THE WISE MEN OF THE EAST: THE ANGLO- INDIAN GOVERNMENT.

THE Ministerial organs sing To pwan over what they call the suc- cessful policy of Lord AccitLisna : the Conservatives, of course, have nothing to say against that policy, since the Whig Go- vernment, in sanctioning it, sanction the international policy of the sainted CASTLEREAGH. The unrefiecting, always carried away for a time by what is bold and dashing, nod applause. But the day of reckoning is to come yet. We must pay for our whistlesome time : the ides of March are not past. We have got into Afghan- istan ; bow are we to get out again ? Awkward forebodings on this score seem already to damp the joy felt in high quarters. The friends of Lord AUCKLAND are already beginning to whisper that the credit of devising the master-stroke of policy which has placed Shah SHUJAH on the throne of' his ancestors, is his alone; that. the small drawback—the enormous ex- pense—will have been entirely owing to the obstinacy of Sir JOHN KEANE, who would only move with a very large military force. This attempt to determine where censure must rest before censure is so much as whispered—this preparation even in the drunkenness of triumph to prepare an excuse against the disagreeable moment when the score must be paid with an aching head—shows that the rulers of India are not so well satisfied with the result of their late movements as they would have the public believe. Lord AUCKLAND'S character as a statesman is of that commonplace, shallow, and glaring kind, which he who runs may read : lie is a melodramatic statesman. Having men and money at command, he feels a pride in saying, " Concentrated in may own resources, I have struck down hostility in Afghanistan ; and at the first indi- cation of a similar spirit in Nepaul and Ava, I will strike it down there also." This is a coup de theatre which tells with the vulgar : and that internal security which results from the wellbeing of the community—that deep recognition of a nation's power expressed in the safety which its commercial and other travellers feel every- where under the shadow of its name—are beyond the conception of your AUCKLANDS. To minds of his caste, the temptations attendant upon the governor of a distant dependency have ever been fatal. Lord AUCKLAND thinks that he can dazzle during the few short years lie remains in India, and that the reverses which must come will be laid at the door of his successor. But, from the anxiety his clacqueurs show to lay the blame of the expense of his operations at the door of another, before the public even suspect the amount of that expense, it would seem that Lord Auex.raxn begins to fear that even the year he has yet to remain in Bengal may be long enough to reveal the true character of his dashing ad- ministration.

He is in the right. The recent movements in Afghanis- tan are on the part of the British authorities a violation of prin- ciple, and at the same time bad policy. They are, as was said by the epigranimatical French diplomatist, "a crime, and worse than that, a blunder."

They are a crime, inasmuch as they are a violation of the rights of an independent nation. The Afghans have constituted for up- wards of a century and a half, a recognized, independent state. Their nrganization was mine of the' Most Perfect, bet 'that': visas. no concern of :foreigners. • The right of 'regulating their own 't onCerns within their own territories—the right toSsmanage them ilts-if they pleased—was theirs. ' If -otrr readers'ssillturn tohe ' t map Ai4ia,

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and from the point where the range-of which Hindoo Koosh is the nucleus abuts on the Indus, draw two imaginary straight lines,. the one down the river to Shikarpore, the other along the high moun- tain range to Herat, then describe the .arc of a circle of which these two shall be radii, (which will pass a little to the west of Can- dahar) they will pretty nearly include the whole of that billy country within which the tribes or clans of the Afghans constitute the dominant race. This country has been their territory as far hack as we have records in the least degree to be relied upon. About the year 1723 these tribes were organized by AHMED SHAH into one monarchy, and several adjacent provinces were annexed to the empire. Under the successors of that monarch the annexed provinces were one by one withdrawn from their sceptre ; and in 1818 the dynasty was overthrown. Since that time the Afghan tribes and their territories have been parcelled out among four governments—a scion of the house of AHMED at Herat, DOST MOHAMMED at Cabul, one of' that chief's brothers at Pcshawur, and three of the same flintily at Cambium None of these governments acknowledged the authority of any of the others : each was anxious to extend its territories at the expense of the others. But none of them acknowledged a foreign sovereign, and

they were in the habit of suspending their enmities when any one of them was threatened from without.* By the law of nations this state of affairs is sufficient to give the Afghan territories a claim to inviolability so long as the Afghans are not aggressors. But in addition to this, Great Britain has, in a specific treaty, expressly recognized the integrity and independence of the Afghan nation and territories. By the ninth article of the definitive treaty be- tween Great Britain and Persia, it is provided that, " If war should

