The Middle East

Options for peace

Joel Cohen

As I write, the outcome of the fourth Arab—Israeli war is still unclear. The Israeli determination to survive and the Arab determination to recover the honour (and some of the territory) lost in 1967, prolong the war to one of attrition. However, one may be excused for looking ahead, perhaps optimistically, for suitable channels towards peace between the two sides: action by the United Nations; peace imposed by the Great Powers; indirect and direct talks between the two sides; each has its good and bad points.

Since the 1967 Six Day War most hope has been pinned on the United Nations, which adopted Resolution 242. It purported to set out the guidelines for the peaceful and political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the wake of the 1967 war. It was supported by the Soviet Union and the United States and approved by Israel and Egypt but not Syria. A close reading of the speeches at the UN on the Middle East ever since this resolution was passed shows that the resolution has been a major obstacle to peace. It provided an alibi and extended hope to all those who believed that the prevention of an early peace settlement was more to the advantage of the party involved than any peace based on compromise.

The resolution brought into the open the paradox facing delegates to this international body which preaches the principle of 'universality' — either to represent their government's interests or to allow 'international morality" to win the day. In the case of the Middle East, individual governmental interests prevailed. With threats of an oil boycott, governments found the resolution useful as a non-commital political hideout rather than bravely taking an independent stand on the Middle East conflict. At the end of the day, Egypt still refused to negotiate a settlement until Israel withdrew from the territories she captured in 1967, while Israel still refused to withdraw before a peace agreement was signed. Both sides lost confidence in the United Nations. To the Arabs, the loss of honour was a stumbling block to negotiation. As the written constitution of a

western-orientated body, the Charter of the United Nations did not accommodate such apparently non-western norms as honour. To the Israelis, the attitude of appeasement adopted by some states during the debates in response to Arab threats of an oil boycott rid the UN of any power it had to settle international disputes. The Israelis cite May 1967 and October 1973 as evidence of this. In the first, on the eve of the 1.967 war, the United Nations failed to take action when the late President Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran and assembled his troops in the Sinai Desert. In the second, Israel which had already given up hope of UN action, was stunned when even verbal criticism was not forthcoming after Egypt and Syria attacked last week.

If both the Arabs and Israelis have lost confidence in the United Nations, at least they still confide in their respective power allies, Russia and America. The Arab world knows that, even if the Russians disagree with Arab plans to renew hostilities, they can still rely on the Soviet Union to replenish their armouries. This, in fact, has already happened in the latest round. Similarly the Israelis trust solely in the United States when her survival is threatened. With such a monopoly, the United States can afford to influence Israel not to strike first. .

With this two-way relationship between the Arabs and Russia and between America and Israel, and the mutural interest of the big Powers in detente, some observers look to Messrs Brezhnev and Nixon for finding the key to peace in the area. In what form could the Big Powers act effectively? As this fourth Arab-Israeli war has shown, political pressure is inadequate to dissude the Egyptians from taking up arms. A stronger form of pressure is needed, it is suggested, such as the Americans and Russians stationing their troops along the Israeli and Arab borders respectively and for their navies to patrol in coastal waters. Messrs Brezhnev and Nixon may conclude that the Arabs and Israelis are not going to upset their plans for world detente. As the pace of Arab nationalism gathers momentum the last thing President Sadat

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soil. To the Israelis an American presence on Israeli soil, while a different kettle of fish to the UN ' observer' force in the pre-1967

days, would be dependent on a government which is subject to the whims of an electorate every four years, and susceptible to all types of outside political pressure such as threats of oil boycotts. Detente-mongers argue that any situation in which America and Russia face one another is an invitation to another world war.

However, it is not inconceivable that both Americans and Russians could combine to form a Big Power-type UN force rather than face one another. This may stop actual fight

ing between the Arabs and Israel; but isolating each side from the other is not going to

bring them peacefully together. Isolation could result in each side building up false perceptions of the other, and if one or both sides got the opportunity to shake off the yoke of the UN-type force, as happened in 1967, fighting would again resume.

The great powers and smaller states, maY be pleasantly surprised at the achievements of behind-the-scenes diplomacy. In recent years Israeli and Jordanian statesmen, up to the heads of Government level, have met as the result of quiet diplomacy by a third party. The Arabs who were humiliated by the 1967 war, may find this type of diplomacy more amenable than publicly sitting across 'peace tables ' with Israelis.

As I write, the Egyptians appear to have recovered some lost territory, but if the Israeli

repulsion of the Syrian offensive is an indica

tion of what is to come, any honour which has been gained could be short-lived. It has already been suggested that Israel should give up part of or all the territory captured in 1967. Some Israelis doubt whether such action would result in the arab leaders beginning talks. They argue that, even when the Israelis held the 1967 borders, the Arabs still attacIted Israel. They cite as evidence the late President Nasser's action in closing the Straits of Tiran and in amassing troops on Israel's border ill May 1967. Israeli withdrawal to her 1967 boundaries they argue, is merely the first stage in "pushing the Jews into the sea. Admittedly in the past year, this call has been used less regularly. But the Israelis argue, no

Arab head of state has so far publicly stated, and reaffirmed such a statement, that Israel has a right to exist.

Many Israelis believe that no territory captured in the 1967 war, a war which Israel argues was forced upon her by President Nasser's acts, should be returned until Israel's right to exist is acknowledged. The vicious circle of one side not compromising to save the other's face, while the other side refuses to negotiate until its face is saved continues as each side digs into its own position. Some people believe the arabs will make peace if they are forced to. They cite, as evidence, the instance of King Hussein of Jordan, who, having lost the better half of his kingdom in 1967 to Israel had little alternative but to come to terms with Israel's existence. During the past five years he has found his increasingly close relationship with Israel to be beneficial for economic reasons'and useful to fall back upon when attacked from within the Arab world. Even if the Arabs eventuallY lose honour, the advantages of .peace — such as restoring the economy to a peacetime footing; in the case of Egypt to re-open the Suez Canal; and making trade ties and co-operating industrially and economically with one's new friends — easily outweigh the loss of honour.

Whichever path is taken to achieve peace, a central issue at indirect or direct talks is likely to be the exchange of refugees between each side. Israel is likely to seek equality of citizenship for the Jewish communities in Syria and Iraq as well as permission for those who want to emigrate to Israel. The Arabs have

called for re-cognition of the "inalienable rights of the Palestine people." Israel has offered compensation for the Palestinian refugees but these offers have been rejected by the Arab governments. Some Palestinian refugees have already re-settled in Israel during the past six years. Israeli acceptance of Al Fatah's demand for a secularised Palestine of Arab, Jew and Christian is rejected by many Israelis as being " impractical." Some Israelis support the view of the deputy Prime

Minister, Yigal Allon, for an autonomous state of Palestine Arabs on the occupied West Bank.

The calls of the forgotten groups on both sides of the conflict have once again been drowned by the cross fire of tanks, and by the bombast of accusations and counter-accusations. As each side mourns its dead, it is just possible that a less bloody form of fighting — across the peace table — will replace the bunker as the next battlefield.