Italian Miners ?
By G. W. MITCHELL* MAN-POWER in our mines has been steadily falling for the past thirty years. Sufficient new entrants into the mines are not forthcoming (particularly from the ranks of boys leaving school), to offset those leaving the industry for more congenial work or because of old age, illness or acoident. The admission of Italians to the pits is the obvious short-term means of solving the immediate acute man-power problem and easing economic stress in the country. The greatest difficulty here is to persuade the miners to accept and work with them. The Minister of Fuel and Power in an answer to a question informed the House of Commons on December 4th that of 137 miners' lodges that had balloted on allowing the Italians in the mines, 105 had voted against. What are the miners' objections ? To what extent are these objections based on fact or prejudice ? To what extent are they justified ? The objections are numerous, but they show a sur- prising uniformity, in spite of the faot that a clear lead for the acceptance of Italian labour has been given by the miners' leaders at national levels. First of all, from the miners' viewpoint, comes the fear of unemployment at some future date, and probably a not too distant date. If this happens—who will be the first to go ? Will it be the Italians ? What will be the effect upon trade unionists of an alien element in the labour market that is not cradled in the tradition of British trade-union principles ?
Is this objection justified ? Apart from spasmodic bursts of recruitment, man-power wastage is exceeding the new entry. In the North-Eastern Division in 12 months 13,500 men had to be brought in in order to get a net increase of 2,000,and of these fewer than 500 were boys of school-leaving age. it is the firm opinion of the Labour Relations Department of the N.E. Division that there will be no surplus of labour for years to come. Against this the plan for coal published by the N.C.B. in October, 1950, in its statement on nun-power says : " The- plan involves big changes for those working in the industry ; the numbers of mine- workers needed in 10 to 15 years' time would decrease by about 11 per cent., or 80,000." it then goes on with this significant phrase : " This is a cautious estimate ; it is based on modest assumptions about changes in productivity, and makes no allowance for new methods or machinery not yet tried. The numbers needed, therefore, may be less." It then goes on to say: " The Board's policy will have to be carefully co-ordinated with measures taken by other authorities to prevent unemployment." On future consumption the Board says, " To estimate the demand for coal in 15 years' time is hazardous." It assesses future demand at 240 million tons against 227 million tons in 1938, and
*The writer is himself a .coal-face worker in Yorkshire.
present output of 204 million tons, and says : " In drawing their conclusions, the Board have to bear in mind that the future out- put may have to be substantially more or less than 240 million tons." It follows with: " The plan will enable the reduced labour force.(11 per cent.) to produce about 120 per cent. of the present output of coal. This is a cautious estimate, not a forecast."
Statements like this from such a source must provide food for thought, particularly to the miner, who has been very often the sacrificed pawn. The report further states : " The execution of the plan will be in the hands of local management." Are the relations between management and men at local level such as to inspire that mutual confidence which is needed to allow the influx of foreign labour which the local branch of the trade union could only control by direct action ? The fear of an over-full labour market is to the miner a real one. Its consequences to those who lose their jobs are very obvious. To those retained it is a constant threat. A return to such conditions is a living night- mare to the miner. It would take another catastrophic 1921 or 1926 to make him accept them.
Then there is the danger that the Italians will be used to undermine the British standards. This is very much in the minds of our miners. Experience shows that local managements are jealous of the miners' present standards. It is possible for the Italians to be used for price-cutting and the setting of unreason- able standards. This could be overcome by insisting that all work done by this labour had been ratified by the local branch of the N.U.M. before its commencement. That would ensure that the British rate for the job was paid. But the miners' objections are. still far from exhausted. It is argued that the introduction of Italian labour will not solve the problem, that the expense is not justified by the results, that the last experience of foreign labour (Displaced Persons) did, not provide the coal-face workersexpected, and that most of the Italians will get "cushy jobs."
There is a tendency on the part of the miner to generalise from particular incidents. This could, and does, produce a false picture. To take one example, in the North-Eastern Division 2,600 out of 3,000 Displaced Persons originally accepted are still in the industry. Publicity for the known facts can obviously help to eradicate this trouble.
But still further obstacles lie ahead. The Italian is a member of a late enemy nation. A large number of miners and their sons fought againSt the Italians and experienced their prisoner-of- war camps. The time is too close for these experiences to be forgotten. This is a real difficulty, not imaginary. It links up with the social problem of mixing Italians into a small community like a small mining village. This is not as easy as some_people would have us believe. Human needs other than the need for bread must be satisfied. Mixed adult educational classes with students both British and foreign could be most helpful. It might be possible to teach the " British way of life."
But there would still remain the argument that the necessary coal could be obtained without this labour if more efficient use were made of existing man-power and modern methods of pro- duction. Here is probably the most controversial of all the state- ments that are being made. Much has been done, but more could have been accomplished if relations at local levels had been more amicable. Loading stations could be more intensely mechanised and the output efficiently handled by fewer men. Modern methods at the pit bottom and on the surface could secure present outputs with considerably less man-power. A new pit bottom at my own colliery enabled a staff of men and boys reduced in number by 76 to handle an output that has been steadily increasing. This new pit bottom was a large scheme costing £300,000 and took three years to complete. In 1945 one haulage shift was required for every 5.5 tons of coal produced in Britain. In Holland the figure was 30 tons, and in America 50 tons. One pit in West Yorkshire which practically turned over to Diesel locomotive haulage was able to produce 62.5 tons per haulage shift. The difference between the increase in output per man-shift between the years 1925-1936 in Britain by comparison with the Continental countries was most marked. The increase in Holland was 118 per cent ; the Ruhr 81 per cent. : Poland 54 per cent. ; Britain 14 per cent. The great difference is almost entirely due to greater mechanisation, im- proved haulage methods and efficient use of man-power. This explains, I think, the cautious approach of the N.C.B.'s report on " The Plan for Coal." The N.C.B. are making great efforts in this direction. Its effect upon future man-power need should not be under-estimated. Is it not by far the better way to solve the man-power problem 2- - I have tried to put the case as objectively as I can. My train- ing in the Workers' Educational Association, in the social sciences and economics leads me towards the conclusion that we should accept the Italians in the attempt to solve the immediate problem of falling man-power. My instincts and my life-time environment as a miner caution me to " go canny."
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