TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE INDIAN FRONTIER WAR. THE Government of India displays at once -vigour and discretion in mobilising an army on its North-West Frontier. We are wholly opposed to what is called the " Forward " policy, and should regard a fourth invasion of Afghanistan as an act of political lunacy ; but the dif- ference between aggression and armed precaution covers in Northern India the whole distance between rashness and wisdom. The Government, it is quite clear, finds itself in presence of a danger of which it cannot discern either the precise extent or the precise direction, which may pass as it has passed before, but which at present is serious, and may, if neglected, develop formidable pro- portions. The victories which Abd-ul-Hamid has been permitted to achieve have bad precisely the effect of the victories which Abd-ul-Medj id in 1856 was assisted to achieve. They have stirred up all through Northern India and Central Asia among all Mussulmans a hope that a fortunate hour for Islam has arrived, that the destiny of the infidel is unpropitious, and that it is the duty of the Faithful to take advantage of their oppor- tunity. The Pathan clans of the North-West Frontier, always armed and always inclined for war, have stirred first, and the Afghans may stir behind them. It is not probable that Abdurrahman Khan greatly wishes them to stir. He is an able tyrant, he knows something of the real strength of the European Empires, and he is hampered by a position which recalls that of the two last Kings of Sardinia towards Italy, by the fact, that is, that he can gain nothing unless he gains the whole. No petty success on the frontier, not even the revindication of Peshawur, if that were possible, would compensate him for the loss of his subsidy, or bring him anything except the deadly hostility of the great Empire in the South which he regards at once with dread and loathing. His single chance, as disaffected Indian Mussulmans are telling him every day, is to play the part of Mahmoud the Ghaznavide, invade India, call its fifty millions of Mussulmans to arms, and rebuild by the scimitar the throne of the Great Mogul. Old for an Asiatic, tormented with periodical attacks of gout, with the succession un- settled, and with deadly enemies to hold down within his own dominion, Abdurrahman Khan will hardly attempt to play so grand a role. He knows too no pne better, that the British army in India is at its fUllese strength, that it is mobile as it never was yet, and, what is at least as im- portant, that all the warrior races of India itself—Sikhs, Ghoorkas, Rajpoots, and Mahrattas—are passionately Hindoo, and sooner than see a Mahommedan autocracy revive, would strike for the maintenance—for the moment —of the white intruder's power. Still, the vision must always be before his eyes, if only because preachers whom he respects incessantly call it up ; he is a sincere Mussul- man greatly moved by Mussulman victories over Euro- peans; and if the Pathans were to inflict one striking defeat on British troops, he might be swept away by a torrent of mixed religious feeling, national pride, and anti-European hate. If such a moment ever occurred, our one chance for avoiding a civil war that would extend to every village would be victory, decided and real victory, at first; and the Government of India does well to be visibly ready, to collect an army complete in all its departments, and to give all the forces at its disposal that gentle but perceptible impulse towards the North which is now proceeding, and which has given rise on the Continent to the wild suspicion that we con- template a fourth invasion of Afghanistan. The work is sure to be well done. The Chitral campaign taught the supply departments several things—for one, the immense consumption of cartridges in modern expeditions ; all soldiers believe in the thorough competence of Sir George White, the present Commander-in-Chief ; and Lord Elgin has proved himself in all the questions that have come before him a sound man of business, who can take a decided course, and—an invaluable quality—likes clear advice instead of being jealous of it.
