TOPICS OF THE DAY
THE ARMY THAT WE NEED. • WE trust that Mr. Haldane will take an early oppor- tunity of clearing up certain ambiguitias in regard to his scheme, and will make it known that a good many of the interpretations of what he proposes to do in the case of the Militia and the Volunteers are incorrect, and that his intention is to strengthen greatly as well as improve those forces, and in no case to diminish them in numbers. When we asked our readers to supply the funds for raising and training the Spectator Company as an experiment in Militia training, we did so on the ground that our military system pivots on the Militia, and that, therefore, an efficient Militia is essential to the strength and welfare of the British Army. But if our Army as it is pivots on the Militia, still more will it do so under Mr. Haldane's scheme. If, then, his scheme is adopted, it becomes absolutely necessary to reform the Militia and to make it a living and developing part of our military force. Unless the Militia is reformed and vitalised, not only will Mr. Haldane's proposals not work, but they will become a positive source of danger. His proposals rest on a Militia foundation, and if that foundation is defective the whole structure must fall in ruin. Granted, then, that Mr. Haldane's proposals are adopted, the imperative question of the moment is the reorganisation of the Militia, and reorganisation in such a way that the force shall become " war-worthy " in the fullest sense.
Our readers know already the means by which we con- sider that the Militia can be, and ought to be, made "war-worthy." The first thing is to draw it from a better class and to fill it with young men of sound con- stitution, character, and intelligence. Now there is only one way of doing this, and that is to make the conditions of Militia service of a kind which will not prevent men fully employed in important civil avocations from joining the force. It must cease to be the refuge of the casual labourer, and become, as the Volunteers and Yeomanry now are, a place where the best type of civilian may learn to serve his country in arms. We contend that the Spectator Experiment in Militia Training, although it is not yet completed, has proved that it is possible to make a competent infantry soldier in six months, and to teach him his work so thoroughly that he will afterwards require to go under canvas only for one week in the year, and to do a certain amount of musketry and drill in his spare time, to remain efficient for four, five, or six years, which- ever may be the term of his enlistment. Under these conditions, supplemented by the creation of a Militia Reserve, we may have, we believe, a Militia Force so good and so numerous that it will be possible without risk to reduce the Regular Army by the twenty thousand men proposed in Mr. Haldane's scheme. We venture to say, however, that it is not safe to reduce the Regular Army until this new and improved Militia Force has been created. Confident as we are that it can be created, we hold that it is perilously near gambling with the national safety to make the reduction before the efficient substitute is actually in existence. We have always said that we should like to see the Militia raised to two hundred thousand efficient men. The majority of these should be enrolled in infantry battalions. The remainder might consist of the semi-military force which Mr. Haldane desires to raise on what he has termed "a Militia basis,"—i.e., as drivers, Army Service Corps men, Army Medical Corps men, Sze. For such men a six months' training would probably not be required. Two months to begin with, and after that a week a year, should be enough.
Before we leave the subject of the Militia we may point out that the six months' preliminary training, plus subsequent training under Volunteer conditions, would help to solve the officer question quite as much as it would help to solve the question of the men. There are plenty of young men who would have no objection to joining the Militia as officers under such conditions. They would like the six months' steady training if in after years they would only have to leave their profession or business for a week at a time.
As we stated last week, we approve of what we may call the administrative part of Mr. Haldane's scheme. We find a great deal that is thoroughly sound and practical in his improved system of mobilisation, and of organising the loose military links scattered about thr country into a coherent chain. We also like his plan of placing the Yeomanry and Volunteers under County Associations in order that they may excite the maximum of local interest and obtain the maximum of local encouragement. But though we approve the scheme so far, we are free to confess that it does not give us the Army that we need, and that Mr. Haldane must add a great deal more to his statement before he will con- vince the country that he is providing us with a really sound military system. In these circumstances, our readers will pardon us if we once again state the nature of the Army that we need. We have already sketched what we consider is required in the case of the Militia. The Yeomanry we would leave alone, except that we would organise a strong Yeomanry Reserve. We would, that is, lose touch with no man who had served in the Yeomanry, provided that his physique remained good, and that he was willing, as we are quite sure the whole of the Yeomanry would be willing, to keep in touch with his old corps.
