SPECTATOR'S LIBRARY.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CONEMPOTIM/HICE,

Selectious from the Despatches and General Orders of Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington. By Lieutenant-Colonel thirwood, Empire to his Grace as Knight of

the Bath Murray.

THE WELLINGTON PAPERS.

THE object of this publication (in one large octavo volume of 940 pages) is to furnish to such persons as could not afford to purchase the twelve volumes of the entire series, the most important and interesting parts of the Wellington Papers. It contains the military despatches ; the general orders issued from time to time to the Army, upon detail, discipline, and behaviour ; a selection from the letters to public servants on public affairs; and gleanings from the more private correspondence. To these are added several papers on matters connected with the economy of the Army, written when the Duke was Commander-in-Chief; together with a selection front his evidence on military punish- ments; and the letter "to the Officers calling themselves the rem- nant of the Captains and Subalterns of the Peninsula, who have sent a Memorial and Printed Paper to Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington "—in which the military reasoning is more conspicuous than the graciousness.

The twelve volumes of the Wellington Despatches never reached us. The present "Selections," though of course less complete than the entire work, yet furnish a more whole view and embrace a larger range than any of the single volumes ; each of which, on its publication, was made the subject of long and frequent notice by some of our contemporaries. Extending over the best part of half a century, the papers furnish, and from the pen of a leading actor, a full commentary on the wars and politics of India and Europe during many of the most eventful years in the history of the world, and exhibit for the whole period a complete analysis of the economy of that strange machine of civilization, an army. Unri- valled in this point of view, they have great interest in another-; displaying, under the most trying circumstances, the thoughts of one who for many years, and even in the full tide of success, was the most misapprehended and depreciated of men—a butt for Whig witlings—publicly rated as a mere lucky soldier—a "man with one idea." Our notice of this extraordinary volume will therefore of necessity be of considerable length ; not only from the character of its writer, the magnitude of the subjects, and the multitude of the materials, but from having now to consider the whole, instead of getting rid of it piecemeal. Yet, long as the paper must be, many things are omitted that it was designed to include, and many points altogether unnoticed.

As our acquaintance with the entire series of the Despatches is, however, second-band, this fact must be borne in mind in any judg- ment we pass upon the compilation before us, or deduce from its con- tents. With this reservation, we cannot award very high praise to the taste and acumen which Colonel GURWOOD has displayed in this selection. Some of the more striking or curious passages of the original work seem to be omitted ; and in many cases the ar- rangement of the recueil is too fragmentary for such a volume: not merely are single sentences, or little more, presented in juxtaposition with very extended documents to which they have no relation, through a too rigid adherence to chronological order, but the commentary is sometimes given without the text, the remark without the fact which called it forth. A superfluous delicacy is displayed in suppressing names when the names are desirable to give reality to the thing; and as they seem to have been published in orders of the day or judgments of courts-martial, &c., the omission is a needless-refinement—an attempt to write history in blank. But these are matters of detail : the want felt by the general reader will be, the absence of illustrative or connecting notes, no matter what typographical form they might have taken. There are very many persons desirous of possessing this volume, and capable of reading it with advantage, who have not a sufficient acquaintance with the detailed annals of the periods it refers to, intelligently to follow the documents. In the entire series this defect may exist, though we should imagine to a less extent ; but this volume being intended for popular circulation, the peculiarity natural to all original authorities chronologically arranged, of not conveying an entire narrative, should have been remedied. It cannot be said that this is sufficiently done by the preliminary outline of the career of WEL- LINGTON, drawn up though it is with business-like precision.

These remarks, it will be understood, do not detract from the value or interest of the publication : we only conjecture that it might have been made more complete and interesting, as we are certain it could have been done in a more workmanlike way.

In regard to the contents of the volume, the impression left on the mind of the reader as to the character of the writer, is that of a man of wondrous common sense and reflective observation, with great sagacity and worldly wisdom. Profoundly skilled in the science of' war, without the parade (perhaps without the knowledge) of its pedantry, he has added an extensive practical experience to this knowledge of principles, and both have been applied with unrivalled calculation, patience, and steadiness, and promptness when the mo- ment for action came. The military preeminence of the Duke of WELLINGTON seems,however, less an essential of his nature than an accident of his career. The ideal of a man of business appears to be his true character. To study thoroughly whatever he undertook to do, no matter whether large or small—to acquire the principles on which the business was to be conducted, without knowing or per.

baps caring to know what principles meant in a theoretical sense, and having once engaged in any thing to carry it out without regard to his own feelings or the feelings of others, or any check whatever except the conventional notions of morals, and such obvious viola- tions of the common rights of human nature as would alike injure the agent and any business he should hereafter engage in—are essential to the whole class. In this character, peculiar perhaps to England, industry, attention, order, punctuality, and direct- ness, are common and as it were natural elements ; as well as a disposition to judge of things less by any abstract standard or innate sense of right or wrong, than by the effect of actions upon the actor's social interests or repute. The peculiarity of the Duke of WELLINGTON consists in the high degree in which he possesses all these qualities. His panegyrists would say that his essential characteristics were firmness and insensibility to external influ- ences—a kind of practical stoicism :

"A soul supreme, in each hard instance tried,

Above all pain, all passion, and all pride."

