TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE RUMOURED REDUCTION OF SHIPS IN COMMISSION.
ON Monday the Standard published a statement to the effect that it is the intention of the Government, acting apparently on the advice of the Board of Admiralty, to reduce our fighting ships in commission—that is, the ships afloat and at sea—by a very large number of first-class battleships and cruisers. If this statement is true, we do not hesitate to say that it is one of the most disastrous pieces of news which the country has heard during the present generation, and that it behoves every Englishman to make his protest against the carrying out of a policy so fatal to that upon which the safety and welfare of the realm depend,—our supremacy at sea. Let us hasten to say, however, that, in spite of Lord Tweed- mouth's regrettable silence on the point in his speech at the Cutlers' Feast on Thursday, we do not believe it to be true, for we cannot believe that even if such a course were recommended by the First Sea Lord and his colleagues under some temporary aberration or infatuation, the Cabinet, who know the present condition of Europe, would be so mad as to accept it. The Government want, and rightly want, economy, but they cannot fail to be aware that an economy which would risk our national safety must mean the ruin of themselves and their party, with all its political hopes and aspirations.
But though we must refuse to credit the Standard rumour until it is confirmed by some definite act or state- ment on the part of the Government, we feel the matter to be so serious that we shall venture to put on record the reasons against a reduction of our fighting strength at sea at the present moment. They are reasons which the people of this country cannot consider too carefully. We must point out, to begin with, that a reduction of ships in full commission is the most perilous form of reduction, owing to the extraordinary suddenness of attack which is possible in naval warfare. Antagonists on land can watch each other as a boxer watches his antagonist. The first aggressive move across the frontier is instantly discovered. In naval warfare, however, the first blow comes, not like a blow from the fist, but like a projectile through the air, which strikes a man and lays him low before he has even heard the sound of the discharge, or is aware that he has become an enemy's target. If we are to maintain absolute security, and nothing short of absolute security will suffice for a people situated as we are—in other words, a people dependent upon the sea for our daily food, and without the men or the munitions of war required to repel the invasion in force which would follow the loss of the command of the sea—we must have an invincible Fleet, not a Fleet which would probably beat the enemy, but one against which attack would be useless. If the attempt is made—or perhaps we should-say more accurately, when the attempt is made—to wrest from us the command of the sea, it will be by an attack so sudden that only those of our ships which are in commission will be available to meet it.
We are most anxious in what we write to-day to avoid anything which may savour, even in the slightest degree, of exaggeration, and we would therefore ask our readers not to receive the impression that we con- sider that the ships in Commission in Reserve—that is, the ships which are half ready, and have a nucleus crew on board—are in any sense useless, or that the system of such half-readiness is not, within proper limits, a sound system. All we contend is that these ships would not be available to meet the first rush of attack from an enemy who had come to the conclusion that the command of the sea might be taken from us by a sudden stroke. The ships in Commission in Reserve would take at least a week, or more probably ten days, to obtain their full fighting efficiency. No doubt they might nominally be placed in the battle-line a great deal earlier ; but the officers com- manding and the men working them would not be able to use the mighty instruments in their charge to complete advantage till the time we have specified had elapsed. But we cannot afford to wait a week or ten days before our full power at sea is developed. We must be ready to strike—for striking is the only true form of defence—not at a day's notice, or twenty-four hours' notice, but on the instant. The moment we as a nation stand on the defensive at sea, and act on the principle that we shall be quite ready to meet the enemy in a week's time, we say farewell to the command of the sea. That priceless gift may easily pass, and pass for ever, in an hour's naval action. The difference between ships in full commission and ships in reserve and half ready is the difference between & guard of men who are standing to their arms in some public building liable to attack, and a guard who have been told that for the time they may put away their arms in the armoury, and that they will not be wanted until they are specially called for.
We have stated the dominant reason why we ought to keep, not just enough ships in commission, but an over- whelming force, for "just enough" is not nearly enough when the whole future of the nation and the Empire is at stake. There are, however, plenty of other reasons, and most important, reasons, which can be brought against a proposed reduction of our ships in commission. We must never forget that ships out of full commission—ships, that is, which are not at sea—mean men and officers out of commission and ashore. Now, though a good deal of work can be found for officers and men ashore, and a certain amount of very useful training may be given them, it still remains a fact that a process of deterioration is going on whenever sailors are in barracks instead of being afloat and on their own element. We all saw the effect of land- seamen on the Baltic Fleet. The Russian seamen, partly owing no doubt to physical conditions, were accustomed to live ashore and to be marched down to their ships every day for drill and practice. They were, in fact, taught as landsmen, and when they were sent to sea they behaved as landsmen, and were unable to get anything like the full fighting-power out of their ships. We do not wish, of course, to be too absolute on this point, or to speak as if sailors ought never to be in barracks, or as if there should be no such thing as a reserve fleet and naval mobilisation. What we do say is that these things, good, or rather necessary, in themselves, have in them the seeds of great evil, and that the tendency towards creating a class of land- seamen ought to be most carefully watched and to be kept within strict bounds.
