SIR HENRY LAYARD'S "USEFULNESS."
TT is, we own, with much regret, not unmixed with a feel- ]. ing of uneasiness, that we have read the complimentary references made by Lord Hartington and Sir Charles Dilke to Sir Henry Layard's present services. He is, we are assured, earning his full salary, though absent from Constantinople, because he has been for some time employed at the Foreign Office, and is doing "very useful" work there. We do not grudge Sir Henry Layard the receipt for a time of his salary—. though Mr. Goschen is doing his work—if that is technically necessary to enable him to retire on a first-class pension. But we should much prefer that he should draw it in retire- ment, than in return for "very useful" services at the Foreign Office. Neither Sir Charles Dilke nor Lord Hartington ex- plained the character of the " useful " work which Sir Henry Layard is doing, and it is possible that the work which has been assigned to him lies in a department of Foreign Affairs which has nothing to do with the Ottoman Empire. If that is so, we have no objection to his continued employment. But if Sir Henry Layard's work at the Foreign Office is, as -we fear, con- nected with Turkish affairs, we cannot imagine anything but mischief as likely to result from it. His conduct as Ambassa- dor at the Porte seems to us to demonstrate his incapacity for any "useful" work in that field of foreign politics. His is not simply the case of a servant of the Crown obeying the instruc- tions and carrying out the policy of the Queen's Government. That policy wts bad enough, in all conscience. But Sir Henry Layard strove to make it worse, and succeeded. Whenever the Government strayed, or showed any inclination to stray, into a right groove, Sir Henry Layard's vigilant perverseness was on the alert to mislead them. We make that assertion with an accurate recollection of his despatches, and we proceed at once to give some examples by way of proof. When it became plain that the Porte had resolved to reject even the "irreducible minimum" of the Constantinople Con- ference, Lord Salisbury, as the spokesman of the Plenipotenti- aries, delivered a very solemn warning to the Sultan and his Ministers. "The position of Turkey before Europe," he said, "will have been completely changed, and will be ex- tremely perilous We can foresee dangers near at hand.which will threaten the very existence of Turkey, if she allows herself to be entirely isolated ;" and "the responsibility of the consequences will rest solely on the Sultan and his advisers." This language was angrily censured by the Turkish organs in the London Press ; but it was emphatically approved by Lord Beaconsfield's Cabinet. The Ambassadors of the Great Powers were accordingly recalled from Constantinople, and the Russian declaration of war followed, after the abortive Protocol of London. In the interval, however, Sir Henry Layard was sent as "Special Ambassador" to the Sultan, who welcomed him as "a delicate mark of attention" on the part of the British Government. Now, we must assume, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that a Cabinet which had denounced "the Sultan and his advisers," and cast on them the "sole responsibility" of the war with Russia, and its consequences, did not send Sir Henry Layard to Constantinople to countermine their own declared policy. If we are to accept the bona fides of Lord Beaconsfield's Government, Lord Derby being at the time Foreign Secretary, we must assume that Sir Henry Layard's instructions were to repeat and accentuate the warning of Lord Salisbury. But how, in matter of fact, did Sir Henry Layard signalise his advent as Ambassador at the Porte? He at once took up the role of a hot partisan of the Turkish cause. In flagrant opposition to the declaration of Lord Salisbury, which was sanctioned by his Government, Sir Henry Layard at once assumed that the quarrel was one entirely between the Governments of Russia and Turkey, and he espoused, with the eagerness of a fanatic, the cause of the Turks. To this end, he drew up a Memorandum for the benefit of the Porte, with the view of teaching it how to evade the consequences of its own obstinacy, and trick public opinion in England into the belief that it was not "the Sultan and his advisers" who were responsible for the war, but the Czar and his advisers, Lord Salisbury's declaration to the contrary notwithstanding. "It is of the utmost import- ance to Turkey," says this remarkable document, "that this impression [of the Porte being responsible for the impending war with Russia] should be removed." "Public opinion in England would not support or approve any Government that was prepared to help Turkey. It is of vital importance to Turkey that she should seek to change or modify this opinion." Sir Henry Layard accordingly instructs the Sultan and his Ministers as to " the best way to do so." His plan, he thinks, "would be more likely than anything else" to put Russia in such a dilemma that she would either be "compelled to de- clare war," in which case public opinion in England would probably support an Anglo-Turkish alliance ; or, on the other hand, Russia would find herself "under the control of the Powers, who might call upon her to disarm." And "if Russia refwsed this condition, she would undoubtedly place herself in the wrong before public opinion." The Porte took this crafty advice ; the Russian declaration of war followed ; and Lord Bea- consfield's Government took their cue from Sir Henry Layard's confidential memorandum to the Porte, and, straight in the teeth of their own previous declarations, publicly charged Russia with the sole responsibility for a war which Lord Salisbury, in obedience to his instructions, had already charged upon the Porte. The annals of diplomacy hardly furnish a parallel to this extraordinary voile-face, which is duly recorded in the Blue-books. The Sultan had good reason to welcome the advent of Sir Henry Layard as "a delicate mark of attention," and the Turkish Parliament was justified in presenting the British Ambassador with an address of thanks for having committed his Government to the Turkish cause, as against the Russian.
