BOOKS

The Heart of Hampshire

BY A. J

AYER

PittLoSOPHY is not an easy subject, and Mr. Hampshire is not one of those who try to make it seem easier than it is. His new book* makes a heavy demand upon the reader. Apart

from a short preface and conclusion, it consists of four solid chapters, ranging in length from fifty to eighty pages, all without a break of any kind. This effect of density is strengthened by a weighty style of writing. Many questions are raised, but they are not dealt with one by one. There is no orderly progression from one stage of the argu- ment to the next: Indeed, there is no continuous argument. The form is rather that of a musical composition. A set of recurrent themes is woven into a diversified 'pattern. We are expected to view the work as an organic whole.

Such a book requires close reading. I had to go through it twice before I could get to the heart of it; and even now I do ..ot find it easy to sum- marise. But if it requires close reading, it also re- pays it. In a period in which philosophers, at least in this country, are becoming increasingly shy, not merely of any form of speculation, but of committing themselves to any general theory, Mr. Hampshire boldly sets out to sketch the con- tour a synoptic philosophy. He pays a penalty fot The breadth of his approach makes it difficult for him to be meticulous over details.

There are times when one cannot see the trees for the wood. But the attempt at.what he calls a more general survey was well worth making. The posi- tion which he develops is interesting and impor-

tant. '

It may he most easily described by contrast with•the traditional attitude of British empiricism. prom Locke to Russell, British 'empiricists have based their theory of knoWledge upon the indi- vidual's sense-impressions.. The existence 1.4 Physical objects 'and of other persons had to be constructed out of these sense-impressions, or in- ferred froM them. This was a purely intellectual operation; given the sensory material it could be carried out by a disembodied spirit. The indi- vidual subject was located in the world as a spec- tator, not primarily as an agent. In so fat-as these empiricists concerned themselves with action, they held that it was motivated by desire and to this extent non-rational. The function of reason was to discover the means by which the desired ends could best be attained. It was-only in a rather

suPerficial sense that min was regarded as a social animal. Society was a device by which individuals 'night be better equipped to secure their separate aims.

Mr. Hampshire rejects this position in every detail. To begin with, he holds that sense-impres-

sions do not provide a basis for the theory of knowledge, on the ground that they cannot be identified without reference to physical objects. He argues that 'we must unavoidably think of

reality as consisting of persisting things of differ- ent types and kinds' and that 'physical objects and persons are the plain and unavoidable cases of particular things that retain their identity

• * Tnotimir AND. ACTION. By Stuart Hampshire. (Chatto and Windus, 2513

through change.' If we are to give an intelligible account of perception, we must start with the notion of an observer who is in communication with other observers and is in control of a body which has 'a real situation in the world' in the sense that it occupies a definite position in public space and time. The body is the medium of per- ception, and it is only by taking this into account that one can establish a .distinction between the percipient and the objects which he perceives.

So far Mr. flampshire's main objection to the empiricists is that they vainly tried to justify what he thinks it necessary to assume. But he goes on to argue that they have made a serious mistake in treating the observer as passive. 'In fact I find - myself from the beginning able to -act upon objects around me . . . I not only perceive ex- ternal objects, I also manipulate them.' My body itself is 'external' in the sense that it is a physical object among others, but in another sense it is not external. For example, it is not an instrument, just for the reason that it is not something that I can at any moment lay aside. The direct know- ledge which I have of its position and its move- ment is a necessary condition of my engaging in meaningful discourse or action. Thus there is no question of my having to infer its existence, any more than there is any question of my having to infer or construct my own identity out of par- ticular perceptions. One's self-identity depends upon one's sense of oneself as a source Of mean- ingful action. 'To myself I am always a continu- ing thing producing changes, of which I know directly that I am the cause.'

Mr. Hampshire is not a behaviourist. He does not deny that there arc circumstances in which minds 'can be contrasted with bodies, nor does he claim that mental states or events are always re- ducible to physical ones. All the same, there is a sense in which he does think that the mental is subordinate to the physical. He speaks of mental actions as being in their nature 'parasitic and shadowy.' The 'substantial reality of human thought' is its expression in speech or writing or overt action. Our mental life is the shadow which remains when these public performances are in- hibited. And whereas for an intellectualist like Descartes the essence of the mind consists in thinking, for Mr. Hampshire it seems rather to consist in being prepared to act or, as he puts it, in having intentions. 'At any moment of my waking life, there are always things that I intend to do in the future and there are always things that i am doing with intention at that moment.' Moreover, Mr. Hampshire finds in our know- ledge of our intentions the type of certainty, the so-called incorrigibility, that other philosophers have ascribed to reports of one's present sensa- tions. He argues that while the subject may make a mistake in describing his intentions he cannot possibly fail to know what they are.

To act with conscious and deliberate intention is to know what one is doing: and, according to Mr; Hampshire, the more a man knows what he is doing, the freer and more responsible he be- comes. All that is then required is that the range of achievements open to him, in the sense that they are not barred to him by the actions of others or by social institutions, should be relatively. :wide. A determinist might object that it is relevant here to ask how the' man's intentions have been formed, and that if it can be shown that they are causally determined his freedom does not amount to anything worth having. But to this Mr. Hamp- shire answers that there is logically no limit to what one can try to do. He even goes so far as to say that a man's character is something that he chooses from a number of alternatives. At the same time he revives what he calls the philo- sophical commonplace, but I should call the philosophical fallacy,. that freedom is the know- ledge of necessity. 'Recognition of a causal uni- formity is at least a first step towards finding the means of evading its effects by trying to alter the initial conditions, or the boundary conditions, upon which its operation depends.'

Throughout his book Mr. Hampshire lays em- phasis upon social factors. Thus he holds that what we count as real depends in part upon our methods of classification, and that these presup- pose social interests. Our language, which helps to make reality what it is for us, is something that we use in communication with one another. In Mr. Hampshire's view, the idea of a solitary thinker is logically inconsistent. And when it comes to morals, he argues,convincingly that this is not simply a question of harmonising ends, or imposing laws upon the will. Our moral judg- ments are made within a conceptual framework, which is itself subject to criticism. There is a freedom of intelligence as well as of the will. For Mr. HaMpshire, the fundamental ethical concept is that of the good man. He is even led by this io the rather extravagant conclusion that philosophy itself is 'a search for "a definition of man."

All this is highly reminiscent of the existential- ists. I think that all Mr.' Hampshire's main con- tentions would be accepted by Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. Like them he asserts more than he suc- ceeds in proving. It might be wished, as I have said, that he had dealt with fewer issues and ex- amined them more minutely. But this would have yielded a different sort of book. As it is, the scope of this work is impressive. ff, as Ramsey said, the chief danger to our philosophy is schol- asticism,'Mr. Hampshire notably escapes it.