be declared between the Afghans and Persians, the English Go- vernment shall not interfere with either party, unless their media- tion to effect a peace shall be solicited by both parties." That the British Government felt itself bound to respect the independence of Afghanistan is further proved by the correspondence of Lord WILLIAM BENTINCK with Shah SULTJAH in 1832, when that Prince was projecting an invasion of Afghanistan. On the 20th October in that year, Lord WILLIAM wrote to the Shah from Simla—" I deem it my Cluty to apprize you distinctly, that the British Govern-

ment religiously abstains from intermedslling with the affairs of its neighbours when this can be avoided. Your Majesty is of course master of your own actions ; but to afford you assistance for the purpose which you have in contemplation, would not consist with that neutrality which on such occasions is the rule of guidance adopted by the British Government." On the 23d of April 1833, his Lordship repeated these sentiments in a letter addressed to Maharajah RuNsEnT Simi», from Fort William. " Your Highness

states that Shah SIIUJAII intends to make another attempt for the recovery of his throne. This is a matter with which the British

Government. has no concern, and it has therefore taken no pains to inquire into it. The Shah's success or otherwise depends upon the will of Providence and the favourable disposition towards him or otherwise of the inhabitants of that quarter."

Leaving out of view for a time the question of policy, we admit that even on the abstract grounds of principle, an attack upon Afghanistan or its rulers might be justified by hostile demonstra- tions on their part. Let us see, therefore, whether any thing has

been done by the Afghans to furnish a pretext for British inter- ference in their internal arrangements. That nothing has been done by the rulers of Herat to provoke British hostility is clear, from the support lent to them against the Shah of Persia. - Sir ALEXANDER BURNES, who deservedly stands high in the esti- mation of the Anglo-Indian Government, shall speak for the other

Afghan chiefs. Of the chief of Peshawur (now subjected to the Seikh Government) he says—" No chief in the kingdom of Cahill entertains a higher respect for the British Government than Sultan

Mohammed Khan." Of the Candahar Government he says, after

complaining of its excessive duties on the transit trade, " I am persuaded that these exactions at Candahar arise from ignorance,

for the chief is well disposed towards the British Government." Of Doss' MOHAMMED KHAN, the especial object of the late blow,

he says, " He is a man favourably disposed towards the British Government, as indeed are the whole chiefs of the kingdom :" and again, (after proving that the British merchants were driving the Russian out of the markets of Afghanistan) " To the justice and equity of Dost Mohammed Khan, the chief of Cabul, we must mainly attribute a change so beneficial to Britain." And in Sir

A Lux:mil:it's opinion Of these chiefs, Mr. ELPIIINSTONE and every more recent traveller in Afghanistan concur. We shall be told that Doss' MOHAMMED and his brethren were intriguing with Russia. Waving fbr a moment the question whe- ther the measures the Anglo-Rdian Government have adopted arc the best to alienate the affections of the Afghans from Russia, let us take a fair view of the circumstances upon which this charge is founded. In 1836, Sir ALEXANDER then Captain 13nassEs was despatched to Cabul and Candahar, ostensibly upon a commercial mission, but in reality to endeavour to persuade DOST MOHAMMED to acquiesce in the retention of Peshawur by RUNJEET SINGH, * WINR, in 1832, Candahar was threatened by the Persians, DOST MOHAM- MED, then at fend with his brothers hi that city, wrote to them-‘," When the Persians come, let me know ; and as I am- now your enemy I will then be your friend." -Which that • chief had• seized at the moment when.suririvisiorgof Shah SHUJAH 'distracted the attention of the- chidfallof 'Athan- istan. The Afghans wished to emancipate this pontioxillofsthear territories from the Seikhs. Captain Bloom give'DoszsMismalt- sum to understand that he could only obtain the friendshiP Cethe • British Government by relinquishing this idea. This' intitnatidtn was of itself an interference in the internal arrangements of Afghan- istan—a violation of its independence. When an ambitious neigh- bour avails himself of internal disturbances in a state to seize :a portion of its territory, the 'nation aggrieved has an undoubted right to vindicate its property by arms. Any third state, making acquiescence in the wrong a condition of its friendship, abandons a neutral position and takes part with the enemy. When DOST Monsiminn, therefore, heard the Anglo-Indian Government assume this tone, and recollected that Shah SHUJAH Vial3 pen- sioned by the British Government and allowed to reside oti the frontiers of their territory nearest Afghanistan, and that a partsof his pension had been paid to him in advance when in 1834 he invaded Afghanistan, the British authorities being aware of' the nature of his expedition, what reliance could he place on the friendly professions or good faith of the British Government ? In 1837 or 1838, a Captain VICKOVITCH, professing to be a Russian envoy, arrived at Cabul. The tone which the British Envoy *as instructed to employ in reference to this event, may be assumed from the following passage in a letter from Captain llenrszs to Mr MAsssAcarrnx. " As M. Vickovitch still remains in Cabul; (and his presence is the strongest test of the Ameer's disposition 'to make use of him against us,) and as Dost Mohammed Khan does not appreciate our good offices in Peshawur, I shall deem it my duty to retire when I receive the Ameer's letter, unless some

