BOOKS.
PAN-AMERICA.NISM.*
SUCH books as that by Mr. Hudson Maxim, which we reviewed recently, and this fascinating study of Pan-Americanism by Professor Roland G. Usher, as well as Mr, Roosevelt's con- tinual exhortations, prove that if there be a considerable pacificist movement in the United States, there aro also strong brains and stout hearts which recognize that pacificism is not the way to peace. They recognize that both peace and honour may have to be bought at a heavy price, and can be secured in no other way. It would not be easy to name an author in the United States who writes with mo►e moderation and has a wider range of historical vision than Mr. Usher ; yet with as much earnestness and conviction as Mr. Maxim, if with less violence of phrase, he warns his countrymen that they are living in a fool's paradise, If they would be truly independent, they must have the power which is the pre- requisite of independence. They cannot guarantee peace to themselves by merely saying that they wish for it. In the intelleotual conflict which is obviously developing in the United States between pacificistn—the blear-eyed paeifieiem which sings "I did not raise my son to be a soldier"--and finely reasoned domande for adequate naval and military preparation such as are put forward by Mr. Usher, the stronger brains will probably win. If they do not win, Pan-ArnerrIcanism: a .17`n-vcast of the Inimitable Clash between the united Vera and /furore's Victor. fly Roland C. ITaLer. Ph.D. Loudon: Countable wan Co. '03a. 6.1.
there will be sooner or later an accident on a large scale to the whole fabric of American security. If Germany should be the victor in the present war, the challenge to the United States would come very soon indeed. Mr. Usher's book should be read by every American, and we hope it will be read by a great many Englishmen. He implores his countrymen to think out their problems while they can still do so in a. quiet and orderly manner. If they have to do the work under the pressure of a heavy menace, they may do it hysterically and ineffectually. The crisis which the present war has brought to the United States is, says Mr. Usher, without parallel in her history. This is, we think, no exaggeration. if Germany should win, it would be "America's turn next." But even apart from that—for of course we do not believe that Germany will win—the people of the United States must still make up their minds how they mean in future to exert their own rights, and how to stand for the rights of all those Latin-American Republics which by the terms of the Monroe Doctrine they have taken under their wing.
We cannot accept all Mr. Usher's conclusions. Notably his conviction that the victor in the present war must necessarily fall foul of the United States seems to us a gloomy piece of pessimism. In tracing the origin of the problems which now confront the United States, he shows how in the past the balance of power in Europe operated to save the New World from hostile attentions. Even when the nucleus of the present United States was a British colony, it was not worth while for Britain to fight with all her strength in the New World. Washington had only to endure, and to avert decisive defeat, and the day was certain to come when Britain would find that the prosecution of a war so remote and so difficult to organize was a case of payiiig ten shillings in order to save five. The circumstances which made it comparatively easy for the Americans to win their independ. Klee served them well again for the next few generations. And it was fortunate for the United States that sea power remained in the hands of Britain, for, as Mr. Usher admits, that power was nearly always used with restraint and con- sideration. But the conditions which permitted the Americans justly to consider themselves safe from European attack no longer exist. It would be no more difficult for a European army to support itself in the United States than it is for European armies in the present war to support themselves to a considerable extent on American supplies. While assenting to all this, we cannot see why Britain should be likely to act with less restraint in the future than in the past. Mr. Usher thinks that the economic necessities of the victor in the present war will be so urgent that he will be forced to attempt something like the strangulation of commercial competitors in the Western world. A nation which resists strangulation will at the very least find itself, as he thinks, in a hostile relation to Britain. If we were Protectionists, we might swallow such a conclusion. But as we assume that English. men are as far off as ever from acting on the theory that in order to make your own trade prosperous you must ruin that of others, we cannot believe that economic competition will bring us to grips with the United States. Nor can we agree that if Britain holds the undisputed supremacy of the seas after the war she will want to seize such places as can easily fall to naval operations without extensive hind operations. The truth is that we have all the territory we want. Events have suggested in the past few years that we could not easily administer further territories in accordance with our accepted standard of coni- potence and honesty. Rather than fail in this respect we would willingly do without another inch of territory. But of course there is one pressing reason which will cause Britain to hold more territory as the immediate result of this war. We cannot ask the self-governing Dominions to abandon what they have conquered by their own efforts and may wish to retain. Nor can we hand back to Germany native populations who may beg never to be submitted again to an arrogant tyranny. Nor can we give back what might enable Germany to gather strength once more to try to dominate the world. Our task is to save the world finally from German bullying and bad faith. But none of these reasons for acquiring new territory will affect our relations with the United States. Our answer to Mr. Usher's question whether it would not be "entirely natural" for Britain to turn her attention once more to the Gulf of Mexico is that it would be entirely unnatural.