Fortunately, Sir Henry Layard was in error, in supposing that his diplomatic manceuvre would so hoodwink the British public that they would support an Anglo-Turkish alliance against Russia. What he really did was to push the Turks into an unequal contest, which has dealt a mortal blow to their empire. But destiny was indulgent to Sir Henry Layard. It offered him another chance of arresting the up- lifted sword of Russia, and saving his Turkish clients from the doom which hung over them. Before the Russian army crossed the Danube, the Czar confided to the British Govern- ment the tarns upon which he was then willing to make peace with the Porte. They did not differ greatly from the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, and Lord Derby communicated them to Sir Henry Layard, with a view to his sounding the Porte on the subject. The Ambassador refused, in peremptory terms, to do anything of the kind. And he assured his Government that "by following" his advice, "we may recover and main- tain a part of that great and preponderating influence which England once enjoyed amongst the Mussulman, and even Christian, nations and communities of the East, and which she was able to use most effectively for their good and her own." Sir Henry Layard was allowed to have his own way. And what is the end of it all ? His own last despatch, written on the eve of his departure from Constantinople last April, tells the instructive tale :—" I have exhausted," says that melan- choly and despairing document, "every diplomatic resource in endeavouring to bring the Sultan and his advisers to a sense of the danger to which the empire is exposed, in consequence of the state of things I have described. I have used every representation and remonstrance—I may almost say menace—to induce them to put into execution, and to carry out loyally and fully, the promised reforms But hitherto in vain If we are in earnest to save this country," "we must be prepared to go further than mere menaces." This is the outcome of Sir Henry Layard's astute diplomacy This is how he "recovered and maintained a part of that great and preponderating influence" which England at one time wielded in the East ! It is Sir Henry Layard's own pen which records the damning fact that under his management British influence in Turkey sank to a depth which it had never touched before. And who can wonder at it, that remembers the means Sir Henry Layard adopted to further his policy? We have already described some of them.
Let us run over a few more. He systematically vilified all who ventured to condemn the iniquities of Turkish rule.
Our readers will remember the Negroponte calumny against Mr. Gladstone ; but very few of them are probably aware that a member of Sir Henry Layard's own staff, Mr. Baring, was treated to the Ambassador's public sneers for the crime of telling the truth about the Bulgarian massacres. And what shall we say of the discretion and equity of an Ambassador who reported to his Government, without troubling himself to verify the story, that the Russian troops, on the capture of Ardahan, had massacred "between 1,000 and 1,500 of the inhabitants." As a fact, the Russian troops behaved with singular humanity on that occasion, as the Times' Correspondent, who was present, has publicly testi- fied. It is also well known that the British Consul at Erzeroum wrote a despatch to Sir H. Layard in which he completely disposed of the story of the massacre. What has become of that despatch? There is no trace of it in the Blue-books ; but the Consul was removed from Erzeroum. It is unnecessary to go into Sir Henry Layard's despatches concerning the Rhodope Commission, but one fact is worth mentioning. Sir Henry Layard vouched in vehement terms for the truth of the trumped-up evidence which the Commission collected. In language equally vehe- ment he had, not long previously, reported all sorts of atrocities as committed by the Bulgarians against the Mussuln3ans. Now, the one thing upon which the witnesses examined by the Rho- dope Commission were unanimous was the " angelic " conduct of the Bulgarians, as contrasted with that of the Russians. The Bulgarians, said the Mussulman witnesses, had always behaved to them "like brothers," "like angels," and loved them so dearly that they " wept " when they saw the Mussulraans de- parting. What are we to think of the judgment of a man who affirms and denies the same proposition with equal fanaticism, according to the passion of the moment ? We cannot imagine a less " useful " adviser on Turkish affairs. Fortunately, the present Government is exceptionally strong in knowledge of the Eastern Question, and is not likely to be led astray by Sir Henry Layard. But we really do wish they would not think it necessary to be so complimentary to any man who has particularly distinguished himself in doing damage to his country.
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