very p

decided change of tone takes place at Cabul." A projected mission from the chiefs of Caudal= to the Persian Government was in like manner made the ground of a threat to break up inter- course with that court. NOw if the Governments of Candahararid Cabul were entitled as independent governments to receive R British mission in like manner they were entitled to receive 'a missifin front

mission, or to despatch one to Persia, with both 'of which

countries Britain was at peace. The Anglo-Indian- Csovekt- meat had no more right to demand the dismissal of a Riissiiin mission than the Russian Government had to demand the distifitistal of a British one. In the whole of the transactions betweeti-the Anglo-Indian Government and Cahill, bad faith, and a dietateitial conduct inconsistent with what is due to a free state, cisaractrfie the conduct of the former. The British authorities' keep in'their pay a pretender to the Afghan crown,* and furnish him With meaty when they know he is about to invade Afghanistan ; they thaw obstacles in the way of the chiefs of Afghanistan, who seek Sni1y to regain a part of the national territory forcibly taken from than while repelling this British pensioner; they peremptorily order The Afghan chiefs not to receive envoys from Russia or send envoyaito Persia ; and because it is suspected that under these eiretinistaiices the good-will once borne by the Afghans towards Great Britain may grow cool, the British authorities send their puppet to revolsi- tionize Afghanistan by British troops, and to govern it for:them'in his name, but for their ends. Nothing more dishonourable lo Britain—nothing more violent and fraudulent—was perpetrated' by the CLIVES and WARREN HASTINGS of the last century. And to add to our disgrace, while thus tyrannizing over the weak we have been truckling to the strong. If Doss. :MOHAMMED was in fault, Rs Was Russia. Yet Lord PALMERSTON writes to Count Pozzo m BORGO.'" " The despatch from Count Nesselrode contains assurances the insist. full and complete; and her Majesty's Government accept as entirely satilactory the declarations of the Imperial Cabinet." The British Government punishes a sovereign in Asia for taking part in trans- actions which it declares in a European sovereign to be perfectly innocent. t So much for the morality of the AUCKLAND movements in Asia.: a word or two with regard to their policy. True policy dictates on all occasions an adherence to recognized conventional maxims of law, and honourable conduct. By acting sincerely and honestly we gain a character which conciliates the good-will of our neighbours. By obeying conventional rules though they make or seem to make against us, we gain the right to insist upon their observance when they make in our favour. Had we respected the integrity and in- dependence of the Afghan territory, we could have resisted with a good grace Russian interference in the internal affairs of Persia. Can we do so now? When our spouters about Poland and Cir- cassia inveigh against the Russian Government, may it not justly tell them to take the beam out of their own eye first? By un- settling the first great principle of the inviolability of national territory, we have done more to promote the ambitious designs of Russia, than its whole military, naval, and diplomatic staff.

* In a letter from Mr. .11PNAcnTss, quoted by the Chairman at the last General Quarterly Court of Proprietors of India Stock, that gentleman naively enough calls Shah Summit "mu' King ;" i, e. not the King to whom -Mr. M`NAGIITEN, a loyal Briton, owes allegiance, but the King belonging to the corporate body represented by Mr. lir..)LsonTss.

t It is advisedly that we say "the British Government" have acted thus in Asia. The Court of Directors is managed by the Secret Committee ; the Secret Committee by the Board of Control ; the Board of Control b_y the Foreign Secretary. At the last quarterly court of Proprietors of India Stock, Sir CHARGES FonnEs stated without contradiction, that *he understood the campaign arose out of the suggestion of Lord Palmerston and Sir John Rob- house." The Benedick of the Foreign Office, truckling to Russia and venting his valour on the Afghans, is the pc-simile of Fag taking a kick fromlui master awl giving it to the errand-boy

:..Again, by our domineering tone and insincerity in the mat- 'ter of Afghanistan, we have in a few short months destroyed a character which for long years we had been labouring

to acquire. Sir ALEXANDER BURNES says, in the second volume

Of his Travels—" The chiefs of Afghanistan were not in power 'When the British Mission entered the country in 1809 ; but our re- putation was then established, and the good opinion of all parties has been acquired by our immediate withdrawal afterwards. That Circumstance, it is true, was unavoidable ; but it left impressions most favourable to our disinterestedness." In 1837, Dosx Mo-

