Commonwealth and Foreign
READJUSTMENT IN FINLAND
By FRANK CLEMENTS
Helsingfors, April.
IN the centre of Helsingfors there stands a simple monu- ment to commemorate the German soldiers who fell in the struggle against the Russians and the Reds in the days when Finland was fighting for independence. No one who wants to assess Finland's attitude to Europe must forget that monument and all it implies. To the Finns, the Ger- mans came as allies, and although there were, admittedly, more than altruistic motives behind German intervention, it is true to say that Germans played a very different role in Finland from that to which they were committed in the Baltic States. More than twenty years have passed, but the Finn, except in times of unusual stress, is sluggish and stead- fast in his emotions, so that Germany has been regarded with real friendship and gratitude as well as admiration. It is idle to argue, as some do, that German intervention was ruthless, self-seeking, and entirely without regard to the Finns except as pawns in a larger game. That may or may not be true, but that is not how the Finn sees it.
Sweden's rdle in Finland acts in many ways as comple- mentary to the main stream of German influence. What- ever the Swedes think of present-day Nazis, it is undeniable that as a nation they feel themselves akin to the Germans, and that they are to some extent in awe of German culture. Not only is there a Swedish minority in Finland—about ten per cent. but very influential—but Finland and Sweden are bound by old ties, and the basis of modern Finnish culture is Swedish. More than architecturally is Helsingfors "a small Stockholm," as so many Finns themselves describe it. As a result, German academic and cultural influence has been marked, conversation with students, for example, re- veals that they still use more German books in their studies than those in any other foreign language. Various other minor considerations encourage this tendency, such as the relative cheapness of German books, and the enterprise of German publishers, who make their books much more easily available than English or French ones.
The third force at work in Finland is the traditional, and to a stranger astonishing, hatred of Russia. This dates only from the closing years of the last century and the Russifica- don policy of the Pan-Slays, but it was intensified by the behaviour of the Red Army in South Finland. But the feeling is altogether too strong to be based entirely on past experiences. The fact is, that the Finns are afraid that Russia has still territorial designs on Finland, and the average Finn sees in Russia the one enemy of the nation. (The savagery of this feeling was well illustrated in a Finnish film, The February Manifesto, showing in Helsingfors last March, wherein every Russian was portrayed as an in- human beast.) This Russian obsession colours the outlook of the ordinary Finn, who laughs at the theory that Soviet Russia is not imperialistic. The reply to such a remark would be inevitably: "But we know the Russians. Even today there are about thirty nations in the U.S.S.R., and what sort of independence have they? What sort of freedom would we, or Poland, or the Baltic States have had if we had not been strong? Look what happened to those Republics who could not resist."
Whether you think this attitude correct or false does not matter. You must accept it as being, for some time yet, quite unshakable. In ordinary times it would have no great effect on the European situation, but nowadays it may have the strongest influence. For it is an inescapable fact that Finland will not tolerate a Pact with Russia, and would in no circumstances permit Russian troops to cross her frontier or Russian ships to use her harbours. This is not only the official but the private determination of Finland, and we cannot afford to overlook it. Reason as you may, you will come against the bald statement : "Once the Russians are in, they never go out." On the other hand, except for a small ultra-Fascist minority—the I.K.L.—no Finn would support aggression against Russia or has dreams of territorial aggrandisement there.
Such are the main considerations which have moulded the general outlook of the Finns in the years since the War. There has, in addition, been a steadily growing interest in the English language and culture, and there is a remarkable feeling of goodwill towards ourselves ; but it would be wrong to suppose that this would lead to active co-operation with England in time of war. Finland will fight for one thing only —her own independence, and that only when it is directly and immediately threatened. During the crisis of last September the Finns paid almost as much attention to the movements of the Russian fleet as to the events in middle Europe, and on the whole there was little conception that wider issues might be involved than the immediate one of the Sudeten minority. No strong anti-German reaction was noticeable.
All the more significant, therefore, is the sudden swing of opinion which became obvious during my stay in Helsingfors during March. In the words of a leading editor there, "recent events have shocked Finland more than anyone imagines." Conversations I had with people in all walks of life more than confirmed what he said. The Finn is only emotional under extreme stress and he changes or makes up his mind slowly, so that it will be some time before there are any results to reflect the new trend. But, in one sentence, the old attitude to Germany has changed for ever. As if overnight, the Finn has realised that there is not only one enemy to fear, and that his independence may be threatened from the south as well as from the east. There was in no sense of the word alarm, but only a wary thoughtfulness— watching and hearing them talk, it was clear that a vital prop supporting their viewpoint had been unexpectedly kicked aside, and that they were with still shocked amazement slowly readjusting themselves. However, the consequences of the new German imperialism must not be over-estimated. The Finns may no longer see in Germany a friend, but they still regard her as the lesser of two evils. That is to say, the hatred of Russia is still the stronger in- fluence. Nowhere, in perhaps fifty discussions, did I hear the faintest suggestion that Finland should co-operate with Russia.
What will happen is that the relationship with Sweden will develop even more swiftly. Finland has, to some extent, suffered from an inferiority complex with regard to Sweden, and has been sensitive to the not always tactful behaviour of the Swedish minority, but the new danger is, in their own words, "throwing the two races together," for there is no fundamental antagonism, but rather real mutual regard between them. Finland's conduct over the Aaland Islands question reflected the now accelerated tendency, and the full co-operation of the Finns will immensely strengthen the position of the Scandinavian block.
This group of four nations, though most unlikely to join in a war against Germany, will certainly be a not too well-dis- posed neutral, and, if unanimous, will have the power to pursue a really independent policy in war. Their silent pressure, because of the importance of their raw materials and strategic position, will have no mean effect on any European hostilities. Germany may have advanced in the centre, but she has immeasurably weakened her position on the bloodless but vital northern flank.
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