TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE EGYPTIAN CRISIS.
THEyoung Khedive has been learning a lesson in the working of the political Constitution in which he is called upon to take a part. That a lad of nineteen should not be able fully to understand the working of so complicated a piece of mechanism ought not to surprise us. It would, in- deed, have been little short of a miracle if Abbas Pasha had got through his first two years of power without learning, in the rough school of experience, the limits of his authority. The political situation in Egypt, though complicated, is, however, quite within the comprehension of an in- telligent youth, who is said, while at school in Vienna, to have made a special study of "political science," and we have no doubt that he will ultimately learn to govern as wisely and as well as his father. The only difficulty in re- gard to a true comprehension of his position by the young Khedive, lies in the fact that it is not correct to say that the Khedive is either a real or a nominal ruler in Egypt. He is something of both, and how much or how little he partakes of the one or the other has never been laid down in black and white. The limitations placed on the power of the Khedive are of two kinds. First, those that are imposed by the European Powers as a whole ; and next, those imposed by England in virtue of her military occupa- tion of the Nile Valley. The limitations imposed by Europe as a whole have chiefly to do with the financial position, and with the legal rights of resident foreigners, and these are for the most part well ascertained, and are acted upon everyday. Those imposed by England are, on the other hand, general in character, and are seldom acted upon. Indeed, they are, as far as possible, kept out of sight and not alluded to. For all that, however, they are perfectly real and perfectly admit of being expressed and acted upon when necessary. Thus the Khedive is only his own master when he does not infringe the limits set by the Powers and by England. What are these limits set by England ? They are that the Khedive shall govern his country well and reasonably, and shall not imperil the welfare of his dominions by any act of misgovernment. But this answer, of course, suggests another question. Who is to be judge 'whether an act by the Khedive imperils the welfare of his dominions ? In all matters, except those of the first importance, the Khedive. In matters of moment, the British Government. In other words, the British Govern- ment do not interfere, except in the last resort ; but when they do interfere, they say the final word. They will bear inconveniences in the work of government rather than impose their own opinions upon the Khedive ; but whenever inconveniences fester into wrongs, they claim the right to intervene. There is no sort of doubt about our attitude in this matter. It was put in black and white, and in the plainest possible way, by Lord Granville eight years ago. Writing to Sir Evelyn Baring in 1884, he said :—" I hardly need point out that, in im- portant questions where the administration and safety of Egypt are at stake, it is indispensable that her Majesty's Government should, so long as the provisional occupation of the country by English troops continues, be assured that the advice which, after full consideration of the views of the Egyptian Government, they may feel it their duty to tender to the Khedive, should be followed. It should be made clear to the Egyptian Ministers and Governors of provinces that the responsibility which, for the time, rests on England, obliges her Majesty's Government to insist on the adoption of the policy which they recommend, and that it will be necessary that those Ministers and Governors who do not follow this course should cease to hold their offices." That is still the policy of the Foreign Office, as the Khedive has discovered. experimentally. No doubt it is arguable that these words do not preclude the Khedive from appointing any Minister he chooses, and that, there- fore, Abbas was in his rights in turning out one Ministry, and putting another in its place. This, however, is a mere matter of words. If the new Ministers would have pur- sued the same policy as the old, there would, of course, have been no excuse, as there would have been no ground for objecting. But that was practically impossible. The Prime Minister appointed by the Khedive, Fakhri Pasha, was only three or four years ago dismissed from office for the deternuned attempts made by him in his Ministerial capacity to prevent the reform of the judicial administration in Egypt, —a reform essential to the welfare of the country ; and, therefore, in accordance with the principle of Lord Gran- ville's declaration, Fakhri Pasha was a second time rightly removed by means of English influence. The Khedive chose to appoint a Minister whose policy would be un- acceptable to England, and unacceptable on matters about which compromise was virtually impossible ; and, therefore, we were obliged to show him that he had exceeded his powers. The true position, indeed, is almost exactly analo- gous to that which exists in the case of the most inde- pendent of the Sovereign Princes of India.. We have as little to do as possible with the government carried on by the great Feudatories ; but we lay down one essential rule, —that their policy must not be such as to inflict injuries upon their subjects. As a rule, this leaves the Prince free to choose his own Ministers. When, however, he chooses men whose government will obviously be opposed to his own true interests, we, in effect, veto their appoint- ment. Abbas Pasha had probably not yet realised this. He has now, however, come face to face with an authority which is exercised so wisely, so judiciously, and so considerately by Lord Cromer, that it is usually well-nigh invisible, but which, nevertheless, is a reality. Let us trust that the Khedive, having found out the range of his power, will have the good sense to reconcile himself loyally to the existing position. The day when Egypt may be able to stand alone will not be postponed, but hastened, by a. loyal co-operation with England ; and he will find that as long as he consults the true interests of his subjects, his actions will be as unfettered by England as if he were an absolutely independent Sovereign.
We rejoice to see that no attempt was made by those who are hostile to our occupation of Egpyt, to censure Lord Rosebery for bringing the true position before the Khedive without delay. Those who propose that we should confess to a mistake and evacuate Egypt at once, have a clear and definite line of policy to advocate, and even those who dis- agree with them, as we do, can realise that it is an attitude for which something can be said. To remain in Egypt, how- ever, and not to insist upon our policy being adopted—that is, the policy of reform and good administration—and upon our will being obeyed in the last resort and in essential matters, would be the height of folly. To place ourselves in a position of responsibility, and then to try to avoid that responsibility, would be nothing less than madness. It was because we did not forbid the Egyptian Government to send Hicks Pasha to the Soudan, though we were at the moment occupying Egypt with an armed force, and so really re- sponsible, that we became involved in the Soudan Campaign and all its attendant expenses, dangers, and difficulties. Depend upon it, if we had now allowed the Khedive to choose anti-English Ministers, while at the same time re- maining the nominal masters of Egypt, some analogous diffi- culty would have arisen. It is a question of do or not do. Either let us leave Egypt, or let us insist that our work in the interests of Egypt shall not be destroyed and an intoler- able situation created. But it is idle to talk of leaving Egypt at this moment. Not twenty votes could be got for such a policy in the present House of Commons. This being so, it was most fortunate that the Government determined that there should be no drifting, — no attempts to dawdle out of our difficulties by letting things alone. The Khedive has been taught, once and for all, that he must govern Egypt, not in accordance with the traditions of the Pashas to whom justice unsold and an administration free from corruption seem an infamy, but in the interests of his subjects as a whole. Here alone is the line of safety and prudence, as long as we stay in Egypt. France may be unfriendly and may pose as aggrieved, but it would have been the supremest folly to try to conciliate her by allowing official maladministration to prevail once more in Egypt. The Government, for their wise, swift, and certain action, deserve the congratulations of all sensible Englishmen. They have shown that they can make up their minds at a crisis, and act without delay ; and that is the first and highest duty of the men to whom the care of the State is committed.
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