George's girl
As Condoleezza Rice takes over as Secretary of State, Washington insiders are talking of a new axis of evil — France, Germany and Spain. Bruce Anderson reports
Washington
For four years, she has been one of the most glamorous, interesting and powerful women in the world. As such, she has been scrutinised, intensively. Yet we know no more about Condoleezza Rice's views than we did four years ago. It is as if she has set out to be the humble handmaiden of the President and to ensure that in public his opinions would be her opinions.
This apparent willingness to play a subordi nate role has led to accusations that she is too passive. The national security adviser, part of the White House staff, is in constant contact with the President. Among other things, his or her duty is to ensure that disagreements which occur in other departments are as far as possible resolved before they reach the President's desk. When it came to Cohn Powell at the state department and Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon, Dr Rice was unable to achieve that. Yet who can blame her?
In youth, Don Rumsfeld was a wrestler of near-Olympic class. During his long decades in government, he has used his wrestling skills in order to help win turf wars. Colin Powell was his latest victim. The General was clearly unhappy with some aspects of the Bush administration's policy. If pushed too far, he might have resigned, which could have had serious electoral consequences. It would have been impossible for Condi Rice to knock those two stubborn heads together. She cannot be blamed for failing to grip a dispute which daunted her President.
But anonymity is no longer an option. As Secretary of State, she will become the public exponent of US foreign policy. Yet in essence, her role will not change. She will be implementing George Bush's foreign policy, and during his first term, he developed strong views as to what that should be. '2008; he said the other day, 'democracy in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine. That would be some legacy.'
But a bold strategy is not incompatible with cautious tactics. In recent decades, the Republican foreign policy establishment has been divided between ideologues and realists. The realists, many of them disciples of Henty Kissinger, believe that the main aim of American foreign policy should be security and stability, and that the United States should not seek to remake the rest of mankind in its own image. The ideologues believe in an overriding moral mission, to help less favoured nations move towards democracy and freedom. They also insist that the world will never be safe as long as a large percentage of mankind is suffering under oppressive regimes. But the division between the two groups is likely to be less sharp in the second Bush term than it was in the first.
The ideologues have had their war, which has proved to be a difficult business, with the end still not in sight. We can be certain that the Bush regime will be reluctant to undertake further large-scale military ventures. If Iran or North Korea forced a confrontation, that would be another matter, but it will be many years before the United States marches off to war in the confident, almost light-hearted spirit of 2003. Condi Rice herself was trained by Brent Scowcroft, a ICimingerian. She does not lack a strong streak of worldly-wise pragmatism. As Secretary of State, she may not become a second Colin Powell. Nor is she about to turn into a second Donald Rumsfeld.
This does not mean that the Europeans can relax. In crucial aspects, they are going to find the Bush second-term foreign policy just as unpalatable as they found the first. As Tony Blair discovered last week, the President is not a tabula rasa when it comes to the Middle East. It was widely assumed that the talk from London about a conference on Israel/Palestine and the US special envoy had already been agreed with Washington. Not so: the Americans were bewildered, and asked London to stop those briefings. The President is not necessarily against a conference but until there is an agenda to confer about, he sees no point. The same applies to the special envoy. He would only be dispatched when a genuine willingness to negotiate had been manifested by the locals, especially the Palestinians. This is where Europe is going to be horrified. In Washington, they blame the Palestinians for the impasse. In effect, they are telling the Palestinians that in order to earn their right to statehood, they are going to have to repudiate terrorism and commit themselves to democracy. Back in June, Condi Rice met some Palestinian leaders in Berlin. She told them that they were in a country whose boundaries had only been agreed on in 1991, 46 years after the war ended. The Germans had spent the intervening period establishing democracy, the rule of law and a free society: improving their credentials. Though she did not suggest that it would take the Palestinians 46 years, the implication was plain. Palestine is on probation. It is unlikely that this view of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict will command any significant assent in Europe.
Not that Mr Bush will care. In Europe, as elsewhere, he is far more interested in coalitions of the willing than in universal agreement. In Washington there have already been references to the new axis of evil: France, Germany and Spain. Those who talk like that are only half joking.
There has also been a profound change. For years, British Europhiles were able to insist to the Eurosceps, with some justice, that whatever the state of the special relationship, our influence in Washington depended on our influence on the Continent. If we were marginalised in Europe, no one in Washington would take us seriously. That is no longer the case. If he were a Brit, President Bush would be a Eurosceptic. Though some State Department officials still dream about European unity, they can expect no support from their political masters.
Not only that: many people in Washington are now asking themselves why they need pay so much attention to Europe. Up until 1945, European nations were powerful enough to threaten American interests. After 1945, Europe's weakness was a threat to America, because it could have let in the Soviets. Now that Europe is neither powerful nor dangerously vulnerable, it need not be a vital American preoccupation, especially as other regions are becoming much more important.
Most American foreign policymakers now assume that the big questions of the 21st century will be answered in Arabic script or in Chinese characters. In the last few years, almost by accident, the US-Chinese co-prosperity sphere has emerged. The Chinese need American markets for export-led growth; the Americans need Chinese savings to fund the deficit. That is an area in which Europe can make no contribution. This is not the case when it comes to the threat from Islamic terrorism, but the Americans have virtually despaired of achieving a united and effective European response. Condi Rice will be good at wooing such allies. She will deploy her urbanity and charm. At a personal level, she may become even more popular than Cohn Powell. But on points of substance, she will be as unyielding as Donald Rumsfeld. She will continue to be her President's favourite girl.
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