Is Hitlerism Doomed ?
BY PAUL SCHEFFER.
AYEAR ago the writer crossed the ocean to watch with his own eyes that mysterious and perturbing movement, Hitlerism. It seemed organized chaos. Its organizers were riding joyously a storm of welcome to their multifarious passions. A year later. the writer was again' in Germany. A quieter; and a little hoarSe Nazitum presented itself. In its ranks loomed dis- appointment. Complete victory at the polls had been missed again and again. Worse : Hitler had asked Hindenburg for permission to be Mussolial. He had been refused this permission and had abided.
:Hitlerism has reached- a point, critical for its survival. Its twelve million followers have been melted together, have been raised to united enthusiasm by the same emotional agencies. These emotions alone have:formed a. solid bloc of them. As soon as more rational considera- tions, tactical calculations not very tlifferent from those of - ordinary , political parties, have obtruded themselves on those millions, the very foundations of their devotion to -ate party must be touched. They have been promised that Hitlerism would sweep the country. This promise has beenboiled down to the wearisome question whether Hitler, "; The Leader," could and would enter a. Cabinet either as Chancellor or a Vice-Chancellor of the. Republic. After all, this question had been diseu.ssed on the usual grounds of parliamentary. bargaining. Hindenburg, who personally has no sympathies for, nor confidence in Hitler, vetoed his becoming Chancellor: The . office of Vice-Chancellor Hitler would not accept. There things POW rest..
Gregor Strasser has always been considered by the leaders of the moderates to be the most level-headed and the most " reasonable " of Hitler's lieutenants. It was perfectly natural that he would lead or try to lead the more rationalistic part of Hitler's followers andirisist on the necessity of some deal with the Republic. Men of intemperate passion, devoured by the fever of eternal propagandizing like Goering and Goebbels would insist on the opposite, on blocking all active government until it should be theirs. This parting of ways inside theleading group, shown by the forced leave of Strasser was perfectly natural. It indicates danger for the unity of, the party. All this is obvious. It is not quite as much a matter of course that the issue was not laid before the waiting millions. Just now another lightning has , come out of dark clouds where the battle rages about the future of the party. Commander Roehm, the leader of the armed " S.A.'s " and shock brigades, one of the sharpest adversaries of Strasser, has been sent " on leave" too, No doubt, Hitler is torn up and down between Strasser who 'wishes to conquer the power from inside the government, by compromise, and by his enemies who wish to overpower from outside the men who rule Germany at this moment. .
`And meanwhile the masses of Nazis are waiting. The "Nazi" victory in Lippe, a little Community of purely agrarian -type and not so badly off as not to be able to 'stick' patiently to their convictions expressed half a "year year or a month ago, seems to have imbued, the men round. Hitler with . confidence in the success of new elections.: If they could show that the grip- on their followers holds tight, perhaps Hindenburg would reluc- tantly admit Hitler to the office of Bismarck.
. It has always been the strategy' of General von Sehlercher -to lead a war of attrition -against Hitlerism. Did not the Nazis consist largely of social radicals by dis- position, or by conviction or by material necessity ? The
ideology of the Nazis could not keep together in the long run this portion of an emotional movement with the more moderate elements who were sincere patriots, had still something to lose, or even much, and certainly were afraid of radicalism of any kind. The Nazis were not homo- genedus, not by far. In their ranks there were dangerous as well as highly laudable enthusiasts. They had to be separated from each other. This always has been the deep conviction of Schleicher. The tough S.A.'s, a real threat for public order if they were not paid any more, had nothing to do.
The Nazi movement cannot stick together in the long run.
But how will it disintegrate ? In a mass movement there is always a serious prospect that the extreme elements will carry away with them or suppress the more moderates: Such an outcome of Hitlerism had to be averted in time. To effectuate this has been always the preoccupation of Schleicher. Hitler had to be brought into the Cabinet. This would be unbearable for the Radicals. But the more valuable forCei in his movement would be saved by this procedure, and a solid bulwark could be created with this "-reasonable " part of the Nazis against their former friends. Schleicher and Bruning always agreed that Gregor Strasser had "political sense." It is not surprising that a Combination of Schleicher; Bruning, Strasser has been mentioned lately in certain papers: Indeed, if not Hitler, why not Strasser ? Strasser himself has given the answer. He does not at present trust his strength to carry with him any important follOwing away from Hitler-as long as Hitler does not give his full approval. He will continue to talk and to wait and to see. And the bulk of the Nazis are waiting, too.
Since the last elections to the Reichstag Schleicher and his advisers undoubtedly liave believed and are still believing that new elections would almost halve the Nazis: Btit 'Strasser's hesitation proves that this may be a grave miscalculation. It is title that the chest of the Nazis is empty in spite of a continuous flow of con- tributions. It is true that disillusion and diffidence is raging within the ranks of the party. It is true that despair in the future of the movement has expressed itself vehemently here and there among the " active " rnemliers of the organization. All this is true. •
-On the other hand where shall the masses go who have passed through the delirium of extravagant hope which Adolf's silver tongue has so efficiently created ? Herr von Schleicher may be a great strategist. But he has not created in the least a programme,which would compensate these spoiled masses for their abandoned belief. It is a law in political life that people who have accustomed themselves to staying in a political hothouse only long for still higher temperatures and are loth. to return into the open. The. complete absence of. a " compensating " pro- gramme, though .a negative fact,accounts more than any- thing else for the patience shown by the waiting masses confronted as :they are .by most disturbing proofs that " Nazitum " would be chimericaL That the party must break up from inside remains true.. But as things are it is probable, that it will hold its own for the time being by its own inertia. -Schleicher is aware of the possibility that the split of the party would almost inevitably mean a great increase of the number of Communists in the Reichstag. This is not the place to discuss the reasons why German Communism wields relatively small attraction for the suffering masses, though Moscow is quite willing to produce any degree of heat in German political life. But if there were an equally considerable increase of Communist seats at the next elections as at the previous ones and even if the Communists became the strongest party it is pretty certain that Herr von Schleicher would face a situation of this kind with the same pro- nounced equanimity as Herr von Papen. The Communist programme of physical force would drive the other parties to the right; even the Social Democrats and the importance of the Reichswehr by the same mechanism would be further increased. And political life in Germany would be simplified and many people, worn out by eternal uncertainty and ever-changing apprehensions, would approve such a course of events. Herr von- Schleicher knows this.
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