But we conceive that these are traits of the true old English man of business. Perhaps a more genuine idiosyncracy in WELLINGTON is his power of penetrating to the very marrow of the things which his mind is fitted to apprehend ; the clearness with which he sees the conduct to be pursued; and the dogged firmness with which he

sticks to it.

In philosophy of a certain kind the mind of WELLINGTON is not deficient. Of feeling he has little or none ; and his imagination is, if possible, still more deficient. Hence, after expounding with a depth of penetration, a sagacity of view, and a clinching clearness and closeness of expression, some principle of war, politics, or military economy, he sinks down to the level of a penny-a-liner when enforced to try his hand at compliment or condolence. The same causes render him unequal to narrative or description : his narrative being technical; his description a mere dry enumeration of towns, villages, and physical features. Were it not for the names of places, and the returns of killed, &c., a person would scarcely learn from his despatches that a great battle had been fought. Even with a foreknowledge of the fact, he can scarcely credit that the dry if not repulsive technical account before him is descrip- tive of any thing save the movements of machines. If the reader would bring this opinion to the test, let him peruse Sir THOMAS GRAHAM'S account of the battle of Barrosa, and he will feel that there has been a struggle with brave men—that mind has been en- gaged as well as matter. There is heartiness, too, in GRAHAM'S commendation of his officers and troops ; whereas the Duke's praises seem more like a report made in compliance with the rules of the service. We admit that clear narratives may be picked out from this volume ; but if analyzed, it will be found that the narration is subordinate to the reason—that the statement is merely a vehicle for the arguments. Reasoning, or rather criticism, is the great excellence of the Duke of WELLINGTON; though the vulgar of all ranks will not think so.

This deticiency of feeling and imagination nails him down to the visible and tangible. That which is not physical and practical in its properties or its relations is, for the most part, unseen and un- known:

" The cowslip, by the river's brim, A yellow cowslip was to him, And it was nothing more."

He could tell the form and colour of the plant, and that it made an indifferent sort of wine ; but the latent wonders of its physiology, and the world of speculation thence arising, or the touching remembrances it called up, of the feelings of childhood, and the ties of affection—all, in short, that the poet can express, and very many who are not poets can feel—must be to him a " sturnblingblock' or "foolishness."

It may startle to say that the mind of WELLINGTON is deficient in comprehensiveness : but such is the fact. His range of vision, however extended, is on a level line : he sees nothing above what he stands upon and has little power of penetrating the far-off mist. Comprehensive views may be found in his work, and great results deduced from it ; but this is because the accident of his posi- tion placed him in connexion with great affairs and compelled him to consider them. And he can draw out a truth as large as his sub- ject matter from things adapted to his genius ; but he wants the loftier power to deduce a universal principle from a small and par- ticular instance. Lifted above the clouds, or placed in the centre of the universe, and his visual nerve* purged for the sight, be might have apprehended the nature of thunder or gravitation ; but he never could have drawn down the lightning by a paper kite, and apples or cannon-balls might have fallen for ever without suggest- ing to him the law which holds the universe together. Even in matters adapted to his vision, and which it was his business to pro- vide for, he is deficient in long-sighted prescience. When CLIVE established the territorial power of Britain in Bengal, he laid it down as a principle, that it was only the beginning of an end; and that we must subdue the "native princes"—the " whole Mogul empire"—or they would expel us. In despite of the aversion of the Directors, of the feeling of public opinion at home, and of financial and executive difficulties in India, this prediction has been steadily fulfilling for nearly the century since it was uttered, and seems now in the course of completion. When WELLINGTON arrived at Paris after the first abdication of NAPOLEON, he possessed much more data for the future than Clays could possibly have had ; as he gives in the following extract from a letter to DUMOURIER.

* . . . . "then purged with euphrasy and rue The visual nerve, for he had mach to see."

—Paradise Lost, Boa xi.

[Paris. 1814.]

Ce quit y a de pis c'est le mecontentement general, et la pauvrete univer- selle. Cette malheureuse revolution et ses suites ont mine le pays de fond en comble. Tout le monde set pauvre, et cc qui est pis, leurs institutions em- pecheut qu'aucune famine devienne riche et puissante. Toes doivent done nd- cessairement viser I remplir des emplois publics, non comme autrefoia pour l'honneur de les remplir, mais pour avoir de quoi vivre. Tout le monde donc

cherche de l'emploi public.

