1 MARCH 1879, Page 11

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

BRITISH AND NATIVE TROOPS IN INDIA.

[TO THE EDITOR OF THB " SPECTATOR:1

18 to be hoped that your remarks in last week's issue on the two " leaders " which the Times put out on the Standing Army of India, may induce caution on the part of the Govern- ment in making changes in the Native Army of India, as re- gards either organisation or diminution of that body of soldiers. There is one part of the two " leaders " of the Times which deserves serious attention. With a view to enhance the import- ance of the plea for a diminution of Indian military expenditure, the Times enhances the strength of the Native Army, and thus strengthens the suggestion for a reduction in numbers and cost. In the " leader " of Monday, February 17th, you will find it stated, " India has been burdened hitherto with the maintenance of an enormous standing army Sixty thousand English troops and a hundred and eighty thousand native troops have been the numbers with which we have held the country." And the " leader " of Thursday, February 20th, states that "there are maintained at the present moment more than half-a-million of troops,-240,000 under the British flag, and 300,000 under Native rulers."

The exaggeration in respect to the troops under the British flag is in the strength of the Native Army. The Europeaa force is correctly stated at 60,000 non-commissioned rank and file, which is within a few of the number at p. 7 of the "Army Estimates" for 1879-80; but the Native Army of India, ex- clusive of the late increase of 15,000, instead of being 180,000 strong, is only 120,672 non-commissioned rank and. file, of all arms, artillery, sappers, cavalry, and infantry, making a total of European and Native troops under the British flag of wily about 180,000, instead of 240,000, as stated.

Then with regard to the 300,000 Native troops, stated to be under Native rulers, I advise great caution in accepting that strength of fighting-men. For instance, the Hyderabad Army, of nearly 50,000, is, I am confident, an exaggerated statement. No doubt Sir Saliu. Jung did. return that number, but he in- cluded in the statement every man who could be designated by the enemies of the Nizam as people employed as soldiers. I verily believe the battalion of women, who take the internal duties of the Palace at Hyderabad, to be included in the 50,000.

I admit that the maintenance by Native rulers of vast numbers, under the designation of "soldiers," to be open to great objection. It would be good policy to require the rulers of Hyderabad, Gwalior, and Indore to diminish the numbers now classed as fighting-men. Indeed, it may be equit- able to revise the money contributions and increase the amounts now paid by Native States for the maintenance of troops raised by the British Government. These troops are included amongst the 120,000 native soldiers above spoken of. It is almost impo ssible to state the numbers in that strength now paid for by subsidies of Native States. The whole of the funds so obtained, amounting to 2694,934 in 1877, are wholly included in Indian accounts as Civil receipts, instead of being mainly con- tributions for maintaining troops under the British flag ; but these payments do not show the whole of the troops for which these moneys are paid. The contributions from Bhopal, from Dewas, Jowrah, Oodepore, Jodhpoor, Kotah, Dhar, Jabooah, Bnrwanee, Alirajpoor, Amjeerah, Travancore, Mysore, Cochin, Kutch, Mahratta Jagirdars, are stated to be payments for troops classed under the British flag. The Nizam's contribution is not mentioned. But it must be remembered that the revenues of the Ceded Districts of the Madras Presidency, probably about 2500,000 per annum, are assigned by the Nizam in payment of the strong division of British troops stationed around the Nizam's capital. That amount is now exhibited as a purely Civil receipt, without any liability for the cost of troops. Then the revenues of the Berars pledged to the British Government are more than sufficient to pay, not only all the civil, but the military charges of the Nizam's Contingent.

No doubt considerable sums may be traceable as payments on account of Native troops under the British flag. The error is in not showing these amounts as receipts on account of the Native Army of India, in diminution of the military charges. The Civilians control the accounts of India, and are rigorous in debiting every possible charge to military expenditure, but very careful in not crediting the Army outlay with these subsidies, which would largely diminish the gross military charges. The 'military expenditure of India is enormous. It is no exaggera- tion to state that the whole of the net revenues, that is, the sum annually available after deducting charges in collecting and managing the revenue, cannot be above £38,000,000; and the net military expenditure, after deducting purely military receipts, may amount to more than 217,000,000, including costly mili- tary works and expensive transports. But before we change the present strength and organisation of the Native Army, it would be wise to look at our costly European force. Your able article points to one great cause of expense,—the immense body of European officers. There are 2,644 British officers, for about 52,000 privates which form the 60,000 European force, including non-commissioned officers, corporals, and drummers. In addition to the troop-officers, there are numbers of medical officers, staff and regimental, Generals and their staffs, paymasters, and others, whose numbers have never been calculated out, and whose money receipts are unknown. In all these, great reductions in numbers and cost can easily be effected. The regimental organi- sation is open to the grave accusation of being extravagantly costly. For instance, the infantry force could be supplied by 40 good regiments, instead of 50, as at present. These 40 may be so organised as to comprise the same number of privates as at present in the 50, and have additional ranks, so as to add to the efficiency of companies and battalions. The 9 cavalry regiments, consolidated into 5, might also be so improved in organisation as to be more efficient than the 9 regiments, and still retain the present number of privates. The garrison batteries, now 28 in number, may be formed into 14, and the 15 horse artillery and 43 field batteries formed into 45 batteries, of 8 guns each, with- out decreasing a gun. The efficiency of these several units, battalions, regiments, and batteries, may also be added to by having sufficient subalterns appointed. This will nullify the claim, so often made by the Horse Guards, for more officers of this grade. This demand is, no doubt, put forward with some plausibility, because the Horse Guards fritter away the present establishment of subalterns, by distributing them, for example, amongst 400 companies of infantry and 54 troops of cavalry, instead of amongst 320 companies and 40 troops, into which the present infantry and cavalry strengths could be formed.

Another great abuse is to be found in the Home charges. The Estimate for that outlay in 1879-80 amounts to the large sum of 21,100,000 by the War Office, in addition to the India Office charges of four millions. One-half of the War Office sum may be allowable, being for retired pay, and pensions of officers and soldiers who have served in India ; but in every one of the other items, comprising 2590,000, there are openings for reduc- tion. The first consideration is, how to bring down the military expenditure ? As the Times proposes, by cutting down the Native Infantry, now numbering about 99,000 non-commissioned rank and file, in addition to the 15,000 lately ordered to be raised; or by cutting down the extravagant outlay. I advocate the latter, It is quite practicable now. If we must maintain Native troops. are there any, and what, improvements needed ?

Unfortunately, the disputes and wrangling between the advo- cates of the former formation of Native infantry, with an estab- lishment of twenty-seven European officers to each regiment; and the advocates, or rather, the advisers of the new formation of five doing-duty officers to each regiment, have hitherto pre- vented those alterations in the organisation of 1861 which experience in the present and former operations has shown to be absolutely requisite. No doubt, Lord Napier of Magdala has urged the appointment of seven European officers to each regiment ; but effective measures to supply that number have not yet been resorted to, far less have arrangements been made to keep up such a reserve as will effectually maintain the seven officers.

Many experienced officers doubt the soundness of Lord Napier's advice as to the sufficiency of seven officers. He, how- ever, pleads that the Native officers are aids in leading on the Sepoys. Some may be so relied on, but they are very few in number. In time it may be fully expected that experience will show, as in the past, that the leading of European officers is the main consideration to secure efficient Native Infantry—I