[To TH3 EDtTOR or THE "SPECTATOR. "] Sin.,—Monday night's debate throws
little light on a question which must have been asked by many,—" For what reasons are we co-operating with Germany ? " A month ago there was a widespread foreboding that after the visit of the German Emperor the country would find itself involved in some unfor- tunate entanglement. The expression of this feeling was ridiculed by the Prime Minister in his first public speech as the "wildest and most fantastic invention." To-day English and German squadrons are allied in bombarding a second-rate South American port. England's arm is long, and strong enough to protect her interests without requiring outside assistance. Why have we not acted alone ? When two Powers combine, it is generally found that one is pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for the benefit of the other. If English wrongs were insufficient to justify the offensive use of a British fleet, it is logically clear that English wrongs plus German wrongs do not justify using two fleets unless we are wanted to do the pulling. Warlike operations with a partner are fraught with so many contingencies that prudence will only sanction them under acute necessity or for objects of overwhelming importance. Neither consideration is apparent here. Without ostensible reason, not only have we been hastily rushed into a temporary alliance, with all its risk, for an object of minor importance, but we have chosen as our comrade in arms that nation which so short a time ago heaped unspeakable insults on our great Queen, cast the foulest aspersions on the honour of our Army, and assailed our race with rancorous vituperation of unparalleled intensity. These things are neither forgotten nor forgiven, and many an Englishman must feel that better fifty wrongs from Venezuela than one month of this unseemly comradeship. Not only does the co-partnership offend our legitimate sentiment, but in face of a delicate situation we find our power of withdrawal made dependent on the will of an associate whose well-known brusquerie is quite likely by injudicious conduct to excite the popular prejudice of the United States. To an outsider it looks after Monday's debate as if our Government had made a grave diplomatic mistake, and though holding all the cards, will yet lose the tricks. It is evident that we did not ask or require Germany's co-operation ; nay, more, except under our tegis, Germany would have hesitated, in view of American feeling, to act alone. Why have we given her this oppor- tunity ? After years of labour the Kaiser succeeded in arranging funds for building a great fleet. It has been whispered that the deep hatred of England was not wholly displeasing at the time, because in the beat of the passion the purse-strings were unloosed. But be that as it may, a fleet is not built in a day. For twelve more years at least Germany must wish and wait before the ships are on the sea, and much may happen in that time. Financial crises may promote a movement to allocate the promised funds to other purposes, and what better means could be found to avert so terrible a possibility than to keep alight German imagination by naval demonstrations and object- lessons in the usefulness of a " mailed fist" that floats ? But why in the name of common prudence should we aid and abet ? When the great fleet is built will it too be a dear ally, or shall we have, and in time, to build a Northern Chatham, and make a costly redistribution of our naval resources to meet the possible attack of a new foe ?
But there is a far graver question. The Monroe doctrine has become a " fetish " with the people of the United States, whose reviving friendship we welcome with a kinsman's heart. This Western friendship stands in bold and pleasant relief to the enmities of the East. To risk for any inadequate cause, or the benefit of a non-friend, the possible straining of this friendship is bad business. The
doctrine sprang from Canning's mind. Twice have we been prepared to maintain it in the face of united Europe. It accords with sound and old-established policy. We can even sympathise with its expansion on the flood of a popular wave to lengths that are logically inadmissible. But to our German ally it is anathema maranatha. National feelings on a national idea rise fast and wide, and if through some ill-advised action in Venezuela the American Eagle begins to shriek at us, we are left on the horns of a dilemma, and whichever point pricks, our partners will score. For England to draw back would be awkward and undignified; to persevere would be to flout a friendly nation's most sacred principle. For Germany the creation of friction between England and America, even if she herself participated in it, would be a diplomatic triumph ; to bring the Monroe doctrine into disrepute or break it down would be worth far more than all the German money that ever went into Venezuela. To the outside observer we seem to have got into an embarrassing position, which a simple policy might have entirely avoided. Why did we not represent to the friendly ruler of the States that our wrongs in Venezuela demanded prompt reparation ; that sympathising to the full with the American sentiment of non-interference by Europeans, we were averse from taking direct action ourselves ; that if America wished to establis% before the world her ability and resolution to uphold har great doctrine, here was her opportunity ; that if she would herself coerce the recalcitrant Venezuelan President to satisfy our just claims, we would take no action, would even agree to pay the bill, and would join with her in compelling Germany to adopt the same course ? What line of action would be more in accord with the deep springs of American feeling or confer wider popularity on its leader? If this course has been tried and failed, the fact ought to be made known. From the published information it looks as if England had been bamboozled into a dangerous confederation, and the simple policy neglected which would have saved all danger, forged another link in the friendly chain uniting us with America, avoided needless advertisement of Germany's sea-power, and spared our country an unwelcome and detestable co-partner- [We entirely agree that we have missed a great opportunity of emphasising the Monroe doctrine in a manner which would be specially consonant with British interests.—En. Spectator.]
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