" Bonaparte laissa une armee d'un million d'hommes en France, outre les oificiers prisouniers en Angleterre et en Russie. Le Roi ne pent pas en main- tenir le quart. Tous ceux non employes soot mecontens. Bonaparte gnu- vernait direetement la moitie de l'Europe, et indirectement presque l'autre moitie. Pour des causes a present bien developpees et connues ii employait une quantite infinie de personnea dans ses administrations ; et tons ceux em- ployes Cu dans les administrations exterieures, civiles, ou dans les administra- tions militaires des armees, sont renvoyes, et beaucoup de ceux employes dans les administrations interieures ; a cette elasse nombreuse ajoutez la quantite d'emigres et de personnes centres, tons mourant de faim, et tons convoitant de l'emploi public afin de pouvuir vivre, et vous trouverez quo plus de trois quarts de Is classe de la societe, non employee it la maind'ceuvre on it labourer Is terre, soot en &at d'indigence, et, par consequence, mecontens. Si vous con- shores bien cc tableau, qui eat In stricte verite, vous y verrez la cause et la nature du danger du jour. L'arrnfie, les offieiers surtout, sent mecontens. 1ls to sbut pour piusieurs raisons inutiles it detainer ici, mais cc mecontentement pourra be vaincre en adoptant des mesures sages pour ameliorer l'esprit."

Here, even seen at second-hand, were the elements of restless-

ness and revolutions. A nation where "pins de trois quarts" of the classes above labourers and handicraftsmen were oppressed by necessity, or " mourant de faim," must be unsettled, unscrupulous, and corrupt, and ready to snatch at any change that promised the chance of gain.

"Non erat is populus, quem pax tranquilla juvaret, Quem sue libertas immotis pasceret armis. lode irse faciles, et, quod suasisset egestas, Vile nefas : a * a * Et concussa des, et multis utile helium."

The Duke could not predict the invasion of NAPOLEON, the campaign of Waterloo, the Revolution of the Barricades, and the continual " emeutes " which indicate something dangerous and diseased in the social state of France; but a comprehensive mind would have foreseen the probability of similar occurrences; and if it could not induce princes and ministers to provide for them, would have been prepared for them itself. Yet the evasion from Elba and its success seem to have taken him as much by surprise as any gaping diplomatist ; for he thought only of "le danger du jour." Throughout the volume the writer manifests a rooted aversion to Democracy, and its organ, a popular assembly. The politics of WELLINGTON, however, are not peculiar to the individual, but common to his class. Minds trained to obey, and to require obedience, and attached to order and whatever contributes or seems to contribute to it, are naturally conservative of exist- ing institutions, especially as they are clearly impressed with the evils of change, but do not comprehend the necessity which exists for change, or the means of making it. We do not say that all good men of affairs are Conservatives in the sense of party slang ; on the contrary, many belong to the Movement. But in most cases they are partisans, from accident, narrow views, or personal objects ; and when a change is made imper- fectly, perhaps uselessly, and working with the hitches of novelty, they stop short in terror at their own misshapen handicraft, and apostatize from ignorant fear. The class of minds of which WEL- LINGTON is such a gigantic specimen, make excellent adminis- trators: unless the crisis is too near, they can prevent matters from growing worse, and perhaps improve them; but they can neither found nor renovate. Accustomed to consider consequences, they do nothing upon the principle of haphazard ; but they are too de- ficient in comprehension and imagination to take in the whole of past, present, and future—to penetrate to the heart of government and society, and plan a reformation which, disregarding the forms of things, shall only refer to their essential nature. The very qualities of WELLINGTON as an administrator destroyed him as the head of a Ministry, where a mere Whig or Tory official might have rubbed on longer. The profusion of the salaries, and the incapable laziness of the recipients, disgusted his habits of business; but his economical reforms weakened his influence and deprived him of followers. He granted the repeal of the Test Act and Catholic Emancipation, for the questions were an obstacle to his "carrying on the King's Government." But, after weakening his party numerically and morally, he opposed the natural consequence of his previous grants ; compelling his successors to offer a larger legislative change than would have been gladly taken from him, and parting with the power of guiding events. His age forbids that he should again take a responsible part in affairs ; but were it otherwise, he would be unequal to the crisis which is drawing on, certainly however slowly—the struggle for power between the people and the classes.

Referring to the military service of the Duke of Wsrxricorosr, it may be arranged under five epochs : 1. His campaign in Hol- land during the French Revolution—in 1794-95; 2. His various services in India—from 1797 to 1805; 3. The unprincipled ex- pedition to Copenhagen ; 4. The Peninsular war ; 5. The cam- paign of Waterloo. Of Holland and Copenhagen no memorials exist in the volume before us. The first extract consists of a letter, in 1800, declining to take the command of the army in an expedition against Batavia ; after which, the selections continue with intervals till 1840.

Of the various papers in the volume, the greater despatches are mere Gazettes, scarcely intelligible to the unmilitary reader. The other documents, numerous. as they are, and various as are the subjects on which they treat, may, like the eighty thousand

registered plants of botany, be reduced to a few divisions. And we think, historical results—the principles of military science as • founded on practice—the characteristics of the qualities of the troops with which he served—and the general economy of the military and civil services, with rules for the behaviour of their professors—will include all.

