Before recording events in their order, we wish to say
a word on the grand point of all, the comparative numbers of the com- batants. We have steadily asserted that France was outnumbered, and now believe that our statements were under-coloured,--that Napoleon went to war with the old Army of France alone. He registered, but did not dare to arm, his new organization, the Garde Mobile. If that is correct, if he actually declared war with only his regulars in the field, all is explained. The regular Army of France was 400,000 men, of whom 40,000 were at Cherbourg getting ready for the Baltic, 5,000 in Italy, 10,000 in Algeria, 35,000 in Paris and Chalons, 10,000 in Lyons, and at least 30,000 more in Marseilles, Toulon, Bordeaux, Toulouse, L'Orient, Rochefort, and the hospitals, leaving him 270,000 efficients for the front,—that is, eight corps d'armCe of 30,000 each, and the Guard. This we believe to be exactly the fact ; and on this army rushed, by German official accounts which are accepted in Paris, the Crown Prince with 250,000 men, Prince Frederick Charles with 250,000 more, and the King with 70,000, or 570,000 in all,—more than double the French. Originally, we suspect, these figures v7eie correct, and though the Crown Prince and the King have lost heavily, Prince Frederick has not, and we do not know what reinforcements may have been received from "the second line,"—the 200,000 soldiers encamped between the Rhine and the Weser.
