POLITICS

Why Britain should beware of

being under the influence

BRUCE ANDERSON

His health failing, Helmut Kohl is said to be sunk in elephantine gloom as the Ger- man prosecutors dismember his financial dealings. But the former Chancellor should derive some consolation from recent devel- opments. His reputation may be moulder- ing, but his ideas go marching on. President Chirac may claim to have doubts about fed- eralism, while the entire French official class is alarmed at any hint of German self-asser- tion. But events have their own momentum, irrespective of politicians' will. It was Chan- cellor Kohl who shaped the events which are now shaping Europe. For obvious reasons, Jacques Chirac was unable to express him- self in such terms, but his speech in the Reichstag was an endorsement of Chancel- lor Kohl's European ambitions.

As such, it has caused anxiety in the For- eign Office and in No. 10, and dismay among British Europhiles. The federasts and the Foreign Office share the same nightmare: that France and Germany will override British objections and create a European vanguard. This would leave us marginalised, condemned to membership of a European second division and — ultimate horror — to loss of influence.

In one respect, they are correct. It was inevitable that Britain's refusal to join the euro would change our relationship with Europe; it was equally inevitable that the euro would change Europe's relationship with itself. Herr Kohl knew exactly what he was doing by pushing for the euro: where monetary integration leads, political inte- gration is bound to follow. Even if there is still a democratic deficit, and however much goodwill some of them may feel towards non-euro countries, the governments of euroland are bound to be brought into an ever-closer collaboration. So countries which are not part of that process are bound to lose influence.

But influence can be bought at too high a price. When they talk about influence, our Europhiles are either failing to think clearly or — as usual — indulging in intellectual dishonesty. They talk as if this 'influence' would be a matter of horse-trading by sovereign governments, but that would only be true for an interim phase. Long years ago, when I first visited Brussels on journalistic business, I had a cross-purpose conversation with a senior Eurocrat. He referred to `juste retour'; I thought that this was a good idea which he was endorsing. But clarification came rapidly. 'Juste retour' was a term of opprobrium, used by Brussels to describe the Anglo-Saxons' obsession with their own petty concerns when we should have been happy to help build a united Europe by con- tributing to the acquis communautaire.

Exactly the same would happen over influence. If we joined the euro, there would be a rapid process of evolution, after which our government — or what was left of it — would no longer be exercising British influence vis-a-vis Europe, but British influence within an increasingly uni- ted Europe. That prospect should hold no fears for those whose political identity is European rather than British, who would be happy to see the Westminster Parliament become a glorified county council and who look forward to the day when the British people, on their own, will no longer be able to sack their government. Those who do not share those goals should not be deceived by talk of influence. This is not an argument about balance-sheets of influence, but about dreams, visions and national identity.

The Europhiles are not only being disin- genuous when they talk about influence.

They are also exaggerating, for there are limits to the potential loss of influence. Britain will remain a big economy and part of the single market. While warning of the risks of losing influence, Douglas Hurd tells us that we need have no anxieties about Europe; the crucial economic arguments are going our way. But if that is true which is debatable — why should we worry about influence?

We will also continue to be a significant military power. The Europeans may dream of a common defence and foreign policy underpinned by a European army, but that could never work without British participa- tion. For the foreseeable future, we will make a disproportionate contribution to Europe's defence capability. The rest could do little without access to our men and their kit.

There could be quarrels with euroland, especially over tax. Brussels is prepared to overlook the competitive advantages which Ireland gains from its corporate tax regime because Ireland is so small. But Britain's tax advantages are already causing unrest on the Continent, and that is bound to grow. But as long as the British government cares more about the national interest than about influence in Europe, there is nothing that Brussels can do to force us to alter our tax rates. So let the Europhiles put the argu- ment honestly to the British people. Would you rather have the power to be out-voted over Europe's fiscal policies or the power to control your own?

In their attempt to portray themselves as the party of the future, the Europhiles also cite globalisation. In an increasingly global economy, they argue, the British nation state is an irrelevance; only Europe can pro- tect us. But our prosperity does not depend on Euro-protection. It will be determined by our ability to produce goods and services that people want to buy at a price which they are willing to pay. The principal contri- butions which Europe could make to that process are negative ones, by forcing us to adopt their labour-market regulations and tax policies.

There is also a strong case to be made that globalisation makes the nation state more necessary, not less so. It is true that the nation state cannot insulate its citizens from the rigours of global competition; nor could a European super-state. But people need a haven. The more global the world economy becomes, the greater will be the need for a separate political identity. It is nothing new for Britain to compete in the world market; for centuries, we have made our living on the high seas. But that has never affected the need for a home base, for a political identity based on our ability to make our own laws and protect our own liberties. Nor will globalisation.

The European idea was a typical Enlight- enment project, a blueprint drawn up by intellectuals impatient of the restraints of human nature or national histories ( it is easy to understand why Continental Euro- peans should wish to cut adrift from their history). Especially in Britain, these Euro- fanatics also resemble an earlier group of Enlightenment projectors, the Bolsheviks. They, too, believed that they had the sole key to the future and that as they were acting in the interests of humanity, there was no need to consult human beings: any temporary sus- pension of democracy would be more than justified by the glorious socialist future.

Our Euro-Bolsheviks cannot be accused of suspending democracy; they merely do everything possible to avoid democratic debate. 'Influence' is their latest ploy in that exercise. Like all their previous ones, it is a canard.