In every great work, says REYNOLDS, there is much which must be commonplace : and there is no lack of matter in this selection that either never had any interest save for those connected with the business it refers to, or which interest has long since ceased. But many of the things are more than interesting—they amuse, whilst they instruct in the practice of war or the conduct of life. This quality is no doubt principally attributable to the distinctness with which the writer seizes the point of his subject ; but some- thing is also owing to the quaint directness of his style, and to the comic puzzle—the question continually rising, Is this blunt sim- plicity, or caustic irony ?

Like other original characters, the Duke seems to have been at first what he is at last, only less matured. He appears to have formed his opinions with more slowness in India than in the Penin- sula, and by repeated experiences; whilst after all it may be ques- tioned whether they were so sound. His style is nearly the same, except that its brusqueness was more naked and somewhat less forcible.

Every striking passage shows the man of the world, and the man of calculation ; and not a few, that loose indifference to means which generally characterizes this kind of person. Here is an instance.

PAY TO LEARN—BUT ON THE SLY.

[Written in India. 1803.]

in the Nizarn's durbar the minister has all the power ; and it must be a matter of indifference to us what passes in the interior, provided the result of the exercise of that power is favourable to our views. The minister is pensioned to produce that result ; and the Nizam has been told that the pension is the sum which the minister would have received from the southern districts if they had not been ceded to the Company.

But how is it with the Peshwah? He has no minister ; no person has in- fluence over him, and he is only guided by his own caprices. He cannot be paid in order that he may conduct his government according to our views; and it would be useless to pay his ministers for that object, because they can render no corresponding service. But although they cannot conduct him and his go- vernment, they can let you know in what manner he conducts it ; and for that they ought to be paid. That for which they ought to be paid, is for making you acquainted with every thing that passes that comes to their knowledge ; in order that you may have an opportunity of forming a judgment whether the Peshwah adheres to the alliance or not, and of checking him by remonstrances, if his actions should tend to a breach of its stipulations. But if they are to be paid with his knowledge, it is obvious that he will keep secret from them all that he wishes you should not know ; and that he will in fact have two sets of ministers—one set to deceive the British Resident and another to conduct the real business of his government. Upon the whole, I am convinced that it is absolutely necessary that you should have an accurate knowledge of all that passes in the Peshwah's durbar ; that it is not possible that you should have that knowledge without paying for it ; that you will not obtain it if you pay for it with the consent of the

Peshwah ; and that you ought forthwith to pay Ragonaut Rao. • • • If you should send this letter to the Governor-General, I recommend that it should be by a private channel, as the subject to which it relates is not a very proper one to meet the public eye, however necessary it may be to consider it.

In the declaration against NAPOLEON published by the Allies, there occurred the phrase " vindiete publique"; for which WEL- LINGTON was attacked in Parliament, as encouraging assassination. He seems to have been sore, and writes to WELLESLEY POLE that the translation is wrong—it is "public justice" not "public ven- geance." We may, however, appeal from translation in 1815 to interpretation in 1800. Here is

A DISTINCTION FOR CASUISTS.

[1800.]

A man came to me some time ago, and made me an offer similar to that which has been made at Hyderabad. These arrangements answer well there; but I think them unbecoming in an officer at the head of a body of troops ; and I therefore declined to have any thing more to do with the business than to hold out a general encouragement. The proposer said, that there was a Birder at the head of a body of horse, to whom if I would give a cowle he would come away. I gave the cowlc; but I do not expect either that the sirdar will come off with his troops, or that the proposed deed will be put in execution. Go- vernment have authorized me to offer a reward for him; and I propose to avail myself of this authority as soon as he is at all pressed, and I find that his people begin to drop off from him. This will be, in my opinion, the fittest period.

To offer a public reward by proclamation for a man's life, and to make a secret bargain to have it taken away, are very different things ; the one is to be done, the other, in my opinion, cannot by an officer at the head of the troops.

PUBLIC CORRESPONDENCE.

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

Camp, 11th November 1803. I take the liberty, however, to recommend as a general rule, that between those public officers by whom business can be done verbally, correspondence should be forbidden, as having a great tendency to prevent disputes upon trifling subjects, and to save the time of the public officers, who are obliged, some to peruse and consider, and others to copy, those voluminous documents about nothing.

THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE.

As for the wishes of the people, particularly in this country:, I put them out of the question. They are the only philosophers about their governors that ever I met with—If Indifference constitutes that character.

OUR INDIAN TERRITORY.

[Camp at Hoobly. 1800.) In my opinion, the extension of our territory and influence has been greater than our means. Besides, we have added to the number and the description of our enemies, by depriving of employment those who heretofore found it in the service of Tippoo and of the Nizam. Wherever we spread ourselves, par- ticularly if we aggrandize ourselves at the expense of the Malirattas, we in- crease this evil. We throw out of employment and of means of subsistence all who have hitherto managed the revenue, commanded or served in the armies, or have plundered the country. These people become additional enemies; at the same time that, by the extension of our territory, our means of supporting our government and of defending ourselves are proportionably decreased.

