Defence and deterrence
Sir: Your 'Senior Officer's' article on the subject of Defence and Deterrence presents an admirable picture of the military mind at work. It is all good Staff College stuff with the inbred suspicion of politicians clearly in evidence: and it is undoubtedly an accurate description of the military logistics of the European situation.
What is of fundamental importance, and what is not so accurately described, is the probable nature of any attack and its objective. While it is extremely rash to set too much store by the spirit of détente it is equally unrealistic to assume that the Soviet Union has in mind an all-out invasion of Western Europe. If this occurred, and even if it were successful, it would place the military resources of the Soviet Union under an immense strain which could not be maintained for a long period. The Chinese in the East and the Central European powers would take advantage of this commitment.
The objective of such an operation would be the subjugation of the Western democracies to Communism and this would not be achieved by such methods. The way to achieve that objective is to undermine the authority of the governments concerned through subversion, propaganda, and infiltration. Once this has been achieved the military forces move into establish order: but not before.
The defence and deterrence required to counter these tactics is to suppress the activities of the subversive elements, to strengthen the hand of the politicians and to stabilise the morale of the civilian population. The Northern Ireland operation has demonstrated the nature of this requirement and has exposed the weaknesses of our present methods of dealing with them.
Defence is an instrument of political policy. It is not a policy in its own right except under Napoleonic or Hitlerite control when it becomes offence. Political policy unsupported by the sanction of military strength cannot prevail when it is confronted by the techniques of Communism. What is evident from reading this important and informed 'article is that the co-ordination of the political and military minds is weak and that consequently the objective is blurred and the methods of achieving it are confused. The exact reverse is true of the Communist position. As the French did over the 'Maginot' line we are tending to apply old-style defence to deal with newstyle attack. It is not so much a massive study of defence commitments that is required as a massive re-think of defence methods.
Ian Harvey 28a Star Street, London W2.
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