood with America. But in truth this was rather through the good luck of there being a statesman at the White House than through any skill on our part. In any case, in order to "play up" to Germany, and not to refuse a pressing request from her, we ran a very considerable and unnecessary risk of getting on bad terms with the Americans. It is true that the Americans were powerless in face of a combination of the British and German fleets, but to flaunt such a combination in their faces, though it may have very well suited the Kaiser's book, was a course of action which it was extremely ill-advised for us to take.
An equally glaring example of our persistent efforts to placate the Germans is to be found in the negotia- tions over the Baghdad Railway. There the present Government showed that the Germans had only to ask, and we would at once make the strongest endeavours to meet their wishes, and, in fact, "to do anything to oblige." It was obvious that to abandon our old and wise policy of not mixing ourselves up as a Goverment with commercial concerns would, in the case of the Baghdad Railway, not merely have set a very bad precedent, but also have tended to fill the Russians with suspicion of our designs, and plunge us in addition into a vortex of dangerous intrigue at Constantinople. Yet, as we have said, on the principle of "anything to oblige" the Germans, and to show how friendly we were to them, we supported the Kaiser in his dangerous scheme, and greatly annoyed the Russians. Fortunately, public opinion here was aroused, and our Government were not permitted to fall into the Baghdad Railway morass as they had fallen ,into the Venezuela mess. The fact, however, remains that in both cases our Government showed themselves willing to be the " drudge " of the Kaiser in order to win the goodwill of Germany and to prove that we were not hostile.
Since the Baghdad Railway fiasco our Government have been more cautious, and though refraining from anything approaching a hostile act towards Germany (unless it be admitted that to make friends with France is neces- sarily a hostile act towards Germany), have endeavoured to keep out of German complications. As a result of this determination not to be the " drudge " of Germany any longer, the Germans have assailed us with all sorts of general accusations of hostility and unfriendliness. As a matter of fact, however, not a single specific act has been quoted, or can be quoted, by them to prove their alle- gations. Our action in regard to Germany has been perfectly correct, not merely in form but in substance. The only accusation that has even an appearance of any- thing substantial is that we did not communicate to Germany our Agreement with France. They were, nevertheless, quite well aware of that Agreement, which was published to the whole world. If the know- ledge was not conveyed through diplomatic channels, it was only because our Government were afraid that official communication might be made the excuse by the Germans for disagreeable and unfriendly observations. It is often wiser not to tell an angry man to his face something which he is only too likely to make the excuse for quarrelsome language. In truth, the accusation of the Germans that we have been unfriendly and hostile to them of late is, as we have said, simply that of the wolf in the fable when he told the lamb that his action in drinking from the. stream was most aggressive, and. that, patient and generous as all wolves naturally were,. he did not know how long he would be able to endure the con- stant insults and menaces addressed to him by his neighbour. No doubt we are not quite the lamb of the European fold, but our official attitude towards Germany has been consistently lamb-like.
We can only end as we began, by declaring that we are certain that there is not .the slightest reason to fear that the Liberals will undo the good work which has been done in bringing France and Britain together. Again, though they may make yet another effort to be friendly with Germany, we are equally sure that they will not place themselves so much under German influence as to abandon either the entente with France or the proposals for a better understanding with Russia. The Liberals will maintain our foreign policy on exactly the present lines, both because it is the traditional policy of their party, and still more because it is the inevitable policy of those who will not agree,. as certainly the Liberals will not, that we cannot be friends with France and on good terms with Russia for fear of being accused of hostility to Germany.
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