Upon all questions of increase of territory these considerations have much weight with me ; and I am, in general, inclined to decide that we have enough— as much at least, if not more than we can defend.

This looks, and was, and is sagacious ; but on a narrow view. Experience shows that CLIVE'S was the comprehensive judgment : for he regarded the law which regulates our Indian existence ; WELLINGTON the convenience only.

We pass from India to the Peninsula and France.

THE HOMILY ON PAY AND FEED.

[Dated from Lesaca, in 1813.] As I have above stated to your Lordship, the Spanish troops do not want discipline, if by discipline is meant instruction, so much as they do a system of order ; which can be founded only on regular pay and food, and good care and clothing. These British officers could not give them ; and notwithstanding that the Portuguese are now the fighting-cocks of the army, I believe we owe their merits more to the care we have taken of their pockets and bellies, than to the instruction we have given them. In the end of last campaign they be- haved in many instances exceedingly ill, because they were in extreme misery, the Portuguese Government having neglected to pay them. I have forced the Portuguese Government to make arrangements to pay them regularly this year; • and everybody knows how they behave. Our own troops always fight ; but the influence of regular pay is seriously felt on their conduct, their health, and their efficiency ; and as for the French troops, it is notorious that they will do nothing unless regularly paid and fed.

WELLINGTON ON SALAMANCA.

We bad a race for the large Arapiles, which is the more distant of the two detached heights which you will recollect on the right of your position : this race the French won, and they were too strong to be dislodged without a ge- neral action.

I knew that the French were to be joined by the cavalry of the Army of the North on the 22d or 23d, and that the Army of the Centre was likely to be in motion. Marmont ought to have given me a pont d'or, and he would have made a handsome operation of it. But instead of that, after rnanteuvering all the morning in the usual French style, nobody knew with what object, he at last pressed upon my right in such a manner, at the same time without engaging, that he would have either carried our Arapiles or he would have confined us entirely to our position. This was not to be endured ; and we fell upon him, turning his left flank ; and I never saw an army receive such a beating.

The neglect by the Ministers at home upon every point—men, money, provisions, and even common naval assistance for transport— is well known to all who have given any attention to the Peninsular war. As soon as WELLINGTON'S victorious career established a prestige in his favour, they teased him with all kinds of schemes ; some their own, some the Regent's, all injudicious, and mostly based on the grossest ignorance or the most extravagant hopes. The following extracts will show the half reasoning half contemp- tuous way in which he answered these idle projects.

WHAT WE SHOULD SHARE WITH OUR NORTHERN ALLIES.

[Petiegua. 1812.]

It is scarcely necessary to consider what we shall do with our army after the French withdraw from Spain ; as that event is not at present very probable, unless Bonaparte should be so pressed in the North as to be induced to weaken

his force. • • * My opinion is, however, that if we should get the French out of Spain, and the war should continue, we should carry on our operations on the Southern frontier of France. * • *

In regard to all schemes in Italy and the North of Europe, founded on this army—first, I would observe, that you must reckon that six months would elapse after you should decide on the measure and should issue your orders in Downing Street, before the army would be fit to engage in an operation in the new scene : secondly, it would be but a small army, incapable of acting alone ; and at the same time, that it would not be easy to connect it with any other : thirdly, it must not be expected that any of the Powers in the North of Europe would give us the direction and management of their concerns, as we now have those of the Portuguese at least, if not of the Spaniards. The Powers of the North would willingly avail themselves of the bravery of our troops they would share in our riches, partake of the plenty in our camps, which our good arrange- ments and money should procure for us ; but they would share with us nothing but their distresses.

WHAT CANNOT BE DONE.

[Lesaca. 1813.] It is a very common error among those unacquainted with military affairs, to believe that there are no limits to military success. After having driven the French from the frontiers of Portugal and Madrid to the frontiers of France, it is generally expected that we shall immediately invade France ; and some even here expect that we shall be at Paris in a month. None appear to have taken a correct view of our situation on the frontier, of which the enemy still possess all the strongholds within Spain itself; of which strongholds, or at least some of them, we must get possession before the season closes, or we shall have no communication whatever with the interior of Spain. Then in France, on the same great communications, there are other strongholds, of which we most likewise get possession. [St. Jean de Luz. 1813.] In military operations there are some things which cannot be done ; one of these is to move troops in this country during or immediately after a violent fall of rain. I believe I shall lose many more men than I shall ever replace, by putting any troops in camp in this bad weather ; but I should be guilty of an useless waste of men if I were to attempt an operation during the violent falls of rain which we have here. Our operations, then, must necessarily be slow,

but they shall not be discontinued. • • •

ENGLISH NOTIONS ON MILITARY MOVEMENTS.

[Ciudad Rodrigo. 1812.]

