How much is enough?
DEFENCE WHITE PAPER LAURENCE MARTIN
It is less than two years since a Defence White Paper boldly asserted that the process of review- ing British defence policy was over and the new era firmly begun. There followed devaluation and the final radical withdrawal west of Suez. One therefore cannot help admiring the dogged courage which begins this year's White Paper with the declaration that 'reorientation of our defence policy is now completed and the Armed Forces can look forward to a period of stability and progress.' One hopes they can, and the re- lative lack of surprises in this year's statement is reassuring as far as it goes. But, as the state- ment more or less admits when it gets down to the bones of policy, what has been done so far is chiefly the discarding of the east of Suez com- mitments and some hasty reactions to Czecho- slovakia. We have yet to work out a coherent policy for the future which has received national endorsement as a sensible British role for the long haul One cannot but be struck by the contrast be- tween the ever-increasing sophistication of the techniques by which investment in defence is allocated to particular programmes and the crude budgetary slashing which has determined the diminishing size of the cake in recent years. The trouble is that once a nation ceases to try to do everything—which we have properly done —yet does not wish to model its armed forces on Denmark, it becomes difficult to find stan- dards by which to decide how much is enough.
The source of this year's confidence that we are now at the end of the road of agonising re- appraisals is presumably to be found in the re- mark that our present defence task 'is stable because it is irreducible.' That is to say, we can withdraw from east of Suez but we cannot with- draw from Europe—at least not with today's technology.
But are the requirements of a British defence policy in Europe so easily discerned for a limited budget? First of all there will certainly be argument about the size of the effort. Mr Healey has recently been making a very con- vincing case indeed for the need to maintain a high deterrent level of NATO force in Europe. The Czechoslovak affair has demonstrated both the instability of the Russian empire and the decisiveness with which the Russians will turn to military means to shore it up. Admittedly they have done this on their side of the line. But the lines does not look as clearcut as it once did, and the possibility of east-west col- lisions arising from turbulence in southern and eastern Europe is a very real one.
This, however, does not tell us what to do or where to do it. Mr Heaky's own realistic warning that a serious military collision would S0011 drive NATO to recourse to nuclear weapons in itself points to a dilemma., If even the current reorganisation to permit flexible response only adds a matter of hours to NATO resistance, and if some further American withdrawals are likely, may we not have to consider an entirely new, mobile crisis-manage- ment strategy for accidental encounters and an even franker reliance on nuclear deterrence to prevent really serious aggression? To avoid this will certainly require sustained efforts on the Central Front. This would accord well with the current British enthusiasm for wooing Germany, pursuing long overdue Euro- pean strategic discussions to provide a more coherent voice as interlocutor for the Americans and a more compatible foundation for joint arms production. All of this seems urgently re- quired on straightforward defence argument, and to justify the White Paper's view 'that the European members of NATO should do more to establish a common identity within the alliance.' Properly handled this seems a useful step for now, and a wise start to preparations for the day, which must ultimately come but which there is no need to accelerate, when America does less for Europe. Indeed, the growth of co- herence in European views is probably neces- sary to ensure that American policy gives as much weight as possible to European interests.
But as Mr Healey's recent interview in Der Spiegel demonstrated, such a British policy will be eagerly misinterpreted and Britain's concrete contribution to European defence scrutinised to see if it matches the loudness of our protes- tations. Unfortunately, Germany, the power we are most eagerly wooing, is much less akin to us in strategic conceptions than the French are, and is likely to measure us very much on the Central Front. Here is one of the choices that still remain to be made—a choice, moreover, that could very much affect the appearance of our armed services in the future.
For there is real room for difference as to what the Europe to which we have withdrawn is. There is a phrase in the White Paper that recalls the old grandeur and could easily be re- presented as our global role writ small. 'We are the only European power,' it boasts, 'with a role and military capabilities which cover the three main NATO fronts from the Arctic to the Caucasus on land, sea and air.'
-Quite naturally the Russian naval activity in the Mediterranean and the rising response by the Royal Navy is given considerable attention. Since we have a good deal of naval force already it is obviously sensible to use it. In a rational alliance there would be a strong case for Britain to make a disproportionate air and naval contribution and to do less on land. But we cannot be at all sure that this will be the view of our continental and particularly our German allies, and it may well be that there will turn out to be a contribution between our mov- ing towards a European strategic `caucus' and an arms-producing consortium, and our taking an intimate interest in what has until- recently been very much the special American role of propping up Greece and Turkey, neither of which is a very likely member of Mr Wilson's new Europe.
Thus one can see in this White Paper the germs of at least one great debate, which will be not unlike the traditional controversy be- tween the maritime and continental schools of thought, if on a reduced scale.
Given the probable pattern of trouble in Europe over the coming decade, southern Europe may well be the area most needing sup- port. Whether we would be wise to provide much of it is a matter for debate. We have to be careful not to allow the smell of a global role to lure us into the Mediterranean if cooler arguments suggest otherwise. But the new Europe will one day have to exert itself at large and we should not allow our more parochial allies to drive us against our own judgment merely because we are temporarily in a rather chastened mood.
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