THE BATTLE OF AMERICA
By ERWIN D. CANHAM By Air Mail IT would appear that President Roosevelt and the actual majority of United States citizens who believe this nation must aid Britain short of nothing have won the Battle of America. As long as President Roosevelt remained silent, the noise and possibly the actual strength of the non- interventionists gained. But with the President's speech on May 27th, which was what can only be called an executive declaration of war, an historic decision was made. The people welcomed and supported the President's analysis, and they are obviously ready to follow him in the actual steps he proposes to take.
How far the United States now goes will depend upon the President. Informed by the capable advices of Ambassador Winant and in closest touch with the British Government, American and British policies should now be well co-ordinated. Two important steps are most likely: farther-reaching American action to protect merchant ships going to and from Britain, and American occupation of Atlantic outposts includ- ing the Azores, the Cap Verdes, and possibly Dakar.
Already the American North Atlantic patrol is in opera- tion, 1-ut it is obviously far from adequate to protect merchant shipping. President Roosevelt constantly deflects attention from the convoy method, so it seems clear that he contem- plates largely air protection. In all probability a very sub- stantial enlargement of the patrol system will shortly be applied. Under the system, a very large part of present scouting duties would be undertaken by the United States forces, and the actual fighting—at least in waters beyond Greenland—would be left to Britain. To make possible more comprehensive British naval action, it seems probable that addi- tional American naval craft will be lent or leased to the Royal Navy. Divisions of American Marines are now ready for the opera- tion of occupying the Azores and Cap Verdes, as well as Martinique and Guadelupe, and Greenland is already occu- pied. Presumably the task of taking the island.: would not be very difficult, particularly with the recent activity of the British Navy against ' Bismarck.' Dakar is an entirely different matter. Although the United States is acutely aware of its importance, to occupy Dakar would open a severe breach with Vichy. And so that operation will doubtless wait on events. Congress will support without visible minority opposition almost any sort of action in the Western Hemisphere. And if from vantage points in this area the North Atlantic patrol system can adequately protect British shipping, all these steps involve no difficulty of any kind. They can be counted on just as soon as they are physically possible. Likewise the Pre- sident now has sufficient national support to lend or lease vir- tually anything he feels can be spared. When it comes to actual convoy duties or physical conflict with Nazi forces outside the Western Hemisphere, there may still be a bridge to be crossed. It remains to be seen whether the nation would support such acts. It has not had a chance as yet to indicate direct approval or disapproval of specific steps in these regards. All the evidence is that the nation will finally support any action necessary to implement the broad policies laid down by the President on May 27th. The policies which Mr. Roosevelt defined are, of course, broad enough to cover all types of aid to Britain and resistance to the Nazis. The precise problem today—the problem which Washington and London are certainly coping with in all their relationships—is to determine what physical acts the United States is capable of undertaking. The limits of action are virtually the same as the limits which have applied to Britain all along: physical feasibility. For instance, the United States must obviously retain certain naval forces in the Pacific to prevent Japan running amok, which would damage British interests. as much as it would American. The problem President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill must answer is whether and when the time has come to take a chance in the Pacific in order to make the North Atlantic life-line a little surer.
The United States must not over-extend its forces, or its help to Britain may be severely jeopardised. It is an intensely practical problem, and one that can be answered only by those with comprehensive knowledge of the actual military and naval situation of the United States. President Roosevelt has laid down the policy, which is undeclared war without the name, and now all that remains is to determine on operations.
But there is another front—the home front. Here it was vital to end " business as usual," and the President's declara- tion of a total emergency was the basic essential step to that end. He now has the authority to commandeer whatever is necessary, to stop strikes, to stir the economic structure to its full potentialities, to " awaken the sleepy giant." His May 27th speech was a stirring call, and it did as much as any speech could to arouse the nation. But the executive orders he will issue under his emergency authority will be needed to complete the task. Sweeping measures may be expected, and have already begun, to end some of the inefficiencies and deadlocks in the defence set-up. The nation is ready for sacri- fices, is prepared to do what the President and his advisers declare to be necessary.
British readers, and historians, will want to know why President Roosevelt waited so long after the passage of the Lease and Lend Law to take us the distance of his May 27th speech. There are two answers. First, it was his profound conviction that the authority of the Lease and Lend Law, and the quiet but broad action begun under it, was all the public would stand. He definitely deemed essential a cooling-off period of two months before taking the next step. Second, some close observers of Mr. Roosevelt feel that not until April or May was he absolutely convinced that American participation in shooting-war would be unavoidable. Up to that time, say they, he clung to the hope that aid to Britain short of war might make victory possible. When it finally became apparent that the fateful plunge had to be made, the President paused and weighed deeply all the consequences before crossing the stream. Mr. Roosevelt's habitual technique is to wait until suspense becomes painful, and then to act.
Thus he usually reduces opposition to a vanishing point in the onrush of relief from the enlarging majority. It must be remembered that during a seeming lull American acts to assist Britain were going on behind the scenes and the final test was what could be done in military and naval action.
Doubtless it would have been much better still to have had a frank American declaration of war on Germany, with Congressional approval. But despite all the support the President gets in his tacit declaration, it is not certain that Congress would have voted this step. The menace to the United States is clear, the world issues are stark. The disease of the democracies afflicts this nation, as it has others, and we are still clinging to half-measures. But that is too pessimistic. They are not half-measures, but at least three-quarters. And the time is coming when they will be full measures.
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