The people of England, so happy as they are in every respect, so rich in re- sources of every description, having the use of such roads, &c., will not readily believe that important results here frequently depend upon fifty or sixty mules, more or less, or a few bundles of straw to feed them ; but the fact is so, not- withstanding their incredulity. I could not find means of moving even one gun from Madrid. — is a gentleman who piques himself upon his over- coming all difficulties. He knows the length of time it took to find transport even for about one hundred barrels of powder and a few hundred thousand rounds of musket-ammunition which he sent us. As for the two guns which he endeavoured to send, I was obliged to send our own cattle to draw them ; and we felt great inconvenience from the want of those cattle in the subsequent movements of the army.

VALUE OF THE CONVERSATION Or PRINCES.

[Lessee. 1617.]

There appears, therefore, no concert or common cause in the negotiations for peace [amongst the Allies in Germany] ; and as for the operations of the war,

there may be something better, as Lord Cathcart has not gone into details at all; but there does not appear to exist any thing, in writing or anywhere, ex- cepting in loose conversations among princes. For my part, I would not march even a corporal's guard upon such a system.

WAR IN AMERICA.

[Gerrie. 1914.]

Then, as to the landings upon the coast, they are liable to the same ob- jections, though to a greater degree, than an offensive operation founded upon Canada. You may go to a certain extent, as far as a navigable river or your means of transport will enable you to subsist, provided your force is sufficiently large compared with that which the enemy will oppose to you. But I do not know where you could carry on such an operation which would be so injurious to the Americans as to force them to sue for peace, which is what one would wish to see.

The prospect in regard to America is not consoling. That power will always bang on the skirts of Great Britain, unless there should he some change in her own situation; or the state of the Spanish colonies should make aa alteration, not only in America in general, but in the colonial system of the world; or our own colonies in America should grow so fast, as that, with very little assistance from the mother-country, they shall be equal to their own defence.

Of news-purveyors, news-writers, newspaper editors, et id genus ennne, he entertains the meanest opinion : and naturally enough. Their many faults were obvious to him; he was a mark for their necessary haste and too common emptiness and rashness ; whilst the press, by publishing accounts of his position, did him harm in a military sense whether the accounts were true or false. It was not the nature of his mind, indeed it was scarcely to be expected from any one in his position, to observe the difference between countries where the press is free and countries where it is fettered or non-existent, and to conclude that after all there must be something valuable in it, or connected with it, when it appears the accompanier of human civilization and improvement. These were things out of his way. Here are some of his views.

EFFECTS OF NEWS AND NEWS-WRITERS.

(Alverea. 1910.]

All this would not much signify if our staff and other officers would mind their business, instead of writing news and keeping coffeehouses. But as soon as an accident happens, every man who can write and who has a friend who can read, sits down to write his account of what he does not know and his comments on what he does not understand ; and these are diligently circulated and exaggerated by the idle and malicious, of whom there are plenty in all armies. The consequence is, that officers and whole regiments lose their repu- tation; a spirit of party, which lathe bane of all armies, is engendered and fo- mented; a want of confidence ensues ; and there is no character however meri- torious, and no action however glorious, which can have justice done to it. I have hitherto been so fortunate as to keep down this spirit in this army, and I am determined to persevere.

EXPECTATIONS OF EDITORS.

(Lesaca. 1813.]

There is no man better aware than I am of the state of every officer's repu- tation who has to command troops with such miserable means of support as these have; particularly in these days, in which such extravagant expectations are excited by that excessively wise and useful class of peoplethe editors of newspapers. If I had been at any time capable of doing what these gentlemen eupected, I should now, I believe, have been in the moon. They have long ago expected me at Bordeaux; nay, I understand that there are many of their wise readers (amateurs of the military art) who are waiting to join the army till head-quarters shall arrive in that city : and when they shall hear of the late Spanish battle, I conclude that they will defer their voyage till I shall arrive at Paris.

CHARACTER OF " REPORTS " AND "LEADERS."

Our newspapers do us plenty of harm by that which they insert ; but I never suspected that they could do us the injury of alienating from us a go- vernment and nation, with which, on every account, we ought to be on the best of terms, by that which they omit. I, who have been in public life in England, know well that there is nothing more different from a debate in Par- liament than the representation of that debate in the newspapers. The fault which I find with our newspapers is, that they so seldom state an event or transaction as it really occurred, (unless when they absolutely copy what is written for them,) and their observations wander so far from the text, even when they have a despatch or other writing before them, that they appear to le absolutely incapable of understanding much less of stating the truth on any subject.

THE DEBATES.

I have heard so many debates, that I never read one; more especially as I know that unless a gentleman takes the trouble of writing his speech, the re- port of it in the newspapers is not very accurate.

WELLINGTON ON POPULAR ASSEMBLIES.

[Reclaim 1809.] I acknowledge that I have a great dislike to a new popular Assembly. Even our own ancient one would be quite unmanageable, and in these days would ruin us, if the present generation had not before its eyes the example of the French Revolution; and if there were not certain rules and orders for its guidance and government, the knowledge and use of which render safe and successfully direct its proceedings.

"Goodness moves in a larger sphere than justice :" though WELLINGTON, we believe, would in a general way render justice to everybody, he has none of that goodness which runs about seeking whom it can serve. His refusals to "interfere" are numerous ; and here is one embracing

A DISCOURSE ON ASKING.

