THE CHANCES OF THE COMTE DE CHAMBORD.
OF all the problems—and they are endless—presented by the condition of France, no one is so perplexing to Englishmen as the extent of the strength or weakness of the Legitimist idea. Is Henri Cinq merely a name, or has the respectable gentleman of fifty-one who bears that title any substantial chance of mounting the throne of France f Ask any Frenchman you will, not a Legitimist, his opinion, and he will tell you that loyalty in the old sense is utterly dead in France ; that the people have forgotten the Bourbons, or associate them only with tithes ; that Henry V. is to them a mere name ; that Legitimacy is the highly honourable tradi- tion of a few great families, or the highly dishonourable affectation of a few men who use its profession as a passport to good society, but that it • is in no sense and among no class a working political creed. The love for the White Flag is, in fact, an antiquarian sentiment. This belief has been entertained by a succession of rulers, some of whom at all events must be held to have understood France. Napoleon I., though he warred with the Vendeans, never dreaded or disliked the Legitimists as individuals, and though he shot the Due d'Enghien, systematically trusted them in his diplomatic service. Louis Philippe insulted the party, as in the affair of the Duchess de Berri, without fear, while per- petually making concessions to the Bonapartists, who, as he always believed, outnumbered his own friends. Napoleon detesting and dreading the Orleanists, not only courted the Legitimists, but tried to utilize the historic sentiment in their • favour for the benefit of his own dynasty, suggesting, for ex- ample, in a public inanifesto, that one day the fittest title for his own son, then just born, would be the old one of Child of France. And finally, Gambetta, besides employing them readily in all departments, omitted them with strong words of praise from his denunciations and decree of disqualification. This con- fidence, so strange in men who towards other parties exhibited a feeling of distrustful antipathy, was justified by almost all the visible facts. Daring forty years the Legitimists have never been able to raise an insurrection, nor during those years can they ever' be said to have had out of Brittany a party at the polls. A few great Legitimists, like Berryer, rose to Par- liamentary distinction ; but their relations with Frohsdorf were tolerated on all hands, as being rather courteous triflings of a gentlemanly and even commendable kind, than serious intrigues. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the first Restoration revealed an unexpected depth of re- gard for the old line, and was followed by the dangerous popular movement so well described by Louis Blanc under the title of "The White Terror." No sooner again is government in the provinces overthrown and the country left to itself, than the peasants send up troops of Legitimists as representatives, till they are the strongest fraction in the Chamber, and obser- vers of some experience, though doubtless also of much pre- judice, like the Parisian correspondent of the Times, affirm that the Assembly as a body has decided to acknowledge the right of the exile of Frohsdorf to the throne of France ; and serious politicians interest themselves in projects of fusion, which on the usual theory ought to be about as important as an arrangement between the two lines of Reuss. The Church declares herself friendly to the cause of the dynastic pretender, and Henry V. himself is so much encouraged that he, for the first time, puts forward a programme intended to be some- thing more than a purely literary effort. Hitherto he has contented himself with asserting and reasserting his historical " rights," but his declaration of May 8 is an intelligible and, in some respects, an able political programme, suggesting either that the Comte de Chambord is an abler man of the reflective kind than he was believed to be, or that some one of modern capacity has at last obtained his ear. He does not, of course, surrender his own theory of his own place on earth —that would have ruined him morally with his own party—but he does offer some grave pledges intended to diminish suspicion as to the deductions he draws from his claim to be King by right divine. He renounces formally and distinctly any intention of exercising absolute power, and pledges himself to " submit all acts of his Government to the careful control of representatives freely elected." This pledge is intended, of course, to conciliate all those Orleanists who are rather Parliamentarians than followers of any dynasty, and may have a great effect with the bourgeoisie, while it will not offend his own party, which, though it asserts the doctrine of divine right with almost incredible vehemence, has never denied the right of its head to use any agency or take any advice he pleased. Then he declares that he will not if restored interfere with equality, which is one of "the conditions of the life of the nation;" or attempt to establish privileges,—a concession to the moderate Republicans, who are more afraid of aristocracy than of the throne ; promises complete amnesty, even to the extent of employing men of all parties,—a bid for the adhesion of the bureaucracy ; and finally pledges himself to secure efficacious guarantees for the Pope,—a bid for the village cures, hitherto the strongest because the most interested friends of the Bonapartists. The tone of the whole manifesto in fact is that of a man who believes that a movement will be made in his favour, which may succeed, if only the factions most likely to resist can be temporarily conciliated.
