Japan and the World War and Diplomacy in the Japanese
Empire. By Tatsuji Takeuchi. With an Introduction by Quincy Wright. (Allen and Unwin. 16s.) Tins remarkable book by a Japanese on the conduct of Japanese foreign policy is one of a series of monographs on the causes of war planned by the Social -Science Research Committee at the University of Chicago in 1927, and is a companion volume to Dr. F. L. Schuman's War and Diplomacy in the French Republic which appeared in 1931. The bulk of Dr. Takeuchi's work was also completed in 1931 before the famous Mukden incident in the September of that year opened a new era in Japan's foreign relations ; confronted by the momentous events which followed the incident, he postponed publication, and has now extended the scope of his work to cover the period down to Japan's withdrawal from. the League in 1933. The book he has produced is a uniquely valuable contribution to the study of its subject in the. English language ; it is scholarly, well-written and extremely. objective in treatment.
Dr. Takeuchi is Professor of International Relations at the Kwansei Gakuin University in Japan. The author tells us that his book was written at the University of Chicago, but his preface is written from Kwansei Gakuin and dated June 2,0th, 3935. To a-reader of the book it may well be a matter, for :surprise that its author should neither be dead nor. in exile nor in a. concentration camp, but apparently still in occupation of an academic post ; in a country where there is so much repression and " patriotic " violence it seems strange that so independent a mind should be tolerated at all. Certainly no writer could get away with such outspoken criticism of the ways of the State in Soviet Russia, Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany. But (and it is a point which requires to be emphasised) Japan is not yet a totalitarian State—though it has moved further in that direction as a result of the mutiny in Tokyo two months ago. Its political life and thought are not yet unified-under the control of a one-party dictatorship ; there is still a plurality of political parties and a degree of security for the expression of opinions which must be highly distasteful to the hundred-per-cent. nationalists.
Dr, Takeuchi tells us that he has sought to place the primary emphasis in his book " upon procedure rather than the substance of policy." He does not attempt to give a full history of Japanese foreign policy in relation to the policies of other States and to the details of the issues involved. He is concerned with the formation of foreign policy as a function of Japanese polities and with the position of the Foreign Office and its Minister in relation to the Diet, the Privy Council and the fighting services. . A historical survey of policy in the making since 1890 is preceded by an admirable" study of the Japanese constitution, an under- standing of which is the key to much that is otherwise obscure to a European observer.
By the Constitution the Emperor " has the supreme com- mand of the Army and Navy " (Article XI), " determines the organisation and peace standing of the Army and Navy " (Article XII), and " declares war, makes peace and con- cludes treaties " (Article XIII). The first of these imperial prerogatives is exercised on the advice of the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff ; the second and third, which come under the head of "general affairs of State," on the advice of' the Cabinet of which the War, Navy and Foreign Ministers are members. The Chiefs of Staff are not subordinate to their respective Ministers in the Cabinet but are responsible directly to the Emperor, and the War and Navy Ministers themselves have a special position within the Cabinet due to the rule that they must be general officers on the active list. It is this system which produces the " dual diplomacy " of the Japanese State, for it enables the fighting services, in so far as they are internally united, to pursue policies of their own in the field of foreign affairs and to put pressure on the Government. Sometimes the conflict is between the Cabinet as a whole and the Staffs, sometimes it is within the Cabinet ; thus in 1930 the Cabinet, including the Navy Minister, was at odds with the Navy Chief of Staff over the terms of the London Naval Treaty, and early in 1931 Foreign Minister Shidehara was opposed by his colleague, War Minister Minami, who roundly denounced him for his "Weak " policy:towards China at a conference of divisional commanders. Dr. Takeuchi holds that "a new system of civilian control of military affairs might be instituted without amending the Constitution," but in fact such civilian control, which came near to being established by the victory of Hamaguchi's Cabinet over the Navy Staff in 1930, is no longer in the realm of practical polities, and the latest news from Tokyo is that foreign policy is to be unified by 111E1111S of " informal weekly conferences " between the War, Navy and Foreign Ministers.
Dr. Takeuchi gives a most valuable account of the develop- ment of Japanese policy -during the crisis over Manchuria in 1931-33. He declares that " the immediate reaction of the public [in Japan] to the news was one of violent criticism of the military action," and further that " during the September session of the League Council no voice was raised in influential circles against the League assuming jurisdiction over the Mukden crisis," but that when the Council voted, over Japanese protest. to invite an Americap observer to be present at its deliberations, anti-League sentiments began to find expression. There can be little doubt but that this invitation to the U.S.A. was a major blunder on the part of the League Council, for the League received no real accession of strength as a result of it. whereas the important section of Japanese opinion which was prepared to accept a settlement at Geneva wits alienated by the presence there of a Power which was bound by none of the obligations of the Covenant and was actually at the time conducting a military intervention in Nicaragua. From the middle of October the tide of opinion began to turn in faeour of the so-called " positive " policy. Even so. the General titaff ordered a withdrawal of troops from the Chinchow region as late as November 28th, and it was not until the last week of Deeember, after the change of government, that Japan really crossed the Rubicon by sending reinforcements and renewing the offensive. Once this step had been taken a final breach with Geneva became inevitable, though it was
postponed for another fifteen months. G. F. Iltosos.
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