Moreover, the Indian Government has another and timelier, but quite sufficient, reason for being "prepared," that is, for having an adequate force mobilised for instant action. Whatever may be the truth about the A reear—a point upon which the testimony of people "-who have lived in Cabul " is worth exceedingly little, as little as the opinion of English residents in Berlin as to the foreign policy of the German Emperor—it is quite certain that the Pathan clans of the frontier are in a restless mood, and restless because of the single impulse which affects them all alike, a religious hope. If anything can unite them it is what we agree to call"fanaticism," that is, the crusading spirit directed against the Cross, and when so moved they are not to be despised. They are the bravest of men, they are fairly armed, though practically without artillery, and along a line of more than five hundred miles there are a hundred thousand of them at least willing, if they see a fair chance, to kill and be killed. If they all rose together we should have an ugly business on our hands, a real war, with nothing to get at the end of it, and if we were visibly defeated at any one point, "cut up" on a big scale, or forced to fall back into the plains, they would all rise, be the consequences what they might. They would think God was on their side, and what do consequences matter then ? They are sure not to be attacked from the rear, for though Abdurrahman Khan may not be inciting them, and may even be annoyed by their action, he must, as Mussulman Prince, tolerate and favour any effort for his religion, and while that is his attitude they are sure of ability to retreat. The only way to prevent that danger is to win always, to secure victory whenever we strike, and to maintain such reserves, actual mobilised reserves, not men in distant cantonments, that the smallest disaster can be instantly repaired. It is this policy which the Indian Government is pursuing, and we, who dis- trust the cry of "Forward," can see its wisdom as clearly as the maddest soldiers who ever advised an expedition into Central Asia. Those who decry the Government of India for taking such precautions—and. they are more numerous than appears in the papers,. journalists having a professional kindness for any policy which creates excitement—do not understand the far greater dangers which unreadiness would involve, dangers, we mean, of the very kind which they themselves would least approve. We might have to expend divisions instead, of brigades, and lakhs of pounds instead of lakhs of rupees.
It is all a horrid nuisance, no doubt. Every incident of the kind is an interruption to real work, just as a European war is an interruption to progress. The Indian Government needs every moment of time and every rupee of revenue that it can use, for its daily work of administra- tion, for physical improvements which have hardly begun —just listen to the accounts of men who have seen the Plague in Bombay—and for that solidification of the Empire on bases other than cantonments which has not begun at all. Not one Indian fighting race has joined us yet, nor is there one which can be relied on to perish before the Empress's throne is overturned. There is an infinity of work to do, and whenever there is a campaign it all stops, if only for reasons of expenditure, and all eyes,. Indian eyes as well as English eyes, turn towards the scene of action. It is not only that everything new is postponed "till the war is over," but that all energy of thought is absorbed in the campaign, every European realising fully, whether he will acknowledge it or not, that the British Empire in India is something of a miracle, that its condition is continuous success in war, and that the marvellous dominion which is like nothing else in history, "as it came in a night, so it may disappear in a day." The mere losses of a campaign are eminently disagreeable. The Indian Empire is a military Monarchy, always more or less ready for battle ; but still every death is felt, every regiment worn out must be replaced, every movement involves expenditures, sometimes very considerable, which would not be necessary in peace. In frontier wars in particular the results are most exasperating to the Exchequer. If we subdued the whole Himalaya we should never get a rupee out of it, while as a matter of fact we have never since 1857—forty years ago—attained by any expedition a military position which would enable us to say, "Now, at last, we can reduce the Army." A frontier campaign, in fact, is, if regarded in the light of our real work in India, an unmixed and most embarrassing evil. Nevertheless the Indian Government is entirely in the right in its present action. We are in the Himalaya and must stop there. The " Forward " party has not quite won the game, for it has not conquered Afghan- istan, and so made of Herat our frontier fortress ; but it has so far won it that we are responsible for the Himalaya, and must always watch the moods of a Mussulman potentate in Central Asia whom we have no means of influencing except bribery and terror. It is not a nice position, but it cannot be altered, and the Government of India, in calmly accepting the conditions, and making ready against any surprise, is doing its clear duty with moderation as well as ability. If we do not misunderstand the signs, Sir George White means it to be clearly visible that he is the strong man armed standing in the gate, but has no intention of forcibly breaking into any neighbour's house. We regret the necessity for the arms, which always marks a. defective civilisation ; but, granted the inexorable conditions, that is the right, and indeed the only possible, attitude to maintain.
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