HITLERISSIMUS
T is not often that a speech by Adolf Hitler deserves as un- reserved a welcome as the oration he delivered to the micro- ones in the Kroll Opera House in Berlin last Sunday. Nothing could be better calculated in its results, though naturally not in 5 intention, to encourage the United Nations and depress the spirits of Axis supporters and sympathisers everywhere. There h indeed some danger of putting too favourable an interpretation on the utterance ; the temptation to draw imaginative inferences must be eschewed. But looked at from any angle both the decision to deliver the speech and the nature of the speech itself do point to certain irresistible conclusions. Why did Hitler, who had vowed he would never return to German soil from the Russian campaign till Stalin's hosts were smashed, go home at this moment to address the German nation? The only conclusion can be that he realised that a situation charged with danger existed in Germany itself. A nation fired with confidence in victory needs no such exhortations, much less such threats. A ruler who already possesses power of life and death over all his subjects needs no extension of an omnipotence which if it did not exist formally existed incontestably in fact. The demand for the extension was no doubt prompted by two motives, one, perhaps the more effective, the compulsion of megalomania on a scale un- paralleled in history, the other consciousness of the need to lavish new menaces on those sections of the State, particularly the judiciary and the civil service, in whom still survives some lingering sense of a duty other than conformity to a Fiihrer's whims.
All, in short, from Hitler's point of view, is not right with Germany. Neither, it may be added, from Germany's point of view is all right with Hitler. He promised his subjects victory in Russia without a winter campaign. He makes it abundantly clear today that after the first winter of war he contemplates a second. He may be wrong ; the Russians have their own ideas on that point. But it is better for us on our part to assume that here at least Hitler is right. His eastern campaign has not gone well since the day of his spectacular assumption of the Command- in-Chief, but it is due to him to recognise that it was probably his own decision that led to the retention in German hands through- out the winter, at however shattering a cost, of practically all the key-positions essential to the launching of his spring offensive. But Hitler's description of his campaign can hardly have inspired his hearers. The best he could say of it was that the German armies had escaped disaster by a hairsbreadth, and that he had taken steps which would ensure that things went better in next winter's snow and ice. Part of those steps are the new powers to compel every citizen " to be governed by a single thought— victory." Anyone must be liable to dismissal from any office on any plea, in accordance with the conscience of the Fithrer. How far this constituent of his personality is identical with, or subor- dinate to, that other curiosity, his intuition, is a metaphysical question that must remain obscure. The essence of the declaration—that Germany must be Nazified in every corner and in every stratum of its society—is all that matters.
The best commentary on the Reichstag speech is not the interpretation put on it by Hitler's enemies but the impression it has made on neutrals, and, most significant of all, on Germany's southern ally. The references to Italy in the speech were as notable as the absence of any reference to Vichy France, which had just subserviently remodelled its Government at Hitler's imperious demand. Laval's installation was a blow to Italy. Nothing could have suited Mussolini better than the occupation by Germany of the whole of Vichy France—except for Savoy and Nice, which Italy would take over as the price of her assiduity in the role of jackal. But Savoy and Nice remain French, and Hitler, having no intention of endowing his ally with anything material, scatters compliments over her instead on a liberal scale. What is reputed to be happening in Italy today lends marked significance to his words, though it is as yet a little difficult to distinguish cause and effect. If, as there seems some reason for believing, Mussolini was in serious danger of passing into eclipse, a little patronage from Berlin might have its value. Hence the references to " the heroic revolt of Italian warriors and Italian youth under the leadership of the man vouchsafed to them." But whether or not the intention of the speech was to send up Mussolini's falling stock, its effect was unmistakably to drive it considerably further down. The only case for the Duce's implication of his country in a war which has reduced her to destitution was that he was hitching his waggon to a winner. With the first glimmer of consciousness that the hitch may be to a loser Mussolini's raison d'être disappears with something of a bang.
It is too soon to decide what importance to attach to the circumstantial stories reaching New York by way of Berne of a new turn of events in Italy. The report that the King is taking an active hand in politics and that he has been consulting with men like General Badoglio, if true, is of considerable importance. The disillusionment of Italy with Fascism is far more general and unconcealed than the disillusionment of Germany with Nazism, and Mussolini's regime is not buttressed by a secret police in tho least degree comparable in efficiency and ruthless- ness with the Gestapo. The Gestapo, indeed, is probably the strongest force behind Fascism even in Italy itself. Whether it is strong enough to suppress any attempt at transfer of allegiance from the Duce to the Crown is questionable. Certainly the one rallying-point for loyal Italians is the throne. If King Emanuel, in concert with the Crown Prince Umberto and General Badoglio, decided, after being reduced for years to a cypher, to assert his prerogatives the popular response would be all but universal. Italy is utterly sick of the war. She is not far from starving, she has lost the whole of her colonial empire and half her fleet, she is policed by German troops and S.S. men, her industrial centres have been bombed and will be bombed again, and she has not even secured the territorial reward which tempted her into the war. For one Italian who follows Mussolini out of Jove a dozen follow him out of fear. The population as a whole is inert because there is no alternative visible. If the king can create one, many unexpected things may happen, both in Italy and outside it. But such news as is available on that subject is by no means authorita- tive enough as yet to justify any assured optimism.
More authoritative, indeed, at this juncture are the conclusions drawn from the Hitler speech in such countries as Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey—the first two being in a position geographically which gives views expressed there on Germany a particular value. On the general deterioration of German morale all three capitals are agreed, but deterioration in a country held in the grip of the Gestapo would have to go a long way before it produced any manifestations that would hinder the military effort. A notable military success—of which there seems to be little prospect—would do a great deal to revive flagging spirits. On the other hand a continuance of the R.A.F.'s relentless offensive—of which there seems to be every prospect—will do a great deal to depress them still further. Germany, according to all the indica- tions, has lost what was psychologically her greatest asset, a blind superstitious faith in Hitler's infallibility All the rest of the world realises that in June, 1941, he made one of the greatest mistakes in military history in his gratuitous attack on Russia. His calculation was that the Russians would have been beaten and finished with before snow fell on the steppes. Now, after the most appalling winter German troops have ever known, Hitler speaks to them in April of the conditions of next winter's war. That such defaitisme from such a source should have caused stupefacticin in Italy can surprise no one. What emotions it has aroused in Germany, where all emotion has to be concealed, is still matter for speculation ; but speculation in such circum- stances is not far removed from certainty. Hitler has made the cracks visible. Why, once again, did he do it? The resolution make the Reichstag speech was evidently taken suddenly. did the Supreme Commander leave the Eastern Front? explanation is worth considering. The suddenness of the s may be due to the suddenness of the deterioration of morale. in its turn can be due to one thing only—the intensification of British air-offensive. It would be surprising if what has hap to Lubeck and Rostock and Cologne, with the certainty that w things are still to come, left any nation unshaken. The policy making a second front not against Germany but actually Germany may be justifying itself better than was realised.
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