BOOKS.

MONTALEMBERT ON THE POLISH INSURRECTION.* THERE are few things more remarkable than the extraordinary difference in the warmth of French and English feeling with re- ference to the Poles. The difference is not in the moral judgment which the two nations have passed on the division of that un- happiest of countries. Lord Russell speaks more plainly than M. Billault, and Lord Ellenborough nearly equals the impas- sioned rhetoric of M. de Montalembert. But a few moments conversation with any Frenchman will show that what is with us a languid sentiment of justice, is with them a passionate sym- pathy. And daily the feeling among our neighbours grows and gathers strength, until it bids fair to coerce the Government itself, and involve it, with the Mexican war still on its hands, in a new struggle with Russia.

One of these signs of the times is the pamphlet of M. de Itiontalembeit. The spectacle of a Catholic people in arms for the liberty which he denies only to Italians, driven to revolt by an outrage against justice and even good faith, such as Europe has rarely witnessed, and contending, not merely with bravery, for that they were sure to do ; but even with success, against

The Insurrection of Poland. By the Count de Montalembert, one of the Forty Mentbere of the French Academy. London: Bentley. 1863.

the overwhelming forces of the Russian empire, calls forth all the force of his impassioned nature, and he strikes with double vigour, when every blow tells at once for liberty and Rome. The situation, 'he says, is absolutely identical with that which from 1822 to 182S brought about the emancipation of Greece ; it is a bloody problem, which demands a prompt sovereign and radical solution, and which will have it.

First he offers the right to attempt a solution to Russia. But he takes care to tell her beforehand what it is. She must give back to Poland her "autonomy"—that historical and independent existence which Hungary has obtained, and will yet obtain, from Austria—with the condition that the same person shall always be the sovereign of the twocountries. Then M. de Montalembert "dilates upon a wind of prophecy." He foresees that the gene- rous sentiments of the Russian youth are aroused—that the salaried scribblers who fill the papers, and the fine ladies who fill the Parisian drawing-rooms, will vanish like ghosts that scent the morning air, and their place be filled by "delicate and gene- rous souls, made for all the aspirations and enjoyments of liberty, by hearts tempered in the heroic enthusiasm of unknown sacti- flees." Then Russia will be the second great power of the Con- tinent, the benefactrt ss and liberator of the Slave race, the object of the admiration and gratitude of the world. A short solution, an easy solution, but, alas! a dream. Of all political combina- tions, the one which may most certainly be pronounced impossible

is that which supposes two independent legislatures under one crown. While Austria was despotically governed, Hungary might be constitutionally independent ; but not now. We do not mean that there ate no combinations by which the difficulty could be overcome. Fifty might be devised. But it would be

more easy to invent one to suit the case of an empire like Austria, composed of ten or twelve different nationalities, than that of an empire where there would be but two. Such a state of things must end sooner or later in separation or union ; but even if a scheme were struck out which would enable the two legislatures to avoid clashing, certainly it could never work unless there were a real desire on the part of each nation to maintain the union. Is it reasonable to expect that such a feeling can ever find place in the hearts of the Poles? If they would, can they forget the past ?

But M. de Montalembert insists so little on this solution of the problem, that perhaps it is scarcely the one on which he has set his heart. If Russia, deaf to his warnings, refuses to Poland her autonomy, it is for France to interfere. In 1831 Louis Philippe, just seated on a tottering throne, with daily riots in his streets, and universal hostility felt towards him by every Govern- ment in Europe, could do nothing. Now the Emperor is all- powerful at home and abroad : at home, his adversaries im- potent and silent ; abroad, no shadow of resistance or avowed hostility. There may, indeed, be dreams, or hidden resentments; but in an age of "indispensable and invincible publicity," what is hidden is null. Europe has neither prince nor captain nor statesman capable or desirous of matching himself against France. Therefore, says M. de Montalembert, the Imperial Government must act, and that the more, because it has already decided three European questions by the sword—the Eastern question, the Italian question, and the Mexican question.

The Eastern question M. de Montalembert considers to be in a worse state than ever. His pious soul is still disquieted about the Holy Places. He admits, however, that Europe did gain something by the destruction of the Russian prestige, and because the war drove the Czar on a course of internal refolms, which will for a long time paralyze his empire. Strange, then, that he does not see that it is to the Crimean war that Poland owes what chance she has of success.

