The War Surveyed BRITAIN ALONE
By STFtATEG ICUS IN a few days time it will be a year since the British Empire found herself alone in the struggle against the might of Germany and Italy. The position at that moment was almost desperate. The British Army had been evacuated from France, but had been compelled to leave behind practically all its heavy equipment. The greatly superior German Air Force lay across the channel ready to deliver the attack preparatory to invasion. From Narvik to the north coast of Spain the ports and seaways of Europe were in the hands of the enemy. The numerous bases within easy reach of England in effect represented an immediate and heavy reinforcement of his sub- marine attack upon the sea communications which support the life of the country, supply its overseas military effort and afford the means by which the main part of its war potential can be mobilised and concentrated in the theatres of war. The Italian Fleet threatened the great seaway through which passes one of the most important lines of Imperial communications and two large armies were ready to deliver converging attacks upon the chief nodal point in it.
How does the position look after a year of war? Mr. Lees- Smith said the other day that since the fall of France we have been engaged in " a great delaying action " ; and that is an accurate summing-up of the operations. But, first, we had to keep our main base inviolate, and this was achieved in the splendid victories of the Royal Air Force last autumn. The struggle to keep our main communications open is logically an extension of the same battle, since otherwise Britain would be a beleagured garrison which must be reduced in time. This struggle, the " Battle of the Atlantic," as it has been called, has been more successful than perhaps we could have expected. We have lost shipping and valuable cargoes very heavily, but not so vitally that they have reduced the standard of living dangerously, or gravely affected our war effort. It cannot be questioned that they have influenced the latter since, operating upon external lines, the reinforcement of the Near Eastern and Far Eastern theatres bears very heavily upon shipping ; but so far their effect has not been vital anywhere.
The shipping losses have also had their influence upon the main strategy. The Royal Air Force offensive against the German industries, bases and communications, which is the chief expression of British offensive action, has had much success, and its power is increasing ; but it might have been developed much farther if our sea communications had been completely free. The enemy's night-bombing attacks have not gravely affected the production of bombing aeroplanes ; and, in fact, it is the lag in deliveries from abroad that is more responsible than either. The other means of offensive action against the enemy is the blockade. This is now almost as effective as could be expected. Between the air offensive and the British blockade there is a shortage of several essential commodities in the enemy countries. Wheat, fats and oils and several minerals must be replenished if. Germany is to fight out victoriously the long war which Hitler now evidently foresees. The lack of these necessities tends increasingly to colour his strategy. Whatever be the meaning of the present concentra- tion on the Russian front, it must reflect Hitler's need of com- modities which Russia possesses and he lacks.
The enemy's attempt to break and ours to maintain the blockade have led to several naval actions, and in these Britain has been almost completely successful. The ' Bismarck' is at the bottom of the sea. A second pocket-battleship is out of action. The Scharnhorst ' and Gneisenau ' are immobilised in harbour, where the ' Prinz Eugen ' keeps them company. In the victories of Taranto and Cape Matapan the Navy dealt even more drastically with the Italian Fleet. Smaller craft have suffered more than the capital ships. The British Navy has paid little for these successes. Apart from the loss of ' Hood ' it suffered little outside the narrow waters about Greece and Crete. It is once again operating steadily in the Near East and there seems little reason to doubt that it will be able to continue that close co-operation with the Army that has led to such clear-cut victories as those of the Libyan campaign.
If Italy's reputation as a military power is now in the dust it is mainly owing to the series of defeats inflicted upon her armies in Africa. These campaigns have never yet received the appreciation they deserve. The tendency is to depreciate them because of the supposed ease with which they were carried out. The same criterion is not applied to Germany. She is seen to be in possession of almost the whole of Europe and that is taken to endorse her claim to invincibility. But in Africa General Wavell had to face problems which were in many respects graver than any that confronted Germany. When France went out of the war she left Britain alone to hold the Near East. Mussolini had placed two picked armies in Africa to deliver a converging attack upon the Suez Canal. Each of them was equipped in the most modern way, each commanded by a soldier of repute. Each of them was so placed that it could operate from a strong base at no great distance from places whose capture would have resounded throughout the East.
General Wavell found himself at a disadvantage, numerically and materially, so profound that it still seems inexplicable that he was able to hold off Marshal Graziani and the Duke of Aosta. At the beginning he had not a tenth of the force arrayed against him and not a twentieth the number of guns. The two Italian armies numbered in all about half a million men. Today both armies have been destroyed. With very small loss to himself he has inflicted about 400,000 casualties upon them. If the terrain in which these campaigns were fought is considered they seem the more remarkable. The frontiers of Abyssinia measure about 4,50o miles. One of the British columns had to cover over 1,200 miles to reach the capital; and during the campaign, apart from a number of stiff engagements, six major battles were fought. Everywhere in that colony were almost insuperable obstacles. Liaison between the separate columns had to be effected by aeroplane. The bush could only be penetrated by means of tanks. Water had to be carried immense distances. Rarely have such problems of administration confronted any staff. Those who are " sick of defeat after defeat " would be well advised to study these campaigns, which were almost invariably fought against odds.
There have, of course, been defeats. The withdrawals from Greece and Crete cannot fail to rankle. - But Mr. Lees-Smith said no more than the truth when he spoke of " delaying actions." It is natural but unreasonable that they should rankle so much. If Germany after six years of preparation cannot for some time dispose of overwhelming force, upon what foundation is our hope of victory based? The actions in Greece and Crete established one important point: they convinced everyone, even the Germans, that man for man the Imperial troops are at least their match. And were these actions complete defeats? There is now evidence that it was due to them that the Germans could not assist Rashid Ali in his attempt to hold Iraq for the enemy. The importance of this failure is that the entry into Syria could be effected with a column or columns co-operating from Iraq. Without the reduction of Iraq the Syrian operations could not have been safely undertaken at all; and, unpalatable as they are, Syria had to be occupied.
The one retreat which yielded no advantage was that from Benghazi; but the risk of a surprise stroke was the condition of our intervention in Greece. We lost, however, the pos- session of aerodromes and bases which materially affect the defence of Egypt and it may be that General Wavell is attempt- ing to redress the situation at this moment. The exact scope of these operations is difficult to estimate ; but it is clear that the first effect of the local advance about Sollum was to carry the. imperial detachments to Cappuzzo and cause the enemy to bring up reinforcements from Tobruk. In Syria the attempt of General Wavell to avoid inflicting the casualties entailed by a ruthless attack is meeting with little assistance from the Vichy forces. Sidon has been occupied, and the imperial forces are pushing on towards Damascus ; but there have been sharp counter-attacks in the centre, and, unless the advance from Iraq can be reinforced, the operations seem likely to be long drawn out.
Of that prospect it is impossible to foresee the development. But who that knew the exact circumstances of the situation in the Mediterranean and the Near East a year ago would have cared to predict that General Wavell's negligible force could have effected such a revolutionary change? If we are strongly placed in Egypt, and have been able to reinforce the Far East, that is the reassurance of the future that we most need. If there is a great distance still to go, a year's fighting alone against two great Powers has reinforced the prospect of victory. We have preserved all the main essentials of our position against the heaviest odds, and we have defeated and destroyed great armies and the striking power of two great navies. If there is shade as well as light over this year, the light pre- dominates and grows brighter.
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