Is it conceivable that there is any ground for this tone, that the long despised Comte de Chambord is really one of the most probable candidates for the highest place in France V We cannot profess to answer the question with decision, but there is no visible reason for a peremptory No, and a good many for hesitation. Supposing a monarchy established at all, that is to say, supposing the great cities not to be conciliated, but to be held down, and M. Thiers to be dismissed—and in Paris at least, after this bombardment, the Assembly has no other alternative—the Comte de Chambord is quite as probable a monarch as any other. There is no man of the first eminence to be his competitor, no one in whom Frenchmen have any personal confidence, or to whom any party likely to vote for a monarchy has any devoted attachment. The Count may not be a strong man—though extremely little is known about him —but his rivals are not strong men either, at least if we may trust the indications that the Dac d'Aumale, able as he is as a critic, has in the crisis of his fortunes proved himself unequal to his great opportunities. His condemnation is that he is not now.on the throne. The Count may not be able to reign, but he can sit in the chair of State just as well as the Comte de Paris, can select the same advisers, and is equally uncompromised by any incidents in his past career. He can have no personal enemies to punish, or personal injuries to avenge, or—as he says, with a sly dig at his cousins of the younger branch which recalls the satiric temper of Louis XVIII.—personal fortune to build up. Being childless, is his suggestion, he can have no motive either to make money, or to form rich alliances, or to found a fortune, " unless it be that of France." He has neither sympathy with the Germans nor support from them, for though he has lived in exile, it has been under the Austrian flag, just now by a funny turn of fortune rather popular in France. He has not bombarded Paris, and is not more hated there than any other King would be, perhaps less, for Paris has no gossip to tell of his career. There is no especial reason that we see why he should not be chosen, and two or three very powerful reasons in favour of such a choice. His personality is almost unknown, as unknown as that of Louis Napoleon in 1848, while his name is not unknown ; for, after all, to say that the Bourbons are forgotten in France is, though perfectly true in one sense, more of an epigram than a fact. His selection, instead of adding one more to the list of dynastic parties, would eliminate one, for his heir is the Comte de Paris ; and although the great Orleanists think that fact of a bad rather than a good importance, wishing their King to reign by elec- tion alone—they cannot alter history, or decree that the Comte de Paris shall not one day be the lineal chief of the Bourbons. And finally, his election would relink the broken chain of history, and to a people so weary, so dispirited, so thirsty for repose, that of itself must have a certain charm. We do not see, if the Assembly declares for him, and the cities are held down, and the peasantry refuse under the advice of the cures to resist, why the chances of Henry Cinq are not as good as those of any conceivable pretender. Of coarse, if the Army opposes, its opposition would be fatal ; but there is no especial reason why the Army should oppose the Bourbons any more than the Orleanists, while the Count has at least this military merit—that he has never been defeated. The dynasty could not, we believe, last ; but it might preside with some dignity and great moderation through the interregnum during which France must rehabilitate itself, and allow time for the revival of political life and governing capacity in a country in which twenty years of despotism appear to have temporarily extinguished both. A republic would revivify France more rapidly, and allow far greater scope for the action of a man of genius ; but if the Assembly wins, and declares for a throne, most Englishmen will believe that among pretenders the heir of Hugh Capet may be pronounced at all events the least objectionable.
It may be needful to add that the bid for the Church, which will in this country strike all readers as utterly im- moral, has been made by all parties alike, M. Thiers included, and is in the mouths of all parties alike unreal. It is not in the power of France to restore the Pope, and within France itself the tradition of the Bourbons does not lead them to Ultramontanism, while Henri Cinq himself years ago refused with anger to exempt the Church from the jurisdiction of the State.
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