[Lesace. 1813.] I received last night your letters of the 22d July and 9th September ; and I acknowledge that I wish you had followed the advice of -, and had omitted to send me either; and I will detain both till I shall have received your answer upon what I am now about to state to you.

I have never interfered directly to procure for any officer serving under my command those marks of his Majesty's favour by which many have been honoured; nor do I believe that any have ever applied for them, or have hinted through any other quarter their desire to obtain them. They have been con- ferred, as far as I have any knowledge, spontaneously, in the only mode, in my opinion, in which favours can be aeoeptable or honours and distinction can be received with satisfaction. The ouly share which I have had in these trans- actions hen been by bringing the merits and (services of the several officers of the army distinctly under the view of the Sovereign and the public, in my re- ports to the Secretary of State ; and I AM happy to state, that no General in this army has more frequently than yourself deserved and obtained this favour- able report of your services and conduct. It is impossible for me even to guess what are the shades of distinction by which those are guided who advise the Prince Regent in bestowing dowse honourable marks of distinction ; and you will not expect that I should enter upon such a &amnion. What I would recommend to you is, to express neither disappointment nor wishes upon the subject, even to an intimate friend, much less to the Government. Continue, as you have done hitherto, to deserve the honourable distinction to which you aspire, and you may be certain that, if the Government is wise, you will obtain it. If yon should not obtain it, you may depend upon it that there is no person of whose good opinion you would be solicitous who will think the worse of you on that account. The comparison between myself, who have been the most favoured of his Majesty's subjects, and you, will not be deemed quite correct ; and I advert to my own situation only to tell you, that I recommend to you conduct which I have always followed. Notwithstanding the numerous favours that I have re- ceived from the Crown, I have never solicited one ; and I have never hinted, nor would any one of my friends or relations venture to hint for me, a desire to receive even one ; and much as I have been favoured, the consciousness that it has been spontaneously by the King and Regent, gives me more satisfaction than any thing else. I recommend to you the same conduct, and in ; and above all, resig- nation, if, after all you should not succeed in acquiring what you wish : and I beg you to recall your letters, which you may be certain will be of no use to you.

QUALITIES OF AN OFFICER: NEWSPAPERS AND GAZETTES.

The desire to he forward in engaging the enemy is not uncommon in the British army ; but that quality which I wish to see the officers possess, who are at the head of the troops, is a cool, discriminating judgment in action, which will enable them to decade with promptitude how far they can and ought to go with propriety; and to convey their orders and act with such vigour and de- cision, that the soldiers will look up to them with confidence in the moment of action, and obey them with alacrity. The officers of the army may depend upon it that the enemy to whom they are opposed are not less prudent than they are powerful. Notwithstanding what has been printed in gazettes and newspapers, we have never seen small bodies, unsupported, successfully op- posed to large ; nor has the experience of any officer realized the stories, which all have read, of whole armies being driven by a handful of light infantry or dragoons.

BRITISH TROOPS.

have long been of opinion that a British army could bear neither success nor failure; and I have had manifest proofs of the truth of this opinion in the first of its branches, in the recent conduct of the soldiers of this army. They have plundered the country most terribly ; which has given me the greatest concern. • • •

We are an excellent army on parade, an excellent one to fight; but we are worse than an enemy in a country ; and, take my word for it, that either de-

feat or success would dissolve us. * * I certainly think the army are improved. They are a better army than they were some months ago. But still, these terrible continued outrages give me reason to apprehend that, notwithstanding all the precautions I have taken and shall take, they will slip through my fingers, as they did through Sir John Moore's, when I shall be involved in any nice operation with a powerful enemy in my front. • •

BRITISH DISOBEDIENCE.

The fact is, that if discipline means habits of obedience to orders as well as military, instruction, we have but little of it in the army. Nobody ever thinks of obeying an order and all the regulations of the Horse Guards, as well as of the War Office, and all the orders of the army applicable to this peculiar ser- vice, are so much waste paper. It is, however, an unrivalled army for fighting, if the soldiers CAD only be kept in their ranks during the battle; but it wants some of those qualities which are indispensable to enable a general to bring them into the field in the order in which an army ought to be to meet an enemy, or to take all the ad- vantage to be derived from a victory ; and the cause of these defects is the want of habits of obedience and attention to orders by the inferior officers, and indeed I might add by all. They never attend to an order with an intention to obey it, or sufficiently to understand it be it ever so clear, and therefore never obey it when obedience becomes troublesome or difficult or important.

HEROES OF VITTORIA.

