The Genesis of the Tank
Eyewitness : Being Personal Reminiscences of Certain Phases of the Great War.' " By Sir' Ernest D. Swinton: (Hodder and Stoughton. 25s.)
IT was high time that Sir Ernest Swinton told the true story of the evolution of the Tank, which contributed more than any other weapon or tactical device to the defeat of Germany. Many authors, with more or less knowledge, have written on the subject: But Sir Ernest, as the true originator of the idea, the organizer of the Tank Corps before it had that name and the author of the first outline of Tank tactics, is the primary authority, and his plain narrative is of absorbing interest. The English civilian, traditionally suspicious of soldiers as our history shows, will, it is to be feared, be confirmed in his prejudices by the book. Sir Ernest put his idea 'before Sir Maurice Hankey, secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, in October, 1914, and had a most "friendly reception. But nearly two years passed before the first: few " machine-gun destroyers," which the author envisaged, appeared on the Somme, and then they were fooliShly used in complete contradiction to his advice because the chance of surprise was wasted. In the interval the higher military authorities put every obstacle in the way, and it is perfectly clear that but for Mr. Churchill's initiative and Mr. Lloyd George's determination the advent of Tanks on the battlefield_ would_ have been postponed indefinitely. Highly characteristic of the. military Mandarins was their eagerness to get rid of Sir Ernest as soon as they decently 'could, after the first use of Tanks at the Somme. He had :given dire offence by his persistency in getting civilian Ministers to overrule the Generals, and he was theretOre .deprived of his command just when the Tank Corps'. was taking shape and expanding in the autumn of 1916. Mean- While the German machine-gunner was killing our young 'men by the thousand, and the effective counter to him was delayed by these insensate professional and personal jealousies.
Sir Ernest writes very temperately. He is too skilful may ce experiend a writer not to know that over-emphasis m
ay spoil the best case. He does his utmost to exculpate Lord Kitchener, who, as he says, was desperately overworked, if in part through his own fault in not delegating details to subordinates. But he leaves the reader in little doubt as to where the fault lay before and after Lord Kitchener's &nib. Mr. Lloyd George has often been accused of treating eminent Generals cavalierly in the later years of the War, but such ,books as this show that a quick-witted statesman-bent on a speedy victory must have been exasperated by the :War Office and the General Staff. There is nothing more iffinni- .nating in the .narrative than the brief passage. on Canibrai, November " Manrice Hankey sent for Sir Ernest and told him of the great suritke attack-b.-0'6in. hundred' tanks; which -bad' enabled' our troops to advance about six miles on a Wide' front 'almOst-- without lost -rind
capture eight thousand Prisoners, = . _ : " I rejoiced at this news. At last our terrible enemy—the German machine gun—was., beaten I flit my transports were restrained. I was looking ahead—trying to appreciate the actual situation. My face must have betrayed my thoughts, for Hankey continued : . - , " Wtat's-the matter ? You don't seem.too. pleased.'
" I'm. pleased all right,' I answered. ' But I'm wondering.• bet that cl.H.Q. are just as mush surprised by our success as the
Boehe is, and are quite unready to exploit it." '
Amithis, of course, was painfully true. The Higher Command was se-far unready that the, great opportunity for pushing into Cambrai and disorganizing, the Hindenburg line was thrown away, and within a few days the Germans were able by a-brilliant counter-attack to recover nearly all the positions that they had lost. Sir Ernest Swinton knew only too well that .G.,H.Q. did not believe in the Tank, _regarding it as the mere toy of civilians at home, and he guessed rightly that G.H.Q.'s notorious lack of forethought in handling reserves. would be specially remarkable when it expected_ no success. Nine months more of heavy casualties -had to pass before the Tank was at last properly . used at.A.miens,and its effect was then decisive in breaking the morale, if not of the German infantry, at least of General.Ludendorffhimself. Sir Ernest Swinton describes in his early chapters his experiences in France in 1914-15 as the official War corres- pondent or " Eyewitness." He makes it clear that his messages, welcome as they seemed at. the time, were written under great difficulty and were subject,to severe and repeated censorship. It is odd that the. War Office had never con- sidered beforehand the question of the supply of War news to the public, and that the Government for many months failed to recognize its practical importance. " Eyewitness," for an amateur, did well, but it is easy now to , see that experienced journalists .should have been as welcome in the early days as they were later in the War.
_ EDWARD ITAWKE.
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