We have spoken of the danger of regarding ships in Commission in Reserve as naval units which can be depended upon to meet the sudden impact of war, and of the naval coup de main, which is certain to begin such a war. Still more necessary is it to warn the public that they must not place any great reliance on the ships which are maintained in what we may call the third line,—that is, ships in reserve without nucleus crews. Such ships are quite sure to be neglected, and to degenerate very rapidly, from the point of view of the battle-line. We would not go so far as to say that they are therefore useless, or that we ought to have no such ships in reserve. We fully realise that at the end of a naval war, and when there have been great losses among the best. and newest ships on both sides, such third-class vessels will play a considerable part. What we must do, however, is to banish from our minds the notion that they can take an effective part in standing the real shock of war. It would take not weeks but months to get them into true fighting trim. Therefore they must not be reckoned when we are calculating the force upon which we can rely to secure our naval supremacy.
We have given certain general reasons against the vast reduction of ships in commission alleged to be advised by the Admiralty and contemplated by the Government. These reasons, we believe, would hold good at any time ; but even those who would not be prepared to make this admission must surely agree that the present moment is a most inopportune one for any naval reduction. No doubt our own intentions are most pacific. Not only are the Government sincerely anxious to avoid any sort of warlike adventure, but we are certain that the nation at large longs for nothing more than to keep the peace. But these good intentions are unfortunately of very little avail. We cannot contemplate the condition of Europe without seeing that some untoward accident may at any moment involve us in a war in which we should be fighting for ow very existence. If our readers will carry their minds back over the history of the past year, they will see that we are in no sense exaggerating. It is an open secret that the very first duty that the present Government had to undertake was the consideration of, we had almost said the preparation for, a European war. Had the Algeciras Conference had an unfavourable instead of a favourable outcome, had Germany, in other words, pressed France to the point of war, we should have been forced to stand by her, and thus have instantly been at war by land and sea. The need for the Government to make provision for such an eventuality had hardly passed away before we were on the point of war with Turkey. No doubt, on the first view, a Turkish war does not seem formidable, but in reality it is one of those wars which may have the most tremendous secondary consequences. We might have been obliged to force the Dardanelles, and in such action we might conceivably through ill fortune have lost a very considerable part of our naval force, while at the same time resistance to a land invasion of Egypt might easily have taxed our military resources most severely. In such circumstances, can we feel sure that the Power which poses as the protector of Islam would. not have begun to consider whether the time had not come for challenging our command of the sea ?
If these things have happened and these possibilities have arisen within the past year, how can we venture to say that the coming year will show no similar risks ? It is true that we cannot at the moment point out exactly how the danger may arise, but this fact by no means spells security. Who at this time last year would have ventured to assert that we should be on the verge of war with Turkey within five months ? In a word, the state of the world calls, not for a sense of security, but for anxiety and watchfulness. Let us remember, also, that however opposed we as a nation may be to the pursuit of a Machiavellian policy, to sudden changes of plan, or to unprovoked attacks on the ground of necessity or national safety, such political Mach iavellism prevails in many of the States of the Continent. The disclosures of the Hohenlohe Memoirs may have been a revelation to the British public, but those who have been at all behind the scenes in European affairs know that the principles of statecraft which obtained during the Renais- sance in Italy are still in full vigour abroad. "It would be dishonourable," "It would be wicked," "It would be unjustifiable," are phrases which may, and we honestly believe do, control our policy, but we must never forget that they do not affect the actions of the majo,ity of Continental statesmen. We may regret the fact, and may determine—as we devoutly trust we shall determine— never to copy such political tactics, but we shall be mad if we pretend that a purely selfish system of statecraft does not still prevail in the world. to-day.
We are no panic-mongers, and we have never joined in the outcry for bloated armaments or for panic ship- building. We feel bound, however, to say that if it should unhappily appear that the Government are really deter- mined to put a large number of battleships and cruisers out of commission, we shall be forced, though very reluctantly, to join the ranks of those who declare that the present Government cannot be trusted to maintain the safety of the nation. Till, however, an official endorsement of the scheme is published, we shall, as we have said, refuse absolutely to believe in its truth. Nothing but the most direct and unchallengeable evidence will make us believe that the Prime Minister—who must feel a special responsibility in the matter—and his chief colleagues, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Haldane, and Mr. Morley, would sanction so disastrous a policy, even if it were recom- mended to them by the Board of Admiralty and endorsed by Lord Tweedmouth.
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