If there will be little or no danger to the United States from Britain, however—unless, of course, the United States should ask for trouble, which is not likely—it is only too true that she will become increasingly exposed to danger as the com- munications of the world grow more thorough and more speedy. If the challenge does not come from Germany, it may come froin Japan. It has been proposed that the United States should protect herself by what is known as "Pan- Americanism "—a definitely political cohesion of the con- tinents of North and South America (of course excluding Canada) for the purposes of defence. The withering criticism which Mr. Usher bestows on this fanciful plan makes most refreshing reading, Hitherto there has been a kind of economic Pan-Americanism, and of course the Monroe Doctrine, which shields South America, may be regarded on strict grounds of logic as implying something further. But where logic ends there is nothing in the Monroe Doctrine. It has no real force behind it. It is a tremendous convenience, but an exceedingly precarious one. As for a defensive federa- tion of North and South America, Mr. Usher points out that there is really no nexus for nationalities which differ in character, religion, language, mental habit, and social custom. The whole idea of Pan-Americanism is a chimera; all the elements of cohesion are absent. For purposes of defence the two continents are hopelessly sundered geographically. Mr. Usher aptly introduces an anecdote about Abraham Lincoln.
Lincoln once asked a diplomatist who was making some impractical proposal how many legs a sheep would have if its tail were called a leg. " Five," was the quite natural answer.
But Lincoln explained that the answer should still be "four." A tail would not become a leg by being called one.
After ruling out Pan-Americanism as senseless, Mr. Usher reaches the conclusion not only that the United States must defend herself by her own efforts, but that she can afford to do so much better than most European Powers. The figures he gives of the inordinate cost of her present small Army are very curious. He postulates for his country not merely an adequate Army and Navy, but a large mercantile marine. In regard to the present American merchant navy we suspect, however, that its smallness is due much more to the strangling American shipping laws than, as Mr. Usher supposes, to the world-predominance of the British Navy. It is worth noting that, great as Mr. Usher imagines the peril of
the United States to be in repect of her large and vague undertakings through the Monroe Doctrine of "Hands off," be does not fear an actual invasion of the United States by Germany, even if Germany should conquer in the present war
"In no event is a German army likely to set foot upon the soil of North America to attack the United States, Canada, or Mexico. Though we are told of German plans for the invasion of the United States, no doubt the War Department at Berlin could display in its archives an elaborate scheme for the invasion of every country on the globe, and we shall do well not to deceive ourselves into a belief that the attempt to educate the general staff in various European countries portends an invasion of the United States. Any notion that Germany would even dream of conquering America is based upon a fundamentally incorrect conception of Pan-Germanism. . . , Markets, for the swelling volume of German manufactured goods greater each year by the amount produced by the new generation of efficient hands, Germany is seeking ; markets in which she may continue to sell at a profit indefinitely, and so ward off that readjustment of German industry which must involve considerable, even though temporary, suffering to many of her people and probably invite emigration. Rightly or wrongly, she does not feel that the European countries, the United States, and Canada, will offer her such a market. South America and Central America are appa- rently ideal for her purpose, and she needs merely to remove from her path two technical and artificial obstacles, the English fleet and the Monroe Doctrine. With the one the is at present attempting to deal; to the other she may in duo time direct her attention. '
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