But it is the Italian war on which he rests his case. If the cry of suffering of Italy drew two hundred thousand men across the Alps, and tore up the written law of Europe in the twinkling of an eye, are the cries of Poland to count for nothing? Which of the dethroned princes of Italy was ever charged, even by his British insulters, with such a crime as the seizure of the flower of the youth of the country for military service—not by a conscription, carried out by ballot, or otherwise—but by a midnight plot, by which those persons were taken whom the secret ban of the police had designated as disaffected ? Yet these princes have all-been dethroned, and the Pope, the most august, the most irreproachable

of all, has lost three-fourths of his territory. Excepting that the

agony is, perhaps, piled up a little too high, we have no cbjec- tion to make to this; but it certainly is rather funny when M.

de Montalembert begins carefully to explain that he by no means rejects the aid of the friends of Italian unity, although haying applauded the breaking of the treaty of Zurich, they will cer- tainly be very inconsistent in claiming the performance of the promises made to the Congress of Vienna by the Czar. One is very much obliged to him ; but had he not better look at home? The friends of Italian unity hold the same language now that they have ever done. Every people has a right to freedom and independence, and our sympathies with them are not dependent on the agreements of monarchs or the treaties of diplomatists. Austria having no right to rule south of the Po, France had the right to turn her out, if she chose. From the moment that was done, France, too, became an interloper. The question between Italians and their rulers is one for them, with which strangers have no concern. In Poland our principles are the same. If the treaties of 1815 give a technical right to interfere, so much the better; but it is not that which fires men's hearts when they hear of the doings of the Russian soldiery. But how is M. de Montalembert consistent ? Is the eloquent advocate of liberty and national rights and independence going to silence the im- passioned accents by which our feelings have been so often moved, and to potter over treaties and parchments, lest, forsooth! the old accustomed words should involve him in some difficulty with his confessor, and condemn involuntarily the priestly tyranny which he must still support, and Romans still endure ? Certainly there is also M. Billault's consistency to be considered. But if public opinion in France demands action in Poland, that, probably, will not be found an insuperable obstacle. Nay, M. de Montalembert suggests that lie may even now be preparing for his august master one of those oratorical triumphs which borrow so much of their brilliancy from the contrast between the liberal eloquence of the sovereign and of his ministers.

But there remains the war in Mexico. Of this the Count does not make much, for he has not yet discovered its true origin or end. Really, after the ministerial explanations in the Assembly, and the Emperor's letter, this seems a little ungrateful. But lie makes, at least, one very sensible remark, namely, that if France can send 40,000 men to Vera Cruz, she can send an army in the same way to the Baltic, though he omits to mention that it might be in- convenient to do both at once. An army, then, is to invade Russia and establish the independence of Poland ; but only in the last re- sort. After the proofs of irresistible energy and incontestible mili- tary superiority which France has given in Lombardy and the Crimea, the Emperor had but to pronounce one of those sayings which "warn before striking, and proclaim the right before vindi- cating it," and Russia would have yielded, and all been joy and peace. But if war there must be, France would be enthusiastic in its favour ; she could no longer be, reproached with fighting only when there are provinces to be annexed or debts to be got in. She would quiet the apprehensions of Germany by guaranteeing the integrity of the Federal territory, and she would escape the contemptuous pity of posterity. To all this we have but again to answer how heartily we sympathize with M. de Mositalembert's feelings, and how much we wish we could think him in the right. It is, of course, possible that Germany would be as readily quieted, and Russia as quick to yield as he imagines, though it may very rationally be doubted. But clearly he has not yet read Mr. Kinglake, and knows nothing about the Great Usage. He does not know that a great power must have not only a casus belli, but a reasonable prospect of success (though that, of course, France always has), and an interest in the dispute. That Italy should cease to be an outwork of Austria, even if she should not become an outwork of France, was a clear gain to the latter; but if she has borne with the slavery of Poland for sixty years, and not- withstanding has become, as M. de Montalembert thinks, the arbiter of Europe, surely she might bear with it still. A French war with Russia for the freedom of Poland might be endured by Germany; but never would be by Austria or Prussia. It might be productive of great good ; but it might wrap Europe in flames. No; let England and France ask for the fulfilment of the treaty of Vienna, and to that extent Austria will support them. Let them go the length of compelling the great German Powers to allow Poland a fair fight. And if the internal dissensions of Russia, and the promise which the leaders of the revolution make to the peasants that they shall have their land, enable the Poles to win their freedom, every true liberal will rejoice. But t,heir best chance is still to win their liberties for them- selves, and not trust too much to statesmen who perceive that to begin such a war as M. de Montalembert pleads for .is entering on a course amply justified, indeed, both by law . and morality, but the end of which it is beyond human foresight to descry.

_Ott the labours of the traradator we are not able to speak very

favourably. Any person who is unable to read the original will find in the English version a fair transcript of M. de Monte- lembert's thoughts, and, so far, it may be regarded as a timely publication ; but it is not the work of a scholar. It is not literal and it is not idiomatic. Sometimes it tampers with the original unjustifiably. " Insulteurs Britanniques," for instance, does not mean "British assailants."