Invasion ?
Can Britain be Invaded ? By " Strategicus.' (Dent. Is.: WHATEVER we may think about the possibility of a successful German invasion of this country, it is well that we should assume, with the author of this instructive pamphlet and with the Prime Minister, that Hitler means to make the attempt. For the recognition of such a danger is or should be stimulating. It gives reality to the monotonous labours of our now vast home armies and of the other immense defence forces that have been rapidly organised. Moreover it prevents us from being surprised as the Norwegians and the Dutch were by any sudden assault by sea or air. Thus the discussion of the problem that is now actively proceeding is useful, provided always that it does not arouse fear or panic in untutored minds, especially in rural districts near the
coast. •
" Strategicus," after a brief chapter on the idea of invasion, recalls past invasions of England by Julius Caesar, William of Normandy and Philip of Spain, and, of course, Napoleon's well- planned threat against us. These episodes emphasise the neces- sity of a command of the sea to any invader. And it may be observed that William of Orange's invasion in 1688, not men- tioned in the book, teaches this lesson exceptionally well If James IPs efficient fleet had not been wind-bound in the Thames at the critical moment, it is doubtful whether the Dutchman's rash venture could have succeeded. The author passes on to recount the German invasions of Poland and the Low Countries and the onslaught on Norway which, in his view, illustrates the potentiality of careful planning and reckless daring against which we have to guard.
We approach the real problem in the last chapter on "Our Chances and Risks," and here the author does little more than point out that our enemy with luck might effect a landing. Bad visibility on some foggy night might favour him and hamper our Navy and our Coastal Patrol. But the enemy, once landed, would have to achieve some decisive success within a few days. And this, the author holds, is improbable. " It is impossible to think that any force that it is possible to land could do more than cause damage and suffering "—before, one would add, it was compelled to surrender. " Strategicus " does not seem to say much in his little book, but he says all that is expedient and his
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