Mintoff's Return
By CHRISTOPHER HOLLIS
T is not easy to interpret the exact detail of Mr. IMintoff's resignation and return. Mr. Mintoff, it is well understood, had pressed hard for guaran- tees from the British Government that there would be no dismissals from the dockyards until alternative work had been found for the dockers. The negotiations were confidential, so it is not possible to say exactly what was agreed between him and the Government, but it is at any rate believed in Malta -that he had got a promise out of the Government that there would be no dismissals for three years. Therefore, it is easy enough to see that when recently fifty dockers were dismissed the Admiralty section of the dockers should show 'a serious lack of confi- dence' in Mr. Mintoff, even though it appears that the fifty have been given alternative em- ployment. But the logical course would seem to have been, if resignation there had to be, for the whole Cabinet to resign and to throw on Dr. Borg Olivier and the Nationalists the responsibility of forming a government and of going to the country.
Whatever the answers to these personal prob- lems, the general Maltese question is more in- teresting. It is the common fashion nowadays to talk about Britain's past neglect of her colonies, and such language is used about Malta as freely as about any other colonies. But the truth of the matter is that, if we compare Malta not with Britain but with her Mediterranean neighbours and the Maltese standard of living not with the British but with theirs, the Maltese, though they densely inhabit an exceptionally unproductive territory, have always had a much higher stan- dard than that of the surrounding lands— Catalonia, Sicily, Southern Italy,' the Balearics, Cyprus or, of course, the North African' coun- tries. The reason for this comparatively high standard under British rule has been, of course, that Malta was of great value to the British as a naval base and as a dockyard. This importance brought both business to Malta and British subsidies in addition to the business, because it was essential tos British policy to keep the Maltese loyal and contented.
In the old days of security, when there were no aeroplanes and Britain held, and wished to keep, command both of the six other seas and of , the Mediterranean, it obviously made sense that we should spend' a good deal of money on main- taining an admirable naval base in the centre of the Mediterranean. The last war brought us the story of Malta's heroic defence against Italian attack, but it also showed to more cold-blooded appraisal that it was a very open question whether an island in Malta's position was any longer of much strategic value to Britain. Further strategical developments have made its valve even more doubtful. A bomb on M'dina could
wreck the whole island. If we cannot hold Sitez is there any point in holding the road to Suez? For how much longer shall we want to hold the road to Cyprus? Is Britain ever likely again to have command of the sea in any sense that would make it a sane policy to carry out im- portant dockyard works thousands of miles away from the homeland? It is true that for the moment there is a NATO headquarters in Valletta, but a nation cannot live on a NATO headquarters and nothing more—even supposing that the headquarters remains there.
Mr. Mintoff's cleverness was in seeing all this a few years earlier than either his political opponents in Malta (who fatuously thought that the naval expenditure would go on anyway what- ever the solution of the constitutional problem) or politicians or admirals in Britain. He saw that Malta, as she was, was no longer of much value to Britain and that therefore it was important to fix up an arrangement with Britain before the British noticed this. That was the value from his point of view of the 'integration' plan by which the Maltese should send three Members to West- minster and—what is more important—the Im- perial Government should accept some sort of responsibility for gradually bringing Maltese wages and social payments up to British stan- dards. It is clear how much the Maltese have to gain from such an arrangement. Maltese are incurably suspicious of those who offer them gifts. It is an island of violent political hatreds, and Mr. Mintoff—largely owing to his own man- ners—has many enemies. Therefore it was cer- tain that whatever proposals he put forward would meet hearty opposition in his own coun- try, but the probability has always been that if he can produce a plan he will be able to carry the day in Malta.
The much more difficult question is, What have the British to gain out of such a plan? I think that on pure principles of Gradgrind they will not on balance gain, that it would pay them to tell the Maltese to make for themselves whatever independent arrangements they can. But it is such a change these days to hear of any people that is anxious to draw closer to Britain that I think that the British have been right to see whether a satisfactory scheme of integration could be worked out. An independent and impoverished Malta would not be of any especial disadvantage to Britain in particular, and we are giving up so much these days that one surrender more would not make much difference, but it would have in general a weakening and disintegrating effect in the Mediterranean. It would be irrespon- sible to permit such a disintegration if an arrangement acceptable to the Maltese can be found for avoiding it.
Taking advantage of that British feeling, Mr. Mintoff, an astute bargainer, has beyond doubt been pressing the British Government hard over details of economic arrangements throughout the last year. The story of the negotiations has not been published, but the general impression until recently was that he had got almost everything that he asked for. What, then, is the explanation of the recent moves? Did Mr. Mintoff resign in the hope that resignation would show him to be indispensable? If he was right in this, he will now be strongly placed and in a position unpleasantly like that of a dictator. For it would be idle to pretend that among the Maltese there is any sort of feeling for democratic processes. The Maltese prefer to rally in blind obedience behind a leader —whether that leader be an Archbishop, Lord Strickland or Mr. Mintoff.
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