RAMMED himself said to Sir ALEXANDER—" The treaties which

have been made with the powers on the Indus arc the best proofs of the sincerity in the objects which have led the Government to depute you to Cabul." The Koosh Begec of Bokhara was so con- vinced of the absence of any wish for territorial aggrandizement on the part of the British Government, that he urged Sir Aram-

ANDER BURNES to return to him as a "trading ambassador : " an

Invitation upon which an incidental remark elsewhere made by that gentleman throws additional light :—" The Russians have es- tablished a friendly feeling with the chief of Kokan : they have impressed the whole of the Uzbeks with high notions of their power, to the detriment of all other European nations ; but they have yet to eradicate by their future conduct other opinions which have been as universally adopted, that they want truth and honour in their diplomacy." To the Russian standard we have voluntarily degraded ourselves, and must take the consequences. The good opinion once entertained of us at Bokhara and throughout Afghanistan has been shaken, and the suspicions of the Chief of Kondooz justified. Once the name of Englishmen was a pass- 'port to hospitality in Afghanistan ; now an Englishman is not safe in that country if he passes the lines of the British encamp- ment.

Even taking the word policy in the low meaning of vulgar diplo- matists, as conduct which, however indefensible to an honourable or a philosophical mind, may conduce to a temporary advantage, the recent movement upon Afghanistan is indefensible. The only tenable plea in palliation, is that it was made with a view to pre- vent aggression upon our Indian territories. A government so wealthy as the Anglo-Indian, and having such numerous and well- disciplined troops at its command, must look forward to aggression either with a well-affected or a disaffected body of subjects. If the subjects are well-affected, a line of defence little if at all in ad- vance of the frontier is advisable, unless that frontier be very weak indeed. The further the line of military operations is advanced beyond the frontier, the more expensive and precarious be- come the communications. And in addition to this considera- tion in the case of British India, it so happens, that the fron- tier line, the great desert and the hill country at the sources of the Sutlege and Jumna, form a line more easily defensible than any line in Afghanistan. If, however, the subjects are disaffected, (and this, as well as the features of Anglo-Indian policy which may tend to produce disaffection, we intend to dis- cuss ere long,) it is not by extending our lines that we can put 'aside the dangers of mutiny in the camp. If our Indian domi- nions are difficult of defence because the garrison is mutinous, we do

not see how the difficulty is to be diminished by occupying Afghan- istan, where the garrison must be more mutinous still. Is it more easy to govern two reluctant and turbulent nations, than one, in the face of an enemy ? If our subjects in Hindostan are discontented already, will they be brought into better humour by the additional taxes which must be imposed upon them to defray the expense of the Afghan expedition? Our occupation of Afghanistan must be permanent, if the views of its projectors are to be fulfilled. Shah SIIUJAII holds his throne only so long as he is supported by British troops. When he entered Cabul, he begged that the streets and avenues to the palace might be lined by the British forces. He dared not trust his unwilling subjects ; and the massacres he has, with British

connivance, since perpetrated, cannot have mended matters. His position is this : as head of the Suddozye clan, (and to this title the chief of Herat has as good a claim,) he urges a right of prece- dence first founded in 1723, and extinct for years, on the part of one of the least numerous Afghan clans. In 1829, when .AZEEM

KHAN offered to replace him on the throne of Afghanistan,

he lost his chance by "prematurely displaying his notions of royal authority by insulting some friend of his benefactor, whom he consi- dered to be encroaching on his dignity by using a palanquin." This childishness offended beyond forgiveness the Barukzye, the most numerous and powerful of the Afghan clans; but it has since trans-

pired in 1834, that before SHUJAH advanced into Afghanistan, he had bargained for the support of RUNJEET SING mm, by ceding to that ruler as far as he could a large portion of the Afghan territory; and thus

be has excited against himself every national and religious pre-

judice of the whole of the Afghans. So early as 1832, Sir ALEXANDER BURNES said, "The fitness of Shah Shujah-ul-Mulk

for the station of sovereign seems ever to have been doubtful. his manners and address are highly polished ; but his judgment does not rise above mediocrity." We may now add, that he has shown himself not only destitute of the feelings of common hu- manity, but capable of deriving satisfaction from wanton cruelty. A bold and able bad man can uphold a throne ; a feeble good man may be tolerated on it; but one both bad and weak can only be held on it, and that by external force. This latter task has been undertaken by the Anglo-Indian Government. It must cost them dear; it may cost them all they have.