THE TRIBUNAL OF EUROPE.
WE notice among the graver politicians who are discussing the new Eastern question an impression, or rather conviction, which greatly affects their judgment, and, as we think, affects it for the worse. They will have it that because the Concert of Europe is irresistible, there- fore it ought to be respected. They think of it as the Grand Tribunal, and fear that any diminution of its authority, or rather of the obedience paid to its authority, will introduce a kind of anarchy in international action. The Concert, they believe, not only prevents war among its members, but prevents disorder among those who are outside it. Responsibility, they say, must coexist with power, and all real power in international affairs belongs to the members of the Concert. If there were no fear of them the Little Powers, which are comparatively irrespon- sible, would be always going to war, undertaking adventures, or carrying out plans for the increase of territory necessary in modern times to make civilised existence comfortable. The Concert, it is held, is as needful to Europe as an Emperor was to Germany in the Middle Ages, and for the same object, the restraint of disorderly ambitions, which otherwise would threaten the general wellbeing, which is of course bound up with the permanence of order. But for the Concert, for instance, the Balkan Peninsula might be a theatre of perpetual wars. the Turkish Empire might be always defending itself, Sweden would have no protection excepting its snows, and Powers like Spain, Holland, and Portugal would incessantly give way to the public appetite for a.iventure and expansion. With this idea, which is de- fended in the Standard of Monday with both moderation and force, we should have entire sympathy, believing that all States, like all persons, are the better for the pressure of a law strong enough to restrain aberrations of self- will, but that we entertain incurable doubts as to the character of the Tribunal. An unjust or an inept Judge is often worse than no Judge at all, and there are circum- stances in the composition of the Concert which render perfect confidence in its decisions nearly impossible. What should we say in ordinary civil life to a Tribunal of six Judges in which it was certain that five at least of the an would be guided in their decisions entirely by con- siderations of private self-interest, in which one at least was constantly under the influence of a morbid pride, a second was crafty beyond lawyers' experience, a third was the mere servant of another Judge, and a fourth was so conscious of weakness that he always reserved his opinion until certain which way the majority would go? We should certainly distrust that Tribunal, and this all the more if it was not really bound by a Code, but claimed the right in all but a few cases to make the law, so that it might fit in with what the majority considered the momentary interests of the whole community. Yet by the consent of all men the Tribunal of Europe is a. Tribunal of this sort, with the terrible aggravation that its members are not even governed by the general conscience of human beings, but hold that their direct duty is not to do their best for the world unless that best coincides exactly with the interests of those who pay and promote each Judge. Whenever those interests are imperilled, even in a slight degree, each Judge is ready to cease to act, well knowing that if he secedes, the Tribunal, which derives its whole authority from its unity, will practically be thrown into confusion or will cease to exist. The result, of course, is everlasting "lobbying "—that is, bargaining for the decision—each Judge privately offering something if the remainder will also give up something, so that the out- come in the end is like an American tariff, not based upon any principle whatever, but only on the interests of those who can control the Judges. That we think even our contemporary the Standard will admit is not an ideal Tribunal, or one in which any population whatever, whether it is affected by its action or not, will place any but a strongly qualified confidence. Its character would be immensely improved if each Judge would "table his reserves "—that is, would state openly his policy and the points on which he did not pretend to be either dis- interested or philanthropic—but that is the precise thing which no member of the Tribunal will do. To the world he is seeking only justice and peace, while to his fellow. Judges in part, and to his own people openly, he is seeking only so much justice and such a kind of peace as is com- patible with his "interests,"—political, commercial, or, it may be, connected with his consideration among his peers. The Concert considered as a Tribunal is an unjust body.
But, says Mr. Curzon, you are misusing words. The Concert is not a Tribunal, and does not pretend to be one. It is only a. Cabinet, naturally and properly seeking first the wellbeing of those who formally or informally invest it with the right and the power to govern.' We maintain that it is, in form at least, a Tribunal as much as any other Commission of Arbitration on a political dispute, and is bound to do justice—for example, if it allows fighting, to allow the fighters to employ the same weapons ; but let us pass that by for the moment, and inquire why even as a Cabinet the Concert should be trusted. What should we say of a Cabinet in which no Privy Councillor was thinking in the least of the general good, or even intent on doing the general work, but each member was eagerly seeking so to direct the common body that its action might increase his own fortune, or his own consideration, or the popularity of the party to which he belonged ? What should we think of a Cabinet so jealous that it could scarcely ever act, and when it did act almost always ensured a failure, a Cabinet from which no one expected anything, and which was from the first precluded by internal disorganisation from even attempting to deal with the grievances which it was expected to remove, a Cabinet which, having for its first mandate the arrest of a brigand, had as a consequence of its action increased the powers of that brigand for slaughter and plunder by at least sevenfold, and which at last proposed to him that if he would retire into his hold all his crimes should be condoned, and that he should keep all movable property of which he had deprived his victims ? Should we regard such a Cabinet as trustworthy, or as anything except a Council which, in the mysterious providence of God, was allowed a power which it showed every disposition to misuse, or in its better moments to allow to remain un- used either for good or ill ? We maintain that, judging from the evidence of its acts: no good or sensible man is bound to trust the Concert of Europe, or to expect from it when in action anything but mischief. When quiescent it does indeed one service, real or imaginary ; it advertises in some sort of visible way the resolution of the Great States of Europe not to fight each other if they can help it, and that advertisement diminishes the general amount of fear ; but as an active force it is either nought or hostile to the progress of mankind,— either it does nothing or it protects Turkey. We are per- fectly aware that that conclusion is as useless as a reso- lution passed in New York against a Tammany Judge, because it cannot be carried out. Physical force, which still governs mankind, and probably will govern it till the world cools, is in the possession of the Concert, and it must therefore go on as long as it pleases as supreme arbiter of the nations' fate. We can suggest no substitute for it, and are afraid to break it up without one lest the consequence should be anarchy,—a position, no doubt, which makes criticism appear either ridiculous or purely academic. But we are not going to allow that because we must tolerate the badness of many institutions, we are therefore bound to consider them good, or to refrain from open speech about their badness. On the contrary, while we entirely admit that the man who resists the injunction of a Tammany Judge is a rebel, we maintain that the man who praises a Tammany Judge, knowing him to be what be is, is a dastard, and that the man who will not help, even by grave speech, to reform Tammany is a bad citizen, who deserves to suffer all the loss which in the long run Tammany principles will inevitably inflict. Nothing is nobler than the Concert of Europe as an ideal for politicians, nothing more inept or injurious than the Concert's action has ever been recorded of a, force so great. It is the long-desired Tribunal of Europe, the idea of which has roused even poets and priests to utterances of enthusiasm ; but it is filled by men of whom the majority are intent either on guarding what they have or on filling their pockets, or if you will, their shareholders' pockets, just a little more full, and who therefore secure no end which the good and the intelligent are bound to consider worth securing.
Previous page