We started with the army in the highest order ; and up to the day of the battle, nothing could get on better ; but that event has, as usual, totally an- nihilated all order and discipline. The soldiers of the army have got am them about a million sterling in money, with the exception of about 100, dollars which were got for the military chest. The night of the battle, instead of being passed in getting rest and food to prepare them for the pursuit of the following day, was passed by the soldiers in looking for plunder. The conse• quence was, that they were incapable of marching in pursuit of the enemy, and were totally knocked up. The rain came on and increased their fatigue ; and I am quite convinced that we have now out of the ranks double the amount of our loss in the battle, and that we have lost more men in the pursuit than the enemy have, and have never in any one day made more than an or- dinary march. This is the consequence of the state of discipline of the British army. We may gain the greatest victories, but we shall do no good until we shall so far alter our system as to force all ranks to perform their duty.

There are innumerable other passages of raciness and power tempting us, but we can only afford space for two. We cannot leave out the Prince of Denmark in the play of Hamlet, however common ; and all who read any thing like to know how it was written.

WELLINGTON ON WATERLOO.

To Marshal Lord Bere#brd, G.C.B. Gonesse, 2,1 July 1815.

You will have heard of our battle of the 18th. Never did I see such a pounding-match. Both were what the boxers call "gluttons." Napoleon did not manceuvre at all : he just moved forward in the old style, in columns, and was driven off in the old style. The only difference was, that he mixed cavalry with his infantry, and supported both with an enormous quantity of artillery.

I had the infantry for some time in squares, and we had the French cavalry walking about us as if they had been our own. I never saw the British in- fantry behave so well.

HOW III WROTE HIS DESPATCHES.

To the Right Honourable John Villiers.

Coimbra, 2d May 1809.

I am obliged to you for your offer to procure me assistance to copy my de- spatehee ; but I have plenty of that description. The fact is, that excepting upon very important occasions, I write my despatches without making a draft ; and those which I sent to you were so written before I set out in the morning, and I had not time to get them copied before they were sent, which is the ma- nn why I asked you to return me copies of them.

We have confined ourselves to the more available, not to the more valuable passages ; for the purely military criticisms,

III

as well as many points in the economy of the army, are too long, and in some sense too professional, for the columns of a newspaper. A similar remark applies to the historical pas- sages, with the addition that they are scattered, and involved so as not to admit of a coherent presentment. The historical passages, however, are those which exhibit the intellectual sagacity and acumen of WELLINGTON in the highest point of view, as well as his mental independence. Whilst the world was distracted with the dread of a universal empire, he alone saw clearly that the "system" of NAPOLEON "could not last " ; that the exactions of his civil government must drive all people to resistance, and the exhaustive process of making war maintain itself would at length prevent war from being carried on : and this view was not the basis of his strategy, but the fundamental principle of his whole conduct. He did not expect that the British would be able to drive the French out of Spain, still less that the Spaniards could accomplish that object : he recommended the continuance of the occupation of Portugal, to serve as an encouragement for Spanish resistance, a germ for Continental war, and a diversion to prevent the invasion of Great Britain. With such objects in such a crisis, expense, he said, should not be considered ; but really the expense was little, since the troops could not be disbanded, and they cost little more abroad than at home. With the small force at my dis- posal, he argued, I can hold Portugal wholly or in part, compelling the enemy to continue their large armies in Spain : if driven to fight a battle and I am beaten, I can bring off the troops ; if any overwhelming force should be sent against me, I can still bring off the troops. But I do not anticipate this at present, from the enemy's want of means. The time is coming, it is all but come, when the large French armies necessary to occupy Spain as long as I am here, will be unable to subsist themselves from the country, and must draw their support from France ; and something similar may hap- pen elsewhere. France, ruined by the Revolution, cannot bear the cost of even partially maintaining foreign wars ; internal disaffec- tion will break out, of which all the enemies of BONAPARTE may take advantage ; and as long as I remain here, Portugal independ- ent and Spain unsubdued will be ready to rise as the foremost assailants. In the interim, I shall go on according to my means, risking nothing save the inevitable risk in fighting a battle, if I see one can be fought with good hopes of success ; but biding the time to take advantage of the enemy's distress, or of any foreign re- verses : which last came sooner than he expected.

To this broad principle of action, rooted in the nature of things, military strategy is an inferior matter ; but even in his strategy there was something broad, general, and far-reaching. He aimed at an ulterior result in what he calls "a military operation "; and a plate was taken or a battle fought not as a thing important per se, but as the means of removing an obstacle to a line of action. From the entire work, we have no doubt that if war were among the lost arts, a military man might deduce a practical guide to war; and we, albeit not military, can draw three general conclusions.

1. NAPOLEON'S dictum, that "the moral is to the physical force as three to one even in war," is a truth of universal application.

2. That no country, except a small level one, can be permanently subdued if the people are hostile, and determined to take the risks of resistance, (which, however, a rich people probably will not do) : an army sufficiently large will ruin the finances of the conqueror if he pays it, or be left at last without the means of support if the support is drawn from the country itself.

3. That money is of a truth "the sinews of war." It was the want of money, and the consequent necessity for exaction and plunder, which prevented the conquest of the Peninsula : it was not the arms of his enemies or the snows of Russia which occasioned NAPOLEON'S reverses, but the impossibility of feeding his troops from the country he invaded, and the equal impossibility of finding the means to feed them from his own magazines.