We come next to the Volunteers. And here we deem it essential to apply the principle that the Government should take from every citizen such service as he can afford to offer, provided (1) that he is an able-bodied man, (2) that he knows how to shoot and handle a rifle, and (3) that he is willing to enter a definite organisation and make himself amenable to military discipline. The adoption of these principles means that there should not be a rigid establishment for the Volunteers, and that there should be a great deal of elasticity in the nature of the force. There should be regiments with varying forms of service, and also within each regiment provision should be made to give a long training to men who can afford the time for long training, and shorter training to those who can afford less time. The Government, while giving facilities to Volunteers to pass a fortnight in camp if they can, should never reject a Volunteer because he is only able to put in four or five days in camp in the year. Again, in the case of country corps, we would make the company more the essential unit than it is at present. There are many big villages where a Volunteer company could be got together if it were understood that the men would not be too often asked to give up the time required in order to work with the regiment as a whole. Lastly, we should, as in the case of the Militia and Yeomanry, organise a Volunteer Reserve. Here the obligation should not be a very arduous one, but care should be taken that the corps should not lose touch with its old members, and.that a man once trained by the Volunteers should maintain his connexion with them. To our mind, one of the best things ever said about the Volunteers was said by Sir John Ardagh in his evidence before the Duke of Norfolk's Commission. He stated, in effect, that he would far rather have four hundred thousand so-called inefficient Volunteers than one hundred thousand so-called efficient. And for this plain reason. At a time of emergency the four hundred thousand men could very soon be made efficient, and the nation would then have a most valuable force. On the other hand, the hundred thousand so-called efficient men could not be increased in number. When, therefore, they were used up the nation would be at the end of its resources. Here is the true gospel as regards the Volunteers. We do not want to make the Volunteers into a small body of imitation Regulars, but rather to have them as a large body of men capable of doing service in the field if a great national emergency should arise. To put the matter as we have often put it before, we want quantity in the Volunteers, and not quality in the restricted War Office sense,—that is, men who have done so many drills and been in camp so many days. Below the Volunteers we should like to see an extension of rifle clubs, and based upon the rifle clubs a national Corps of Guides. We should like every parish to possess at least six men recognised as parish guides. In every rural district area we should like to see a dozen or so men recognised as district guides—i.e., one district guide for each group of parishes—and in each county a staff of county guides who would represent districts or groups of districts.
We come next to the Regular Army. Here, though we fully appreciate the attractiveness of the notion of an Indian Regular Army and a Home Regular Army which is so ably advocated from day to day in the Morning Post, we have come reluctantly to the conclusion that the scheme is impossible, and that the Cardwell system of linked battalions must be adhered to for the mass of the Regular Army. We would therefore leave it alone except in one particular,—that is, we would con- stitute the Guards Brigade as a miniature home short- service army. To make this miniature short-service army effective, instead of reducing the Guards by two battalions, we would add two battalions to their present number, and make the Guards Brigade consist of twelve battalions in all. In addition, we would reduce service with the colours in the Guards to two years, letting the men remain for ten years in the Reserve. By these means what we have described as the miniature short-service army provided by the Brigade of Guards should give us, when mobilised for war, a force of some twenty-four thousand infantry. We admit that the arrangements for providing officers, and for the Reserve battalions which would have to be constituted, would raise many difficult points, but they are not, we are certain, in any way insuperable.
Under the system we have sketched we believe that we should get the Army that we need without any intolerable burden. Though our military force would be strong enough without it, we should like in addition, and for moral and physical rather than for military reasons, to establish what we may call military con- tinuation-school battalions or companies where every young man between the ages of seventeen and twenty should be able to undergo a six months' thorough military training of the kind that Colonel Pollock has been giving to the Spectator recruits. We believe that were facilities accorded to them, the greater part of our lads between seventeen and twenty would voluntarily—nay, eagerly—undergo that training. At first, the motive would no doubt be that which actuates all healthy young men,—the desire, as many of the Spectator men put it, to get an insight into military life, and to make themselves men in the full sense by learning how to defend their country. Later, however, we are convinced that another motive would come in,—the desire of the lads to stand the best possible chance in the competition for employ- ment. Very soon it would be found that those who had voluntarily undergone six months' training would stand a much better chance of getting good jobs in factory or workshop or in private service than the lads who had not had that advantage. That being the case, there would be a strong impulse upon all boys who were not wastrels by nature to undergo the training which employers would come to look upon as a necessary qualifi- cation for those seeking employment. No doubt the cost to the State of giving such voluntary training would be considerable; but even if it cost two and a half millions to train a hundred thousand lads a year for six months, the money would, we believe, be well employed. We are not among those who think that it is good for the race that its young men should spend two years in barracks ; but that it would improve our lads in every class and condition of life to have six months' thorough training as soldiers we are fully convinced, and we would make great sacrifices to bring about a state of things so desirable.
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